Amazon Technologies, Inc.

Nima Sharifi Mehr

Muhammad Wasiq

Scott Gerard Carmack

Narasimha Rao Lakkakula

Jesper Mikael Johansson

Darren Ernest Canavor

Jon Arron McClintock

William Frederick Hingle Kruse

Gregory Branchek Roth

Gregory Alan Rubin

David James Kane-Parry

Hardik Navin Nagda

William Frederick Kruse

Ashish Rangole

Christopher Lorenzo Dunn

Volker Helmut Mosthaf

Bharath Mukkati Prakash

Jeffrey John Wierer

Kai Zhao

Kunal Chadha

Chenxi Zhang

Alexis Floyd

Christopher Gordon Williams

Aleksandrs J Rudzitis

Radu Mihai Berciu

Eric Desmond Keith Villiers

Matthew John Campagna

Dominique Imjya Brezinski

Thibault Candebat

Amit Jagannath Mhatre

Sunu Aby Mathew

Gergory Branchek Roth

Various embodiments of apparatuses and methods for distributed threat sensor analysis and correlation of a malware threat intelligence system are described. In some embodiments, the system comprises a plurality of threat sensors, deployed at different network addresses and physically located in different geographic regions in a provider network, which detect interactions from sources. In some embodiments, a distributed threat sensor analysis and correlation service obtains significance scores for different sources of the interactions with the plurality of threat sensors. The service determines which of the sources are malicious actors based on the significance scores. The service receives identifiers of known actors such as compute instances in the provider network, client devices in a client network, or deployed IoT devices in a remote network, and correlates the malicious actors with the known actors to identify which known actors might be infected by malware.

Distributed threat sensor analysis and correlation

Various embodiments of apparatuses and methods for threat sensor deployment and management in a malware threat intelligence system are described. In some embodiments, the system comprises a plurality of threat sensors, deployed at different network addresses and physically located in different geographic regions in a provider network, which detect interactions from sources. In some embodiments, a threat sensor deployment and management service determines a deployment plan for the plurality of threat sensors, including each threat sensor's associated threat data collectors. The threat data collectors can be of different types such as utilizing different communication protocols or ports, or providing different kinds of responses to inbound communications. The different threat sensors can have different lifetimes. The service deploys the threat sensors based on the plan, collects data from the deployed threat sensors, adjusts the deployment plan based on the collected data and the threat sensor lifetimes, and then performs the adjustments.

Threat sensor deployment and management

In response to a process being triggered, at least in part by receipt of information regarding communication directed to a first application by a second application, a threat level is computed based at least in part on the information. As a result of the threat level being of a first severity, the second application is migrated to a destination zone that allows for improved communications with the first application. As a result of the threat level being of a second severity, migration of the second application to the destination zone is delayed. As a result of the threat level being of a third severity, a mitigation action is performed.

Distributed denial of service mitigation in a container based framework

The present document describes a communication session resumption mechanism. A client computer system establishes a communication session to a server computer that is a member of a set of related server computers. As a result of establishing the communication session, the server computer identifies the set of related server computers to the client computer system. The set of related server computers share communication session information with each other, allowing the client computer system to resume the communication session with another server computer belonging to the set of related server computers. The communication session may be specified to the other server computer by the client computer system by providing a session identifier or a session ticket.

Communication session resumption

A network-connected device service receives a request to authenticate a network-connected device. The network-connected device service determines, from a digital certificate identified in the request, a set of parameters of the digital certificate. The network-connected device service utilizes the set of parameters to identify, from a set of digital certificate clusters, a digital certificate cluster associated with the set of parameters. Through an audit of the digital certificate clusters, the network-connected device service determines whether the digital certificate cluster is indicative of the digital certificate being anomalous.

Certificate authority breach detection for network-connected devices

Network devices, such as load balancers may be configured to forward client metadata to back-end nodes using defined fields of a security protocol. For example, client metadata may be inserted into an extension field or certificate defined by a security protocol that is used for a secure connection between the load balancer and the back-end node. In some instances, a source IP address based on a received request may be inserted into the extension field or certificate defined by the security protocol before the request is forwarded to the back-end node. The back-end node may extract the client metadata and use the client metadata for any of a number of processes (e.g., billing, tracking, security, logging, etc.).

