International Business Machines Corporation

Globalfoundries Inc.

Peter T Waltenberg

Narayana Aditya Madineni

Simon D McMahon

Michael Wallace Gray

Matthew John Green

Leigh Stuart McLean

Luvita Burgess

Stephen J McKenzie

Alexander John Hennekam

Michael James Thomas

Peter Reginald Horner

Timothy Simon Bartley

Kenneth Stephen

Leigh Mclean

Simon Mcmahon

Transport Layer Security (TLS) connection establishment between a client and a server for a new session is enabled using an ephemeral (temporary) key pair. In response to a request, the server generates a temporary certificate by signing an ephemeral public key using the server's private key. A certificate chain comprising at least the temporary certificate that includes the ephemeral public key, together with a server certificate, is output to the client by the server, which acts as a subordinate Certificate Authority. The client validates the certificates, generates a session key and outputs the session key wrapped by the ephemeral public key. To complete the connection establishment, the server applies the ephemeral private key to recover the session key derived at the client for the new session. The client and server thereafter use the session key to encrypt and decrypt data over the link. The ephemeral key pair is not reused.

Forward secrecy in transport layer security (TLS) using ephemeral keys

A method, a computer program product, and a system for binding post-quantum certificates to traditional certificates. The method includes selecting a traditional certificate in a certificate chain owned by an owner. The method also includes calculating a fingerprint of the traditional certificate. The method further includes generating a post-quantum certificate with identical information fields as the traditional certificate, and populating a serial number of the post-quantum certificate using the fingerprint. The post-quantum certificate acts as an extension of the first traditional certificate providing authentication and validation between a client and a server using post-quantum capable signing algorithms.

Post-quantum certificate binding

Establishing secure communications by sending a server certificate message, the certificate message including a first certificate associated with a first encryption algorithm and a second certificate associated with a second encryption algorithm, the first certificate and second certificate bound to each other, signing a first message associated with client-server communications using a first private key, the first private key associated with the first certificate, signing a second message associated with the client-server communications using a second private key, the second private key associated with the second certificate, the second message including the signed first message, and sending a server certificate verify message, the server certificate verify message comprising the signed first message and the signed second message.

Certificate based security using post quantum cryptography

In an approach for securing data, a processor publishes a traditional public key in a traditional certificate and a PQC public key in a PQC certificate. A processor encrypts data with a hybrid shared secret, the hybrid shared secret generated with a key derivation function by using a traditional shared secret based on the traditional public key and a PQC shared secret based on the PQC public key. A processor decrypts the data with the hybrid shared secret based on a traditional private key and a PQC private key. A processor signs the data with a traditional signature followed by a PQC signature.

Hybrid key derivation to secure data

Extending the useful life of finite lifetime asymmetric cryptographic keys by referencing the number of uses of the keys in conjunction with or instead of the elapsed time since generation of the finite lifetime keys. By integrating asymmetric cryptographic keys into a limited use security scheme, the lifetime of finite lifetime asymmetric cryptographic keys is based on the practical risk of security breach during use rather than an arbitrary duration in which the keys are valid.

Extended-life asymmetric cryptographic key scheme

A method and a system for integrating post quantum cryptographic algorithms into TLS. The method includes transmitting a client hello message to a server including a request for post quantum cryptographic (PQC) mode of operation and a PQC public client key, receiving a server hello message from the server in response to the client hello message including a PQC server key exchange generated from the PQC public client key. The method includes determining the server hello message includes an authorization to operate the PQC mode of operation. The method also includes transmitting a second client hello message to the server including a PQC encrypted client key share. The PQC encrypted client key share is encrypted using a client encryption key. The method includes receiving a second server hello message that includes a PQC encrypted server key share and decrypting the PQC encrypted server key share using a server encryption key.

TLS integration of post quantum cryptographic algorithms

Forward secrecy in Transport Layer Security (TLS) using ephemeral keys

A method, computer system, and a computer program product for secure transport of data is provided. The present invention may include defining a trust relationship based on a secret. The present invention may also include associating a trusted transport key identity (TTKI) based on the defined trust relationship. The present invention may then include receiving a trusted transport key (TTK), wherein the TTK is digitally signed and encrypted with the TTKI. The present invention may further include verifying the digitally signed TTK. The present invention may also include enveloping the secret with the TTK.

