Red Hat, Inc.

Pfizer Corporation

Lord Corporation

Peter M Jones

Nathaniel Philip McCallum

Michael Hingston McLaughlin Bursell

Scot Richard Mente

Mark E Schnute

Li Huang Xing

Neelu Kaila

Liying Zhang

John David Trzupek

Michael L Vazquez

Andrew Christopher Flick

Adam D Jackson

Edouard Zamaratski

Christoph Martin Dehnhardt

Joseph Walter Strohbach

Jotham Wadsworth Coe

Gavin Alistair Whitlock

Rayomand Jal Unwalla

Florian Michel Wakenhut

Goran Mattias Wennerstal

Mark Edward Schnute

David Clive Blakemore

Yogesh Anil Sabnis

Yogesh Sabnis

John David Strunk

Matthew Alexander Perry

Tsutomu Akama

Atli Thorarensen

Robert Toms Jacobs

Christoph Wolfgang Zapf

Yasheen Zhou

James Robert Blinn

David Cameron Pryde

Maureen Emily Duffy

Jacob J Plattner

Marvin Jay Meyers

Thean Yeoh

David Christopher Limburg

Ravi G Kurumbail

David Wayne Cantrell

Jonathan M Owens

Zachary Fuhrer

Christopher Edward Lumens

Brian McGill

Gregg Cune

Thean Yeow Yeoh

Göran Mattias Wennerstål

Martins Sunday Oderinde

Thien Duc Tran

Steven Wade Kortum

Steven Wade Korturn

Rubben Federico Torella

Göran Mattias WENNERSTÅL

James Richard Kiefer

Jacob John Plattner

A method includes configuring one or more permissions for a first page of memory including a first section of a plurality of sections of an executable program code to enable execution of the first section. The method also includes configuring one or more permissions for a second page of the memory including a second section of the executable program code to disable execution of the second section. The method also includes identifying one or more annotations in the executable program code, wherein the one or more annotations indicate one or more allowed transitions and one or more disallowed transitions between the plurality of sections. The method also includes changing, in view of the one or more annotations, the one or more permissions of the second page to enable execution of the second section of the executable program code.

Labeled security for control flow inside executable program code

The technology disclosed herein provides a cryptographic key wrapping system for verifying device capabilities. An example method may include: accessing, by a processing device, a wrapped key that encodes a cryptographic key; executing, by the processing device in a trusted execution environment, instructions to derive the cryptographic key in view of the wrapped key, wherein the executing to derive the cryptographic key comprises a task that consumes computing resources for a duration of time; using the cryptographic key to access program data; executing, by the processing device, the program data, wherein the executed program data evaluates a condition related to the duration of time; and transmitting a message comprising an indication of the evaluated condition.

Using a trusted execution environment for a cryptographic key wrapping scheme that verifies remote device capabilities

The technology disclosed herein provides an enhanced cryptographic access control mechanism that uses cryptographic keys that are based on temporal data. An example method may include: determining temporal data of a computing device; transforming the temporal data in view of conversion data associated with the computing device, wherein the conversion data causes a set of alternate temporal data values to transform to a specific cryptographic value; creating, by a processing device, a cryptographic key in view of the transformed temporal data; and using the cryptographic key to enable access to a protected resource.

Constrained key derivation in temporal space

The present invention relates to boron containing compounds of Formula (IA): that inhibit phosphodiesterase 4 (PDE4). The invention also encompasses pharmaceutical compositions containing these compounds and methods for treating diseases, conditions, or disorders ameliorated by inhibition of PDE4.

Substituted 1,2-oxaborolan-2-ols as PDE4 inhibitors

The technology disclosed herein provides a proof-of-work key wrapping system for verifying device capabilities. An example method may include: accessing a wrapped key and a cryptographic attribute for the wrapped key from an encrypted memory region, wherein the wrapped key encodes a cryptographic key; deriving, by a processing device, the cryptographic key in view of the wrapped key and the cryptographic attribute, wherein the deriving consumes computing resources for a duration of time; using the cryptographic key to access program data; and executing, by the processing device, the program data, wherein the executed program data evaluates a condition related to the duration of time.

Using a trusted execution environment for a proof-of-work key wrapping scheme that restricts execution based on device capabilities

The technology disclosed herein provides an enhanced cryptographic access control mechanism that uses a cryptographic keys that are based on proximity data. An example method may include: determining proximity data of a computing device; transforming the proximity data in view of conversion data associated with the computing device, wherein the conversion data causes a set of alternate proximity data values to transform to a specific cryptographic value; creating, by a processing device, a cryptographic key in view of the transformed proximity data; and using the cryptographic key to enable access to a protected resource.

Constrained key derivation in linear space

The technology disclosed herein provides a proof-of-work key wrapping system for restricting data execution based on device capabilities. An example method may include: accessing a wrapped key and a cryptographic attribute for the wrapped key, wherein the wrapped key encodes a cryptographic key; deriving, by a processing device, the cryptographic key in view of the wrapped key and the cryptographic attribute; using the cryptographic key to access program data; and executing, by the processing device, the program data, wherein the executed program data evaluates a condition related to the duration of time.

