Gemalto Sa

Gemplus

Gegemplus

Olivier Benoit

Nathalie Feyt

David Naccache

Philippe Proust

Eric Brier

Pascal Moitrel

Jacques Fournier

Etienne Cambois

A method for detecting faults by perturbations during execution of a computerized code in an electronic device. The computer code includes a sensitive process. The method includes a step of executing a redundant procedure of the sensitive process and a step of inserting a delay between the sensitive process and the redundant procedure. A trapping procedure is executed during the delay. The trapping procedure is sensitive to perturbations and supplies, in the absence of perturbation, a predictable result.

Detection of a fault by long disturbance

A method for securing electronic device processes against attacks (e.g. side channel attacks) during the processing of sensitive and/or confidential data by a Central Processing Unit (CPU) to the volatile memory (e.g. RAM) of an electronic device such as, for example, a smart card, a PDA or a cellular phone is described herein. The method involves the storage of the confidential data to a dynamically and randomly assigned memory location, thereby rendering more difficult the analysis and subsequently the attacks (e.g. side channel attacks).

Method and securing electronic device data processing

A method of unlocking a mobile terminal after a period of use and ensuring that the first operator who sold the terminal receives adequate payment prior to the use thereof. The identity of the terminal is saved and a security algorithm, which is not known to the operator, is implemented in a security module which is introduced into a server that is managed by the operator. After the period of use, the security module determines a secret key which is obtained by applying the terminal identity transmitted thereby and an operator code to the security algorithm, following a request transmitted by the service entity. The determined secret key, which is encrypted at the terminal, is transmitted over the operator's radiocommunications network and decrypted in the mobile terminal so that it can be compared to the saved secret key in order for the mobile terminal to be unlocked when the compared secret keys are identical.

Method of securely unlocking a mobile terminal

The invention relates to a method for secure data transmission in connections between two functional modules of an electronic unit. A first module of a message of k bits in a word code of n bits is injection coded with a constant Hamming weight of w. The word of code is transmitted to a second module. An error signal is generated when the Hamming weight of the word of code of n bits, received by the second module, is different from w. In the absence of error, the code word is decoded, where k, w and n are whole numbers. The invention further relates to a corresponding electronic circuit.

Secure data transmission between two modules

A countermeasure method in an electronic component using a secret key algorithm K on an input message M executes an operation O(D) on input data D. A random value, of one first random information U, is generated that is of identical size as the input information D. A second random information V, is calculated by performing an exclusive OR operation between the input information and the first random information U. The operation Oor the sequence of operations are successively executed on the first input information U and to the second random information V, supplying respectively a first random result O(U) and a second random result O(V).

Method for countermeasure in an electronic component using a secret key algorithm

The present invention concerns an anti-SPA modular exponentiation algorithm in an electronic component using a public key ciphering algorithm. A pair of registers and an indicator are used to provide symmetrical processing of bits in the algorithm, so that the values of individual bits cannot be determined from power consumption.

Modular exponentiation algorithm in an electronic component using a public key encryption algorithm

The invention concerns a countermeasure method in an electronic component using a secret key K cryptographic algorithm with sixteen computing cycles to supply an encrypted message (C) from an input message (M), each cycle using first means TCto supply an output information from an input information, Said method consists in applying by selection a sequence with the first means or another sequence with other means TC, TCto a group Gcomprising the first three cycles at least and another group Gcomprising the last three cycles at least. Whatever the sequence, the output result of the last cycle of each group is the same for the same input message (M).

Countermeasure method in an electronic component using a secret key cryptographic algorithm

An electronic component uses a secret key cryptographic algorithm that employs several successive computing cycles to supply final output data from initial input data applied at the first cycle. A first random value is applied to a computation conducted for each cycle, to obtain unpredictable output data. A second random value as also applied to the initial input data that is used for the input of the first cycle.

Countermeasure method in an electric component using a secret key cryptographic algorithm

The invention concerns microprocessor cards and, in such cards, various devices for hiding operations performed in the card against fraudulent breaches by analysing the current consumed. The invention is characterised in that it consists in adding in the card a device ( ) modifying the consumed current, either by averaging it by integration, or by adding thereto random values by a random signal generator ( ) so as to hide the operations performed. In another embodiment, it consists in carrying out simultaneously an operation for making secure and writing in an EEPROM memory, the latter generating chaotic current variations which hide the operation to be made secure.

Growing community of inventors

Aubagne, France

Olivier Benoit