Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Parul Manek

Ganesh Pandey

Ayla Kol

Kameshwar Jayaraman

Brijesh Bhupendra Desai

David Charles Oliver

Yoganand Rajasekaran

Shankaranand Arunachalam

Daniel Keith Winter

Benjamin Du

Philip Ross Moyer

Mainul Mizan

Zijun Hao

Raquibur Rahman

Anshul Dube

Andrew Burke Ryan

Jason Craig Nelson

Burra Gopal

Ming-wei Wang

Steven Mark Silverberg

Robert Allen Lowe

Shyam Narayan

Xiaoqin Zhu

Gregory Irving Thiel

Adrian Fanaru

Dmitri Gavrilov

Mingquan Xue

Konstantin E Ryvkin

Mohamed Rouatbi

Srinivasachakrapani Kotipalli

Xin Li

Kevin Gammill

Lei Wang

Qi Cao

Zhipeng Zhao

James P Rupke

Zubin Alexander

Steven Jay Lieberman

Qin Zhou

Gokay Hurmali

Anuj Dhawan

Amit A Bapat

Manjusha Madhav Mangaonkar

Ellery Charlson

Rajeev Kumar Mittal

Christopher Paul Holder

Rahul Kapoor

Roberto C Taboada

Ziyi Wang

Charles Glenn Jeffries

Paul Baecke

Sandhya D Jain

Gang Zhao

Alexandru Croicu

Oleg Ovanesyan

Stuart Kwan

Brad D Rutkowski

Priyanshu Kumar Jha

Jeffrey Lamar McDowell

Daniel John Carroll, Jr

Peiwei Cao

Yang Xiang

Soumit Rahman

Kartik Tirunelveli Kanakasabesan

Brad Rutkowski

Yuan-Fen Kuo

Curtis Thibault

Ajay Kalidindi

Shefali Gulati

Yeshua Garcia

Dan Winter

Patrick R LeQuere

Nisheth P Joshi

Zejian Wang

Sharon E Edelstein

Muthiah K Annamalai

Brian James Hardy

Tony Kao

Methods, systems, and computer programs are presented for protecting restricted actions on encryption keys that control the management of data stored by a service provider. In some implementations, a system of the service provider receives a request to generate a data encryption policy (DEP) for data stored by the system of the service provider for a customer, the request including a reference to a customer key and an availability key. The customer key and the availability key are root keys for encrypting a data encryption key. The data encryption key is used to encrypt the data stored by the service provider for the customer. Further, destructive changes to the availability key require receiving an approval from an account of the service provider. The system of the service provider validates the DEP. The system of the service provider stores the DEP based on the validation.

Protection for restricted actions on critical resources

A client-side system detects a current location of a client device and a cloud interaction metric. The geographic area around the location of the client device is divided into grid sections. The client-side system identifies a pre-defined reference location corresponding to the grid section that the client device location resides in. The pre-defined reference location, corresponding to that grid section, and the cloud interaction metric are provided to a remote server computing system.

Abstracting geographic location to a square block of pre-defined size

A secure investigation platform in a sovereign cloud includes a request processing system that receives requests to investigate an incident. A control message processing system creates a workspace, within the sovereign cloud, so that an investigation can be conducted within that workspace. An investigation pack, which includes investigative resources used in the investigation, is identified and the workspace is pre-configured with the identified investigation pack. The control message processing system performs investigation tasks within the workspace using the investigation pack.

Secure incident investigation workspace generation and investigation control

A client application is specified by a target tenant and represented in an OAuth provider, along with a corresponding secret. A source tenant consents to permissions to be executed by the client application on a resource of the source tenant. A target service uses the secret to obtain an access token from an authorization server coupled to the source tenant and uses the access token to obtain access, specified by the permissions, to the resource served by a source service acting on behalf of the source tenant.

Authentication framework for resource access across organizations

A service computing system receives an API call in which an authorization token, that contains an identifier in the content of the authorization token, is included in a header of the API call. The identifier is also included as a parameter passed in with the API call. The service computing system parses the API call to obtain the authorization token, and the identifier included in the authorization token. It also obtains the identifier passed in as a parameter of the API call. The service computing system compares the identifier obtained from the authorization token to the identifier passed in as a parameter of the API call to determine whether they match. If they do not match, the API call is processed as an unauthorized API call. A security system in the service computing system authorizes the API call based on the comparison.

Client-server security enhancement using information accessed from access tokens

A secure investigation platform in a sovereign cloud includes a request processing system that receives requests to investigate an incident. A control message processing system creates a workspace, within the sovereign cloud, so that an investigation can be conducted within that workspace. The control message processing system performs investigation tasks within the workspace. A secure log generation system captures information corresponding to the tasks and generates an event record based on the captured information.

Secure incident investigation event capture

Access to data and resources in a multi-tenant computing system is managed by tagging the data and resources with attributes, as well as by tagging users with attributes. Tenant-specific access policies are configured. When an access request is received from a workload, a policy decision engine processes the attributes that are tagged to the requesting workload (e.g., user, application, etc.) as well as those tagged to the requested data or resource, given a relevant tenant-specific policy. An access decision is provided in response to the access request, and the access decision can be enforced by a tenant-specific enforcement system.

Controlling access to cloud resources in data using cloud-enabled data tagging and a dynamic access control policy engine

Methods, systems, and computer programs are presented for protecting restricted actions on encryption keys that control the management of data stored by a service provider. In some implementations, a of the service provider receives a request to generate a data encryption policy (DEP) for data stored by the of the service provider for a customer, the request including a reference to a customer key and an availability key. The customer key and the availability key are root keys for encrypting a data encryption key. The data encryption key is used to encrypt the data stored by the service provider for the customer. Further, destructive changes to the availability key require receiving an approval from an account of the service provider. The of the service provider validates the DEP. The of the service provider stores the DEP based on the validation.

In a multi-tenant computing system, a cross-tenant user search system receives a user search input from a user using a client of a first tenant. The cross-tenant user search system accesses a policy that identifies one or more related tenants that are related to the first tenant. The policy also identifies directory records of users in the related tenant that can be searched by users of the first tenant. The cross-tenant user search system executes a search against a directory for the first tenant and executes a separate search against the directory records in the related tenants, identified in the policy. The search results from searching the directory for the first tenant and the related search results from searching the directory records in the tenant are aggregated into an aggregated set of search results which are then returned to the client.

Cross-tenant people search in a multi-tenant computing system

A request to perform a command or operation on a computing system is received from a support user. A clearance level needed to perform that requested command or operation is identified, and a data store that has a pool of cleared users is accessed to identify a cleared user that has an adequate clearance level. The secured user is assigned to the request. A risk level, corresponding to the requested command or operation is identified and surfaced for the secured user. The requested command or operation can be automatically executed, after it is authorized by the secured user.

Cleared user facilitation and control system

Growing community of inventors

Redmond, WA, United States of America

Parul Manek