Salesforce.com, Inc.

Salesforce, Inc.

Bea Systems, Inc.

Oracle International Corporation

Prasad Peddada

Taher Elgamal

Dileep Burki

Theresa Vietvu

David Brooks

Ryan Guest

Kenneth Douglas Scott

Nathan Jensen-Horne

Matthew Small

Gaurav Chawla

Hemang Patel

Walter Sims Harley

Shriman Gurram

Sriram Shankarlal

Dean Bernard Jacobs

Eric M Halpern

Naresh Revanuru

Adam Messinger

Giridharan Sridharan

Jeremy Horwitz

Aaron Johnson

Vijayanth Devadhar

Ashwini Bijwe

Olumayokun Obembe

Sam Pullara

Jason Woods

Gregory Lapouchnian

Nirav K Butala

Jonathan Brossard

Travis Emmert

Karthikeyan Govindarajan

Mukul Raj Kumar

Steven Tamm

Joseph Salowey

Andrew C Smith

Anno Langen

Brian Toal

Matthew Shinn

Anders Lars-Goran Forsberg

Gursev Singh Kalra

Matthew Steele

Yujia Hu

Logan Henriquez

Vishal Agarwal

Matthew Schechtman

Glenn Martin Brunette, Jr

A cloud infrastructure is configured and deployed for managing services executed on a cloud platform. The cloud infrastructure includes a control datacenter configured to communicate with one or more service datacenters. The service datacenter deploys one or more application programming interfaces (API's) associated with a service. The service datacenter also deploys an administration agent. The control datacenter hosts an engine that receives requests from users to perform administration operations by invoking the administration API's. In this manner, the control datacenter functions as a centralized control mechanism that effectively distributes administration operation requests as they are received from users to service datacenters that can service the requests. The cloud infrastructure provides an auditable, compliant and secure management system for administering services for distributed systems running in the cloud.

Administration of services executing in cloud platform based datacenters for web-based applications

Methods, systems, and devices supporting data processing are described. In some systems, a first service executing on a datacenter may receive a request to establish a secure connection and a certificate from a second service. The datacenter may be provisioned with an indication of certificates that have been revoked by a certificate authority (CA). The first service may validate a certificate chain for the certificate from the second service based on the certificates that have been revoked by the CA. If a certificate of the certificate chain has been revoked, the first service may not establish the connection with the second service. If the certificates of the certificate chain have not been revoked, the first service may establish a secure connection with the second service. The services may communicate in accordance with validating the certificate chain.

Certificate revocation at datacenters

Methods, systems, apparatuses, devices, and computer program products are described. A virtual machine may receive, from an application associated with a tenant, a request to perform a cryptographic operation for the application at the virtual machine. Based on receiving the request, the virtual machine may determine that the tenant is limited to using a designated set of cryptographic operations in accordance with a cryptographic operation validation policy associated with the tenant. In some examples, the virtual machine may identify a designated version of the cryptographic operation, from the designated set of cryptographic operations, that corresponds to the cryptographic operation indicated by the request in satisfaction of the cryptographic operation validation policy. The virtual machine may execute the designated version of the cryptographic operation and return a result of the execution to the application.

Multi-tenant cryptography implementation compliance

Administration of services executing in cloud platform based datacenters using token with data structure

A client application and a local security controller (LSC) executing on a host computing device use a Multiparty Computation (MPC) cryptographic key generation technique to create two fragments of a split private key, which are held by the client application and LSC, respectively. The client application generates a certificate signing request (CSR). The client application and LSC sign the CSR with the split private key using an MPC technique. The LSC then signs a token from the client application to indicate that the private key corresponding to the CSR is MPC-backed. A package with the CSR and the first and second signatures is then sent to a remote device acting as a certificate authority. The remote device verifies the two signatures and issues a certificate to the client application. The second signature is verified using information sent to the remote device from the LSC during a registration process.

Protecting application private keys with remote and local security controllers and local MPC key generation

Techniques are disclosed relating to the protection of secrets within a software development lifecycle. Developers can use an encryption service to encrypt a secret to be used by an application within a package. The secret can be associated with the application, and then encrypted and included in a package that is signed and passed through a software automation pipeline to a data center that hosts the production server for the application. The application executing on the production server can request that the secret be decrypted by a decryption service after package verification. A developer can also specify, in a manifest file, a set of secrets needed for applications executing in the same data center. The manifest file may be passed from the software development environment to the data center, where the specified secrets are created and used by the applications without ever residing or being accessible outside the data center.

