International Business Machines Corporation

International Business Machines Corproation

Omri Soceanu

Allon Adir

Ehud Aharoni

Lev Greenberg

Hayim Shaul

Gilad Ezov

Ariel Farkash

Dov Murik

Ramy Masalha

Nir Drucker

Fady Copty

Eyal Kushnir

Nathalie Baracaldo Angel

Ronen Levy

Runhua Xu

Michael Mirkin

Roman Vaculin

Heiko Hary Ludwig

James Thomas Rayfield

Nitzan Peleg

Abigail Goldsteen

Kanthi K Sarpatwar

Boris Rozenberg

Omer Y Boehm

Akram Bitar

Evgeny Shindin

Ron Shmelkin

Michael Vinov

Guy Moshkowich

Oleg Blinder

Muhammad Barham

A technique for privacy-preserving homomorphic inferencing using a neural network having an activation function, such as a non-linear high-degree polynomial. The network is trained to learn input features of an input feature vector together with their associated inverses. During inferencing, an encrypted data point is received at the network. The data point comprises an input feature vector that has been extended with a set of one or more additional feature values, the set of one or more additional feature values having been generated by applying a normalized inverse function to respective one or more features in the feature vector. Homomorphic inferencing is performed on the encrypted data point using the machine learning model to generate an encrypted result, which is then returned. By applying the normalized inverse function, the high-degree polynomial can use any value of an input feature during inferencing, whether the value is within or outside of a particular input range.

Non-linear approximation robust to input range of homomorphic encryption analytics

An embodiment appends, into a concatenated table, a second plurality of records in a second table to a first plurality of records in a first table. An embodiment sorts, according to each identification value in the concatenated table, the concatenated table. An embodiment generates, using an equality mask derived from each identification value in the sorted table, an intersection table, the intersection table comprising a record in the first plurality of records with a first identifier value matching a second identifier value in a record in the second plurality of records. An embodiment generates, using a not-in-intersection mask derived from the equality mask, a not-in-intersection table. An embodiment adds contents of the intersection table and contents of the not-in-intersection table together, resulting in a join table.

Database table joining under fully homomorphic encryption

An example system includes a processor to compute a tensor of indicators indicating a presence of partial sums in an encrypted vector of indicators. The processor can also securely reorder an encrypted array based on the computed tensor of indicators to generate a reordered encrypted array.

Secure reordering using tensor of indicators

A computer-implemented method for generating hash values to determine string similarity is disclosed. The computer-implemented method includes converting a first text string of a first data set into a first set of shingles. The computer-implemented method further includes determining a weight associated with each shingle in the first set of shingles based, at least in part, on a particular record field associated with a shingle. The computer-implemented method further includes generating, based on a hash function, a hash value for each shingle in the first set of shingles. The computer-implemented method further includes reducing the hash value generated for each shingle in the first set of shingles, based, at least in part on the weight associated with the shingle.

String similarity based weighted min-hashing

Mechanisms are provided for performing a tournament selection process of a computer function. A request is received to execute the computer function on an input vector data structure, where a result of the computer function is provided by executing the tournament selection process. The input vector data structure is received, comprising a plurality of values where each value corresponds to a vector slot. An index vector data structure is received that comprises indices of the vector slots of the input vector. Iteration(s) of the tournament selection process are executed to identify a value in the input vector satisfying a criterion of the computer function. An operation is performed on the index vector data structure to generate an indicator vector data structure that uniquely identifies a slot in the input vector data structure that is a result of the computer function being executed on the input vector data structure.

Tournament type selection operations on encrypted data

A method and system for evaluating and selecting an optimal packing solution (or solutions) for data that is run through a fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) simulation. In some instances, a user selected model architecture is provided in order to start simulating multiple potential configurations. Additionally, the cost of each simulated configuration is taken into account when determining an optimal packing solution.

Optimal profile selection for FHE based analytical models

A computer-implemented method comprising: generating, from a key-seed associated with a user, a set of homomorphic encryption (HE) keys associated with an HE scheme; receiving, from a key management system (KMS) associated with said HE scheme, an encrypted version of said key-seed; storing said encrypted version of said key-seed, and said set of HE keys, in an untrusted storage location; and at a decryption stage, decrypting an encrypted computation result generated using said HE scheme, by: (i) recalling, from said untrusted storage location, said encrypted version of said key-seed, (ii) providing said encrypted version of said key-seed to said KMS, to obtain a decrypted version of said key-seed s associated with said user, (iii) generating, from said received decrypted version of said key-seed, a secret HE key associated with said HE scheme, and (iv) using said secret HE key to decrypt said encrypted computation result.