Proof-of-work key wrapping for restricting data execution based on device capabilities

The technology disclosed herein provides a proof-of-work key wrapping system that cryptographically controls access to data. An example method may include: selecting a set of cryptographic attributes in view of a characteristic of a computing device; obtaining, by a processing device, a cryptographic key; encrypting, by the processing device, the cryptographic key in view of the set of cryptographic attributes to produce a wrapped key; and providing the wrapped key and at least one of the cryptographic attributes to the computing device, wherein the at least one cryptographic attribute facilitates deriving the cryptographic key from the wrapped key.

Proof-of-work key wrapping for cryptographically controlling data access

The technology disclosed herein provides a proof-of-work key wrapping system that uses key fragments to cryptographically control access to data. An example method may include: encrypting a first cryptographic key to produce a wrapped key, wherein the first cryptographic key enables a computing device to access content; splitting a second cryptographic key into a plurality of key fragments, wherein the second cryptographic key is for decrypting the wrapped key; selecting a set of cryptographic attributes for deriving at least one of the plurality of key fragments, wherein the set of cryptographic attributes are selected in view of a characteristic of the computing device; and providing the wrapped key and the set of cryptographic attributes to the computing device, the set of cryptographic attributes facilitating determination of the second cryptographic key.

Proof-of-work key wrapping with individual key fragments

The technology disclosed herein provides a proof-of-work key wrapping system that uses integrated key fragments to cryptographically control access to data. An example method may include encrypting a first cryptographic key to produce a wrapped key, wherein the first cryptographic key enables a computing device to access content; determining a plurality of key fragments of a second cryptographic key, wherein the second cryptographic key is for decrypting the wrapped key and at least one of the plurality of key fragments is derived using one of the key fragments as input; selecting a set of cryptographic attributes for deriving the plurality of key fragments, wherein the set of cryptographic attributes are selected in view of a characteristic of the computing device; and providing the wrapped key and the set of cryptographic attributes to the computing device, the set of cryptographic attributes facilitating determination of the second cryptographic key.

Proof-of-work key wrapping with integrated key fragments

The technology disclosed herein provides an enhanced cryptographic access control mechanism that uses a cryptographic keys that are based on location data. An example method may include: determining location data of a computing device; transforming the location data in view of conversion data associated with the computing device, wherein the conversion data causes a set of alternate location data values to transform to a specific cryptographic value; creating, by a processing device, a cryptographic key in view of the transformed location data; and using the cryptographic key to enable access to a protected resource.

Constrained key derivation in geographical space

The technology disclosed herein may enable a client to access a protected resource using cryptographic keys that are based on contextual data of a device. An example method may include: determining contextual data of a computing device; transforming the contextual data in view of conversion data associated with the computing device, wherein the conversion data causes a set of alternate contextual data values to transform to a specific cryptographic value; creating, by a processing device, a cryptographic key in view of the transformed contextual data; and using the cryptographic key to enable access to a protected resource.

Constrained key derivation in miscellaneous dimensions

The technology disclosed herein provides an enhanced access control mechanism that uses a proof-of-work key wrapping system to temporally restrict access to data. An example method may include: determining, by a processing device, characteristics of a computing device; accessing a cryptographic key for accessing content; selecting a set of cryptographic attributes for wrapping the cryptographic key, wherein the set of cryptographic attributes are selected to enable the computing device to derive the cryptographic key from a wrapped key in a predetermined duration of time; and providing the wrapped key and an indication of at least one of the cryptographic attributes to the computing device.

Proof-of-work key wrapping for temporally restricting data access

The technology disclosed herein provides a proof-of-work key wrapping system that uses key thresholding to cryptographically control data access. An example method may include: accessing a plurality of cryptographic key shares, wherein two or more of the plurality of cryptographic key shares enable access to content; selecting, by a processing device, a set of cryptographic attributes in view of a characteristic of a computing device; encrypting the plurality of cryptographic key shares to produce a plurality of wrapped key shares, wherein at least one of the plurality of cryptographic key shares is encrypted in view of the set of cryptographic attributes; and providing a wrapped key share of the plurality of wrapped key shares and at least one of the cryptographic attributes to the computing device, wherein the at least one cryptographic attribute facilitates deriving an access key from the plurality of wrapped key shares.

Proof-of-work key wrapping with key thresholding

The technology disclosed herein provides a proof-of-work key wrapping system for verifying device capabilities. An example method may include: receiving a wrapped key and a cryptographic attribute for the wrapped key, wherein the wrapped key encodes a cryptographic key; deriving, by a processing device, the cryptographic key in view of the wrapped key and the cryptographic attribute, wherein the deriving consumes computing resources for a duration of time; using the cryptographic key to access program data; executing, by the processing device, the program data, wherein the executed program data evaluates a condition related to the duration of time; and transmitting a message comprising an indication of the condition.

Proof-of-work key wrapping for verifying device capabilities

Growing community of inventors

Cambridge, MA, United States of America

Peter M Jones