Load balancer metadata forwarding on secure connections

Client application () submits request () to resource status service () for resource status data ('data') regarding one or more computing resources () provided in a service provider network (). The resource status service submits requests to the resources for the data. The resource status service provides a reply to the client application that includes any data received from the resources within a specified time. If all requested data was not received from the resources within the specified time the resource status service can also provide, in the reply, an identifier ('ID') that identifies the request and can be utilized to identify and retrieve additional status data received at a later time. The client application can also submit additional requests for the status data, and may include the ID, may wait for additional data to be pushed to it, or may check a queue for the status data.

Synchronous and asynchronous responses to data requests from remote devices

Disclosed are various embodiments for preventing the unintended leakage of cookie data. In one embodiment, a browser application stores cookie data from a first network site having a high-level domain in a client computing device. The cookie data includes a sharing attribute. The cookie data is automatically made accessible to the first network site. A network service is queried to obtain data indicating a classification associated with the first network site. The cookie data is made accessible to a second network site having the same high-level domain based at least in part on the sharing attribute and the classification meeting at least one predetermined criterion.

Preventing leakage of cookie data

A system can determine a set of users to access an asset of a computing device. User data for a user in the set of users is obtained. The user data can specify organizational information for the user. The system can determine a value usable to regulate access to the asset. The value can be based on the organizational information for the user, and the value can be further based on other user data attributed to another user in the set of users. Based on the determined value, the system can regulate access to the asset.

Access control for restricted access computing assets

Various embodiments of apparatuses and methods for malware infection detection for edge devices, such as IoT ('Internet of Things') devices, are described. In some embodiments, a malware infection detection service receives data from a plurality of edge devices of a remote network. It can identify a variety of different detection mechanisms to detect whether an edge device is potentially infected with malware, and determine confidence levels for the different detection mechanisms. Using the detection mechanisms with the received data, it can determine one or more findings that an edge device is potentially infected with malware. It can then determine a confidence level for each finding. It can then determine an accumulated confidence, based on the confidence levels of the detection mechanisms and the findings. The malware infection detection service might then identify one or more of the edge devices as potentially being infected by malware based on the accumulated confidence.

Malware infection detection service for IoT devices

Techniques for data source driven expected network policy control are described. A policy enforcement service receives, from a compute instance in a virtual network implemented within a service provider system, a request to access data. The policy enforcement service determines that a virtual network security condition of a policy statement is not satisfied. The policy statement was configured by a user for use in controlling access to the data. The virtual network security condition defines a condition of the virtual network that is to be met. The policy enforcement service performs one or more security actions in response to the determination that the virtual network security condition of the policy statement is not satisfied.

Data source driven expected network policy control

A customer of a policy management service may use an interface with a configuration and management service to interact with policies that may be applicable to the customer's one or more resources. The customer may create and/or modify the policies and the configuration and management service may notify one or more other entities of the created and/or modified policies. The one or more other entities may be operated by user authorized to approve the created and/or modified policies. Interactions with the configuration and management service may be the same as the interactions with the policy management service.

Policy approval layer

A policy management service receives a request to evaluate a provisional policy to determine the impact of implementation of the provisional policy. The policy management service evaluates an active policy against a request to access a computing resource to determine an authorization decision. The policy management service then evaluates the provisional policy against the request to access the computing resource to generate an evaluation of the provisional policy. The policy management service provides the evaluation and the authorization decision in response to the request to evaluate the provisional policy.

Provisional computing resource policy evaluation

A service provider receives a set of credentials from a customer and a request to access one or more services provided by the service provider. An authentication service of the service provider receives the set of credentials and, based at least in part on the received set of credentials, one or more activities performed by the customer, the customer's user profile, and the system configuration of the customer's computing device, calculates a risk score. The authentication service subsequently utilizes the calculated risk score to determine a credential rotation schedule for the set of credentials. The authentication service updates one or more servers to enforce the new credential rotation schedule and enables the customer to utilize the set of credentials to access the one or more services.

Risk-based scheduling for credential rotation

A customer of a resource allocation service can register a function to be executed using virtual resources, where the function includes customer code to be executed. Customer events are defined as triggers for a registered function, and a resource instance is allocated to execute the registered function when triggering event is detected. An identity role associated with the triggering function is used to obtain access credentials for any data source which a triggering event might require for processing. An event-specific access credential is generated that provides a subset of these access privileges using a template policy for the registered function that is filled with values specific to the triggering event. The filled template policy and base credential are used to generate an event-specific credential valid only for access needed for the event. This event-specific credential can be passed with the event data for processing by an allocated instance.

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Vancouver, Canada

Nima Sharifi Mehr