Secure data transport using trusted identities

A source code and architecture information for at least one data processing environment in which a first executable program code compiled from the source code is to be configured to be executed can be received. The source code can be compiled to generate the first executable program code. The compiling the source code can include selecting, using a processor, from a plurality of source code transformations, a source code transformation to apply to compile a portion of the source code based on a plurality of sets of benchmark data, each of the sets of benchmark data comprising data indicating an efficiency of a portion of another executable program code compiled using a respective source code transformation at executing in the at least one data processing environment. The compiling the source code also can include compiling the portion of the source code using the selected source code transformation.

Compiling source code using source code transformations selected using benchmark data

Secure password lock and recovery is provided. A user password is received to access a secure resource protected by a data processing system. It is determined whether a match exists between a retrieved user password verification string corresponding to a valid user password from a storage of a software token and a generated user password verification string corresponding to the user password. In response to determining that a match does not exist between the retrieved user password verification string and the generated user password verification string, it is determined whether a defined number of user password authentication attempts has been exceeded. In response to determining that the defined number of user password authentication attempts has been exceeded, the retrieved user password verification string is set to a preestablished sequence of values locking the valid user password on the storage of the software token. Access to the secure resource is denied.

Secure password lock and recovery

A computer program product for secure data storage. The present invention may include completing a registration process by sending, by the client device, a connection request to the server. The present invention may include generating, by the server, an authentication session identification (ID). The present invention may include sending, by the server, a stored salt and the generated authentication session ID to the client device. The present invention may include sending, by the server, the generated authentication session ID, the server encryption key and user data to the third-party device. The present invention may include sending, by the client device, the generated authentication session ID and user data to the third-party device. The present invention may include generating, by the third-party device, a decryption key. The present invention may include determining the user data received by the client device and the decrypted user data received by the server is authenticated.

Secure data storage system

A mobile device operating system pools any available entropy. The resulting entropy pool is stored in device memory. When storing entropy in memory, preferably memory addresses are randomly allocated to prevent an attacker from capturing entropy that might have already been used to create a random number. The stored entropy pool provides a readily-available entropy source for any entropy required by the operating system or device applications. Then, when a cryptographic application requests a true random number, the operating system checks to determine whether the pool has available entropy and, if so, a portion of the entropy is provided to enable generation (e.g., by a TRNG) of a true random number that, in turn, may then be used for some cryptographic operation. After providing the entropy, the operating system clears the address locations that were used to provide it so that another entity cannot re-use the entropy.

Pooling entropy to facilitate mobile device-based true random number generation

A computer implemented method, computer program product, and a data processing system access a version of shared assembly in a componentized environment, wherein multiple versions of the shared assembly exist concurrently in a single process, and wherein each version of the shared assembly comprises an assembly stub and an assembly implementation. A call to an assembly stub of the shared assembly is received. The call is then forwarded from the assembly stub to an identified assembly implementation using a proxy pointer. A function table structure is then retuned from the identified assembly implementation, wherein the function table structure contains implementation symbols from the identified assembly implementation.

Guaranteeing a single copy of a shared assembly per process

In some embodiments, an apparatus can comprise a memory unit including, two or more assemblies, wherein the two or more assemblies include a first assembly and a second assembly, wherein the second assembly is a later version of the first assembly, and wherein the first and second assemblies include, a stub module configured to detect an assembly initialization request indicating one of the first or second assemblies. The stub module can also be configured to retrieve a reference to a symbol table associated with the one of the first and second assemblies indicated in the assembly initialization request, to store data in the symbol table, and to provide the reference to a caller. The memory unit can also comprise an implementation module configured to perform operations associated with symbols in the symbol table and a processor configured to receive and execute one or more of the stub and implementation modules.

Processing symbols associated with shared assemblies

An unattended computer-based machine is authenticated by the present invention method, system or apparatus. The subject machine may be an auto-restarted machine or similar machine configured to be unattended. Upon receipt of initializing input from a user at a subject computer-based machine, a working process authenticates the user and generates resulting credentials. The working process stores the generated credentials in a memory area of the subject machine. Separate from and independent of the working process is a security monitor of the present invention. A monitoring module of the present invention monitors user activity on the subject machine and upon detecting suspect activity destroys the stored credentials of the working process. Suspect activity includes any activity raising a suspicion of compromise.

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Gold Coast, Australia

Peter T Waltenberg