Homomorphic encryption key management

A second set of data identifiers, comprising identifiers of data usable in federated model training by a second data owner, is received at a first data owner from the second data owner. An intersection set of data identifiers is determined at the first data owner. At the first data owner according to the intersection set of data identifiers, the data usable in federated model training is rearranged by the first data owner to result in a first training dataset. At the first data owner using the intersection set of data identifiers, the first training dataset, and a previous iteration of an aggregated set of model weights, a first partial set of model weights is computed. An updated aggregated set of model weights, comprising the first partial set of model weights and a second partial set of model weights from the second data owner, is received from an aggregator.

Private vertical federated learning

Mechanisms are provided for fully homomorphic encryption enabled graph embedding. An encrypted graph data structure, having encrypted entities and predicates, is received and, for each encrypted entity, a corresponding set of entity ciphertexts is generated based on an initial embedding of entity features. For each encrypted predicate, a corresponding predicate ciphertext is generated based on an initial embedding of predicate features. A machine learning process is iteratively executed, on the sets of entity ciphertexts and the predicate ciphertexts, to update embeddings of the entity features of the encrypted entities and update embeddings of predicate features of the encrypted predicates, to generate a computer model for embedding entities and predicates. A final embedding is output based on the updated embeddings of the entity features and predicate features of the computer model.

Graph based embedding under fully homomorphic encryption

Privacy-preserving homomorphic inferencing utilizes batch processing on encrypted data records. Each data record has a private data portion of interest against which the inferencing is carried out. Batch processing is enabled with respect to a set of encrypted data records by techniques that ensure that each encrypted data record has its associated private data portion in a unique location relative to the other data records. The set of encrypted data records are then summed to generate a single encrypted data record against which the inferencing is done. In a first embodiment, the private data portions of interest are selectively and uniquely positioned at runtime (when the inferencing is being applied). In a second embodiment, the private data portions of interest are initially positioned with the data-at-rest, preferably in an off-line process; thereafter, at runtime individual encrypted data records are processed as necessary to adjust the private data portions to unique positions prior to batching.

Efficiently batching pre-encrypted data for homomorphic inference

Embodiments may provide techniques that may provide more accurate and actionable alerts by cloud workload security systems so as to improve overall cloud workload security. For example, in an embodiment, a method may be implemented in a computer system comprising a processor, memory accessible by the processor, and computer program instructions stored in the memory and executable by the processor, and the method may comprise generating performance and security information relating to a software system during development of the software system, generating performance and security information relating to the software system during deployed operation of the software system, matching the performance and security information generated during development of the software system with the performance and security information generated during deployed operation of the software system to determine performance and security alerts to escalate, and reporting the escalated performance and security alerts.

Sharing insights between pre and post deployment to enhance cloud workload security

Systems for generating attack event logs are disclosed. An example system includes a storage device for storing an event log template. The system also includes a processor to receive a selection of the event log template, and receive an attack description comprising user instructions to fabricate synthetic log entries according to a format defined in the event log template. The attack description includes variables and rules for determining values for the variables. The processor generates the attack event log by determining values that satisfy the rules and writing the values into selected fields of the event log template.

Techniques for cyber-attack event log fabrication

A method comprising: receiving an input tensor having a shape defined by [n, . . . , n], where k is equal to a number of dimensions that characterize the input tensor; receiving tile tensor metadata comprising: a tile tensor shape defined by [t, . . . , t], and information indicative of an interleaving stride to be applied with respect to each dimension of the tile tensor; constructing an output tensor comprising a plurality of the tile tensors, by applying a packing algorithm which maps each element of the input tensor to at least one slot location of one of the plurality of tile tensors, based on the tile tensor shape and the interleaving stride, wherein the interleaving stride results in non-contiguous mapping of the elements of the input tensor, such that each of the tile tensors includes a subset of the elements of the input tensor which are spaced within the input tensor according to the interleaving stride.

Efficient convolution in an environment that enforces tiles

In response to identifying that a Single Instruction, Multiple Data (SIMD) operation has been instructed to be performed or has been performed by a Fully-Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) software on one or more original ciphertexts, performing the following steps: Performing the same operation on one or more original plaintexts, respectively, that are each a decrypted version of one of the one or more original ciphertexts. Decrypting a ciphertext resulting from the operation performed on the one or more original ciphertexts. Comparing the decrypted ciphertext with a plaintext resulting from the same operation performed on the one or more original plaintexts. Based on said comparison, performing at least one of: (a) determining an amount of noise caused by the operation, (b) determining whether unencrypted data underlying the one or more original ciphertexts has become corrupt by the operation, and (c) determining correctness of an algorithm which includes the operation.

Analysis and debugging of fully-homomorphic encryption

An example system includes a processor that can obtain a circuit describing operations of sequential secure computation code. The processor can modify the circuit based on a cost function. The processor can partition the circuit into a number of sub-circuits. The processor can assign the number of the sub-circuits to different processors for execution.

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Haifa, Israel

Omri Soceanu