Honeywell International Inc.

Ping Ye

Xiao Cao Cao

Brian W Schipper

Guoqing Wang

In some examples, a system includes a transceiver configured to receive surveillance messages from Y target vehicles, where Y is an integer greater than two. The system includes processing circuitry configured to determine predicted positions of the Y target vehicles based on the surveillance messages. The processing circuitry is also configured to determine reported positions of the Y target vehicles based on later received surveillance messages. The processing circuitry is further configured to determine that respective differences between the respective predicted position and the respective reported position for X of the Y target vehicles is greater than a threshold distance. The processing circuitry is configured to determine that Global Navigation Satellite System interference has occurred in response to determining that X divided by Y is greater than a threshold level.

Detection of GNSS interference using surveillance messages

Techniques for detecting and excluding spoofed Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) signals are described. Using position data acquired from inertial sensors, a line of sight (LOS) estimation can be determined to various satellites. This data can be compared with range data provided by a GNSS receiver, for example, by subtracting the LOS estimations with corresponding GNSS ranges. The difference can then be compared to an appropriate threshold to determine whether GNSS spoofing is present. Additionally, the non-spoofed GNSS signals can be used to generate an updated position solution, which is verified by an integrity algorithm. If verified, the updated position solution can be used to calculate the position of the vehicle. However, if not verified, the disclosed techniques can adjust the thresholds used to determine GNSS spoofing and perform additional iterations of integrity monitoring to acquire a verified positioning solution.

Systems and methods for inertial measurement unit aided detection and exclusion against spoofing attacks

A method and apparatus are provided for performing consistency testing for a Bose-Chaudhuri-Hocquenghem (BCH) error corrected first sub-frame of navigation message broadcast from a satellite of a GNSS. Consistency testing is performed by comparing BCH encoded portion(s)s of data symbols with elements of look up table(s) to see if such portions are similar to element(s) of the look up table(s).

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Shanghai, China

Ping Ye