International Business Machines Corporation

Patrick Joseph Callaghan

Brian D Valentine

Michael J Howland

Steven Michael Pritko

Kurt Norman Schroeder

Stephen V Feustel

Dimitrios Pendarakis

David R Safford

Kenneth Alan Goldman

George Conerly Wilson

Elaine Rivette Palmer

Miriam Zohar

Guerney D H Hunt

Thomas B Mathias

Pu Liu

Timothy V Bolan

Reinhard Theodor Buendgen

William J Rooney

James A O'Connor

Khary J Alexander

Utz Bacher

K Paul Muller

Craig Raymond Walters

John C Dayka

Tiberiu (Jim) Suto

Andreas Bieswanger

George Henry Ahrens, Jr

Joseph M Gdaniec

Peter G Spera

Paul E Rogers

Stefan Usenbinz

Alan David Seid

Friedrich Michael Welter

Robert K Overton

Sean M Swehla

Richard Jeffrey Planutis

Harm I Osterndorf

Eric A Weinmann

James Patrick Hennessy

Stephen Richard Nichols

Michael W Clark

Timothy R Seeger

Guerney Dh Hunt

Eric W Weinmann

Tung-Sing Chong

A service processor is provided that includes a processor, a memory coupled to the processor and having instructions for executing an operating system kernel having an integrity management subsystem, secure boot firmware, and a tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor. The secure boot firmware performs a secure boot operation to boot the operating system kernel of the service processor. The secure boot firmware records first measurements of code executed by the secure boot firmware when performing the boot operation, in one or more registers of the tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor. The operating system kernel enables the integrity management subsystem. The integrity management subsystem records second measurements of software executed by the operating system kernel, in the one or more registers of the tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor.

Service processor and system with secure booting and monitoring of service processor integrity

Mechanisms for booting a service processor are provided. With these mechanisms, the service processor executes a secure boot operation of secure boot firmware to boot an operating system kernel of the service processor. The secure boot firmware records first measurements of code executed by the secure boot firmware when performing the boot operation, in one or more registers of a tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor of the service processor. The operating system kernel executing in the service processor enables an integrity management subsystem of the operating system kernel which records second measurements of software executed by the operating system kernel, in the one or more registers of the tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor.

Securely booting a service processor and monitoring service processor integrity

A method, system, and computer program product includes receiving, in a booted state of a computing system, a request to load an operating system configuration. The method further includes storing, automatically in response to receiving the request, a digital key to authenticate the operating system configuration. The method further includes restarting the computing system. In response to restarting the computing system and while the computing system is in a pre-boot state, the method includes: validating that the digital key stored is one for a valid operating system configuration; receiving, from a user interface physically coupled to the computing system, a signal confirming the received request; authenticating, in response to receiving the signal, the operating system configuration using the digital key; and booting, in response to the authenticating, the operating system configuration.

Securing operating system configuration using hardware

A set of root keys is loaded as a first part of a secure boot process of a secure system. a first trusted key from a set of trusted keys is verified using a first root key from the set of root keys as a second part of the secure boot process. The set of trusted keys is loaded when an affirmative verification for a subset of trusted keys is received. The subset of trusted keys includes the first trusted key. As a third part of the secure boot process, an immutable portion of a file is validated using the first trusted key. As a fourth part of the secure boot process, the file is loaded when each portion of the file is successfully validated. The first, second, third, and fourth parts of the secure boot process occur before an integrity management configuration takes over the secure boot process.

Securing and changing immutable data in secure bootup

A system includes at least a secure-boot file, a hypervisor, and a host. The secure-boot file is configured to securely boot a VM, where the secure-boot file is signed with a boot private key. The hypervisor is configured to run the VM. The hypervisor includes a boot public key corresponding to the boot private key, such that the hypervisor is configured to validate the secure-boot file, and the hypervisor is signed with a hypervisor private key. A kernel of the host is configured to run the VM, where the kernel includes a hypervisor public key corresponding to the hypervisor private key, such that the host is configured to validate the hypervisor.

Secure boot of a virtual machine

A computer-implemented method for protecting a kernel for secure boot of an operating system includes preparing a kernel component with a signature for a secure boot. A processing unit modifies a machine owner key (MOK) file to include a trusted certificate. The MOK is separate from the kernel file. The processing unit validates the kernel component using a modified Grub file, a modified Shim file, and the MOK, and executes a secure boot using the validated kernel component. The kernel is unchanged by the secure boot process. The kernel component that is protected may be either a program executable (PE) file or a non-PE file.

Portable executable and non-portable executable boot file security

Technical solutions are described for securely deploying a shrouded virtual server. An example method includes sending, by a host manager, authentication information of a hosting system to a client device in response to a request from the client device. The \method also includes receiving a request to deploy a virtual server using a shrouded mode. The method also includes deploying a preconfigured hypervisor on the hosting system, where the preconfigured hypervisor is deployed in an immutable mode that disables changes to security settings of the preconfigured hypervisor. The method also includes deploying, by the preconfigured hypervisor, a preconfigured boot image as an instance of the virtual server on the preconfigured hypervisor. The method also includes sending, by the host manager, an identifier of the virtual server for receipt by the client device.

End-to end protection for shrouded virtual servers

A method and workstation for completing an audiovisual form. In response to a user speaking a command for the web browser to accept keyboard entry of text, the web browser accepts entry of text and displays the form with the text entered into a blank area in a field of the form. In response to all fields in the form having been processed, the web browser generates a pause for a specified period of time. In response to the specified period of time of the pause having expired, the web browser loops back to a top of the form.

Audible presentation and verbal interaction of HTML-like form constructs

End-to-end protection for shrouded virtual servers

Growing community of inventors

Vestal, NY, United States of America

Patrick Joseph Callaghan