Secret protection during software development life cycle

Administration of services executing in cloud platform based datacenters

Multiple systems, methods, and computer program product embodiments for password-less authentication using key agreement and multi-party computation (MPC). In one or more embodiments, following an authentication request received by a host computing device, the host computing device and a user computing device generate a shared key using a key agreement algorithm. Then, the host computing device generates a challenge that is encrypted using the shared key and transmitted to the user computing device. The user computing device decrypts the challenge after regenerating the shared key and sends the decrypted result to the host computing device as the challenge response. The authentication request is granted by the host computing device if the challenge and the challenge response match. New keys and a new challenge are generated for each authentication request. This process relies on public key cryptography eliminating the needs for passwords.

Password-less authentication using key agreement and multi-party computation (MPC)

Methods and systems for securing customer data in a multi-tenant database environment are described. A security module running on a database server may generate a private key-public key pair in response to receiving a request to store client data in a database. The security module may then transmit a request to derive a symmetric key to a key server, the request including the generated public key. The key server may derive a symmetric key, using key agreement and a key derivation function, based on the received public key and a private key managed by the key server. The security module may then receive the symmetric key from the key server and encrypt the client data. To facilitate decryption, the public key used to generate the symmetric key and an identifier for the private key managed by the key server may be stored in metadata associated with the client data.

Tenant-based database encryption

A client may transmit an authentication request to a server. The server may initiate a key agreement process using a short-lived private key generated at the server and a public key of the device, generate a shared secret, and derive a symmetric key. The symmetric key may be used to encrypt a random challenge. Further, the server initiates a key agreement process for the client using the partial private key that was generated for the client and the short-lived public key generated at the server. A partial key agreement result and the encrypted random challenge may be transmitted to the client. The client may complete the key agreement process using the partial key agreement result and a respective portion of the private key. The client may derive the encryption key and decrypt the random challenge. An indication of the random challenge may be transmitted to the server, which authenticates the client.

Authentication using key agreement

Techniques are disclosed relating to user authentication using multi-party computation and public key cryptography. In some embodiments, a server may receive, from a client, a request to authenticate a user to a service. The server may access key-pair information that includes, for a server key-pair, a first component of a server private key and, for a client key-pair, a client public key and a first component of a client private key. The server may generate a partial signature value that is based on the first component, but not the entirety, of the server private key. The server may send, to the client, an authentication challenge that includes challenge information and the partial signature value. The server may then determine whether to authenticate the user based on an authentication response from the client.

User authentication using multi-party computation and public key cryptography

Methods and systems for securing customer data in a multi-tenant database environment are described. A key identifier received from a security server may be stored by an application server. The key identifier may be associated with a private key that is accessible by the security server and not accessible by the application server. A request to derive a symmetric key may be transmitted from the application server to the security server, the request including a public key generated by the application server, a salt value, and the key identifier. The symmetric key may then be derived based on the transmitted public key and the private key using a key derivation function. The application server may then receive and store the symmetric key in an in-memory cache, and be used to securely encrypt data received by the application server from client devices.

Securing data using key agreement

Within one or more instances of a computing environment where an instance is a self-contained architecture to provide at least one database with corresponding search and file system. User information from the one or more instances of the computing environment is organized as zones. A zone is based on one or more characteristics of corresponding user information that are different than the instance to which the user information belongs. User information is selectively obfuscated prior to transmitting blocks of data including the obfuscated user information. The selective obfuscation is based on zone information for one or more zones to which the user information belongs.

Techniques and architectures for selective obfuscation of personally identifiable information (PII) in environments capable of replicating data

A service may leverage a mutual transport layer security (mTLS) service to authenticate a client that is configured with a client certificate chain. The client may request access to the service, and the service may transmit a redirection response to the client. The redirection response may indicate an endpoint for the mTLS service that is associated with the tenant. In response to receiving the redirection response, the client may perform a digital handshake with the mTLS service, and the mTLS service may validate the client digital certificate and digitally sign the client digital certificate. The mTLS may transmit a redirection response, which redirects the client to the service where the client presents an indication of the digitally signed digital certificate chain. The service may validate the chain of trust associated with the digitally signed digital certificate chain and issue an indication that the client is authenticated to access the service.

Tenant aware mutual TLS authentication

Growing community of inventors

Alameda, CA, United States of America

Prasad Peddada