Intel Corporation

Other

Qin Long

Vincent J Zimmer

Jiewen Yao

Liang Cui

Ting Ye

Mohan J Kumar

Mahesh S Natu

Ned M Smith

Michael A Rothman

Willard M Wiseman

Nicholas J Adams

Hua Fang

Shihui Li

Liming Gao

Junjing Shi

Jiong Gong

Sean Shang

Ruiyu Ni

A disclosed example to protect memory from buffer overflow or underflow includes defining an implicit bound pointer based on an implicit bound pointer definition in a configuration file for a memory region; instrumenting object code with an implicit buffer bound check based on the implicit bound pointer; and generating hardened executable object code based on the object code, the implicit buffer bound check, and the implicit bound pointer, the implicit bound pointer located in the hardened executable object code during a compilation phase to facilitate loading the implicit bound pointer in a global bounds table during runtime for access by the implicit buffer bound check.

Methods and apparatus to protect memory from buffer overflow and/or underflow

Described herein is technology for restoring access to a user account. In particular, systems and methods for account recovery using a platform attestation credential are described. In some embodiments, the platform attestation credential is generated by an authentication device in a pre boot environment. A first copy of the platform attestation credential may be bound by an account management system to a user account. Access to the user account may subsequently be restored using a second copy of the platform attestation credential.

Systems and methods for account recovery using a platform attestation credential

An embodiment includes an apparatus comprising: an out-of-band cryptoprocessor including secure non-volatile storage that couples to a root index, having a fixed address, and comprises first and second variables referenced by the root index; and semiconductor integrated code (SIC) including embedded processor logic to initialize a processor and embedded memory logic to initialize a memory coupled to the processor; wherein (a) the SIC is to be executed responsive to resetting the processor and prior to providing control to boot code, and (b) the SIC is to perform pre-boot operations in response to accessing at least one of the first and second variables. Other embodiments are described herein.

Trusted boot and runtime operation

Technologies are provided in example embodiments for determining that a module is to be loaded, the module being associated with module code, determining that the module is a frozen module, the frozen module being associated with frozen module code, determining that a module fingerprint of the module fails to correspond with a frozen module fingerprint of the frozen module, and causing loading of the frozen module code instead of the module code.

Method, apparatus, system, and machine readable storage medium for providing software security

In some embodiments, the invention involves using a policy engine during boot, in the driver execution environment (DXE) phases to authenticate that drivers and executable images to be loaded are authenticated. Images to be authenticated include the operating system (OS) loader. The policy engine utilizes a certificate database to hold valid certificates for third party images, according to platform policy. Images that are not authenticated are not loaded at boot time. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

System and method to secure boot both UEFI and legacy option ROM's with common policy engine

In one embodiment, the present invention includes a method for setting an extensible policy mechanism to protect a root data structure including a page table, interpreting a bytecode of a pre-boot driver in a byte code interpreter, and controlling access to a memory location based on the extensible policy mechanism. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Enabling byte-code based image isolation

Methods and systems to perform an authentication operation after resuming from a sleep state are presented. In one embodiment, a method includes starting a boot process from a sleep state. The method further includes providing platform services to support an authentication operation as part of the boot process and determining whether to complete the boot process based at least on results of the authentication operation.

Authentication for resume boot path

In some embodiments, a processor-based system may include at least one processor, at least one memory coupled to the at least one processor, a boot block stored at a first memory location, a capsule update stored at a second memory location, a startup authenticated code module to ensure the integrity of the boot block upon a restart of the processor-based system, code which is executable by the processor-based system to cause the processor-based system to validate the boot block with the startup authenticated code module upon the restart of the processor-based system, and, if the boot block is successfully validated, to validate the capsule update for the processor-based system with the startup authenticated code module. Other embodiments are disclosed and claimed.

Apparatus and method for secure boot environment

In one embodiment, the present invention includes a method for determining if an isolation driver is present and a processor supports virtualization, launching the isolation driver in a first privilege level different than a system privilege level and user privilege level, creating a 1:1 virtual mapping between a virtual address and a physical address, using the isolation driver, and controlling access to a memory page using the isolation driver. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Method for isolating third party pre-boot firmware from trusted pre-boot firmware

A data processing system supports a virtualization enabled (VE) operating mode. An operating system (OS) is launched during a boot process. However, a trap agent is launched before the OS is launched. The trap agent may intercept an attempt to transition the data processing system to virtual machine (VM) operating mode. In response to intercepting the attempt to transition the data processing system to VM operating mode, the trap agent may automatically determine whether the program that requested the transition is an authorized program. If the program is not authorized, the trap agent may prevent the program from transitioning the data processing system to VM operating mode. In one embodiment, the trap agent is launched before the data processing system selects a boot device. In another embodiment, the trap agent is launched before executing any code from any third-party option ROMs. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Growing community of inventors

Shanghai, China

Qin Long