Nxp B.v.

Pieter Janssens

Bruce Murray

Marc Vauclair

Hans De Jong

Christian Schwar

Abu Ismail

Articles and methods for transaction irregularity detection are disclosed. In one example, the article discloses: a memory including a record of a last-reported security-device transaction with the security-device, and including a last-reported transaction counter value associated with the last-reported security-device transaction; a previous device identifier; a record of the previous security-device transaction with the security-device, and including the previous device identifier associated with the previous security-device transaction; a record of a current security-device transaction with the security-device, and including a currently-reported transaction counter value associated with the current security-device transaction; and a back-end device tagging the previous device with fraud if the current transaction counter value differs from the last-reported transaction counter value by other than an increment. In one example, the method discloses: a transaction irregularity detection process based on the article.

Article and method for transaction irregularity detection

The disclosure relates to dynamic secure messaging using near-field communication. Example embodiments include a near field communication target device () configured to respond to a read request () transmitted by a reader device () by transmitting a message () comprising an unencrypted portion and an encrypted portion, the encrypted portion incorporating a counter that is incremented each time a read request is received.

Dynamic secure messaging

There is described a method of checking whether a transponder device () is in proximity of a reader device (), the method comprising (a) transmitting a first command () from the reader device to the transponder device, (b) in response to receiving the first command at the transponder device, transmitting a first response () to the reader device, the first response including an expected transponder device response time (pubRespTime) which is stored in a memory () of the transponder device, (c) transmitting a second command () from the reader device to the transponder device, (d) in response to receiving the second command at the transponder device, transmitting a second response () to the reader device, (e) at the reader device, determining the transponder device response time as the difference in time between transmitting the second command and receiving the second response from the transponder device, and (f) determining whether the determined transponder device response time matches the expected transponder device response time included in the first response. There is also described a reader device (), a transponder device (), and a contactless communication system ().

Proximity check for communication devices

Device for generating a message authentication code for authenticating a message, wherein the message is divided in blocks (M) with a specified block length, the device comprising a generating unit for generating the message authentication code based on a message by using a block cipher algorithm, and an encrypting unit for performing an exclusive disjunction on the last block with a first key (K, K) and for performing an exclusive disjunction on the first and/or the last block additionally with a second key (K, K) for generating the message authentication code.

Device for generating a message authentication code for authenticating a message

A program is obfuscated by reordering its instructions. Original instruction addresses are mapped to target addresses in an irregular way, with position dependent address steps between the addresses of logically successive instructions. Preferably pseudo-random address steps are used, for example with address steps that have mutually opposite sign with equal frequency. The data processing device has an instruction flow control unit that updates instruction addresses according the position dependent address steps. The instruction flow control unit may comprise a circuit that contains secret information, which is not normally accessible from the outside, to control the updates. A lookup table may be used for example, with address steps, successor addresses or mapped address values. In an embodiment the mapping of original instruction addresses to target addresses may be visualized by means of a path () along points in an n-dimensional array, where n is greater than one. Successive original instruction addresses are mapped to successive locations in the path, and locations along respective rows of the array are mapped to respective mutually disjoint ranges (-). Because an n-dimensional path is used a form of locality is preserved that provides for cache efficiency, whereas the multi-dimensional nature of the path makes it possible to combine this locality with pseudo-random steps.

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Berchem, Belgium

Pieter Janssens