Apple Inc.

Petr Kostka

Jerrold Von Hauck

Steven Porter Hotelling

Gianpaolo Fasoli

Moshe Laifenfeld

Lynn Richard Youngs

Ivan Krstic

Anup K Sharma

Jonathan Pokrass

Roberto G Yepez

Thorsten Gernoth

Feng Tang

Thomas P Mensch

Michael Ross Malone

Lucia Elena Ballard

Matthew C Waldon

Tal Kaitz

Andrei Kolin

Deepti S Prakash

Christopher G Zeleznik

Gideon Littwin

Lucie Kucerova

Eitan Hirsh

Ziv Hendel

Etai Littwin

Yannick L Sierra

Christopher Brooke Sharp

Abhinav Gupta

Wade Benson

Nicholas John Shearer

Anton K Diederich

Matthew C Byington

Charles Edward Gray

Pavan Kumar Anasosalu Vasu

Samuel Gosselin

Gianluca Barbieri

Kumar Saurav

Bruno Kindarji

Kelsey Yukio Ho

Libor Sykora

Ka Yang

David W Silver

Pablo Pons Bordes

Tyler Gentles

Pavan Kumar Ansosalu Vasu

Robert Yepez

Rohit Narula

The present disclosure generally relates to digital identification user interfaces.

User interfaces for digital identification

Techniques are disclosed relating to biometric authentication, e.g., facial recognition. In some embodiments, a device is configured to verify that image data from a camera unit exhibits a pseudo-random sequence of image capture modes and/or a probing pattern of illumination points (e.g., from lasers in a depth capture mode) before authenticating a user based on recognizing a face in the image data. In some embodiments, a secure circuit may control verification of the sequence and/or the probing pattern. In some embodiments, the secure circuit may verify frame numbers, signatures, and/or nonce values for captured image information. In some embodiments, a device may implement one or more lockout procedures in response to biometric authentication failures. The disclosed techniques may reduce or eliminate the effectiveness of spoofing and/or replay attacks, in some embodiments.

Biometric authentication techniques

A device may include a secure processor and a secure memory coupled to the secure processor. The secure memory may be inaccessible to other device systems. The secure processor may store some keys and/or entropy values in the secure memory and other keys and/or entropy values outside the secure memory. The keys and/or entropy values stored outside the secure memory may be encrypted using information stored inside the secure memory.

Cryptographic entropy tree

A content request communication, e.g., generated using a first processor of a device, can be transmitted to a web server. A response communication including content identifying a first value can be received from the web server. The first processor can facilitate presentation of the content on a first display of the device. A communication can be received at a second processor of the device from a remote server. The communication can include data representing a second value and can be generated at the remote server using information received from the web server. Further, the second processor can produce a secure verification output that can be presented on a separate, second display, representing at least the second value. The presentation on first display can at least partially overlap in time with the presentation on the second display.

Data verification via independent processors of a device

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Prague, Czechia

Petr Kostka