Cohort Fs, LLC

University of Michigan

Red Hat, Inc.

Peter Honeyman

Matthew William Benjamin

Adam Charles Emerson

Kevin Fu

Timothy Trippel

Ofir Weisse

Adam C Emerson

Cyber-physical systems depend on sensors to make automated decisions. Resonant acoustic injection attacks are already known to cause malfunctions by disabling MEMS-based gyroscopes. However, an open question remains on how to move beyond denial of service attacks to achieve full adversarial control of sensor outputs. This work investigates how analog acoustic injection attacks can damage the digital integrity of a popular type of sensor: the capacitive MEMS accelerometer. Spoofing such sensors with intentional acoustic interference enables an out-of-spec pathway for attackers to deliver chosen digital values to microprocessors and embedded systems that blindly trust the unvalidated integrity of sensor outputs. Two software-based solutions are presented for mitigating acoustic interference with output of a MEMS accelerometer and other types of motion sensors.

Protecting motion sensors from acoustic injection attack

A client computing device having a processor and a memory receives, in response to a request, a replication layout from a replication controller. The client device initiates a data replication request at each of a plurality of data servers according to the replication layout. The client device receives, from each of the data servers, integrity information representing a state of a replication dataset at each of the servers. The client device transmits the integrity information to the replication controller.

Client-based data replication

A command is received to alter data storage in a cluster, along with parameters for executing the command. Information is obtained relating to one or more volumes in the cluster and information relating to devices in the cluster. A formal description of a placement function is generated that maps one or more object identifiers to a storage device set. Placement function code is generated by compiling the formal description of the placement function to computer-executable code.

Dynamic data placement for distributed storage

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Peter Honeyman