Mastercard International Incorporated

Mastercard Ireland Limited

Patrick Mestre

Patrik Smets

Florent Hay

Eddy Van De Velde

Duncan Garrett

Cristian Radu

Ian Maddocks

Dave Anthony Roberts

Kuan Hua Chen

Duncan Garret

Shilpa Harvey

Dave Roberts

A method for contactless payment relay attack protection includes receiving an online authorization request including a cryptogram, a measured processing time, and a reference processing time from a terminal. The cryptogram is verified, and a determination is performed as to whether the measured processing time exceeds the reference processing time. An online authorization response authorizing or declining a monetary transaction is transmitted, based on the determination. An artificial intelligence transaction analysis can be performed based on past and current conditions (e.g., battery level, operating system, open applications) of a payment device such as a mobile phone, past and current conditions of a terminal, and/or a monetary amount. The online authorization response can be based on the artificial intelligence transaction analysis.

Contactless payment relay attack protection

A bridge service is provided to support multi-user simulated contactless cards that in response to receiving a request to provision a secure element with payment card profile information of a user, provisions a token representing the payment card profile, converts the token representing the payment card profile into a format for the payment application; and provides the payment card profile to the payment application, the payment card profile comprising a single use key. The bridge service enables simulated contactless cards to store payment card information for a user on volatile memory instead of the persistent, secure element memory.

Simulated contactless payment cards providing multiple temporary profiles and corresponding credentials

A method of performing a contactless transaction between a payment device and a terminal is described. The method comprises establishing a data connection between the payment device and the terminal and then establishing if the payment device and the terminal both support an enhanced security architecture. If they do not, they will then perform the contactless transaction according to a basic transaction flow using a first cryptographic system. If they do, they will perform the contactless transaction according to an enhanced transaction flow using a second cryptographic system. The first cryptographic system and the second cryptographic system comprise different asymmetric cryptographic systems. Suitable payment devices and terminals, and methods at the payment devices and terminals, are described.

Security for contactless transactions

Application management services for simulated contactless cards support applying payment when a provisioned card (cardholder profile) is stored in volatile memory of a computing device by maintaining a first channel open between a payment application and a provisioning service while communicating payment information to a point of sale terminal over a second channel.

Application management for simulated contactless payment cards

A method for verification of a bearer of a credential device at a device reader is described. The method comprises first establishing a digital communication channel with the credential device, and then determining a set of verification options for the bearer and providing the set of verification options to the credential device over the digital communication channel. The credential device then selects a verification option from the set of verification options and communicates this to the device reader. The device reader can then verify the bearer of the credential device in accordance with the selected verification option. Methods at both the credential device and the device reader are described, as are suitably programmed credential devices and device readers.

User verification for credential device

Techniques for enabling performance of a quality control function on the contactless interface while the contactless interface is disabled are provided. The techniques include implementing, on a dual-interface payment device, one or more security mechanisms, wherein the dual-interface payment device comprises a first interface and a second interface, using the one or more security mechanisms to prevent a subset of data corresponding to the first interface from being read using the second interface while allowing data corresponding to the second interface to be read using the first interface, and personalizing the dual-interface payment device and the one or more security mechanisms according to one or more requirements of an issuer of the dual-interface payment device.

Apparatus, method, and computer program product for providing a quality control mechanism for the contactless interface of a dual-interface card

A method of enhanced interaction between a first computing device and a second computing device is described. A first channel for connection between the first computing device and the second computing device using a short range communication technology and a second channel for communication between the first computing device and the second computing device using a communication technology are established. A first interaction is performed using the first channel and an additional interaction is performed using the second channel. Suitable first and second computing devices are also described.

Enhanced device interaction

A transaction device for establishing a shared secret with a point of interaction (POI) over a communications network to enable encrypted communications between the transaction device and the point of interaction, the device comprising: an input arranged to receive communications from the point of interaction; a processor arranged to generate a first communication according to a Diffie-Hellman protocol; an output arranged to send the first communication to the point of interaction; wherein the processor is arranged to apply a randomly generated blinding factor, r, when generating the first communication and wherein, in response to receiving a second communication from the point of interaction at the input, the second communication having been generated according to the Diffie-Hellman protocol, the processor is arranged to apply the randomly generated blinding factor and generate a shared secret according to the Diffie-Hellman protocol in dependence on data contained within the second communication.

Electronic authentication systems

A system and method for operating a payment terminal, the method including receiving a list of eligible applications from a payment device; generating a candidate list including applications from the list of eligible applications received that are supported by the payment terminal; determining a reduced candidate list, the reduced candidate list including applications from the candidate list that match merchant-specified network preference criteria; determining a final selection of an application based on the reduced candidate list; and providing an indication of the final selection application.

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Sart-Bernard, Belgium

Patrick Mestre