Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Nathan Jeffrey Ide

Saurav Sinha

Christopher R Macaulay

Gopinathan Kannan

Aaron Payne Goldsmid

Ibrahim Mohammad Ismail

Octavian Tony Ureche

Eric Fleischman

Kun Liu

Vijay G Bharadwaj

Preston Derek Adam

Michael J Grass

Ruslan Pavlovich Ovechkin

Karan Singh Dhillon

Matthew Z Tamayo-Rios

Pranav Kukreja

Peter Gregory Davis

Anshul Rawat

Jing Zhang

David John Linsley

Ping Xie

Dustin Michael Ingalls

Sai Vinayak

Matthias Hermann Wollnik

Craig Thomas McIntyre

Tony Ureche

John Richard McDowell

Guillermo Enrique Rueda

Stefan Thom

Mark Fishel Novak

Innokentiy Basmov

Nir Ben-Zvi

Robert Karl Spiger

Scott Daniel Anderson

Jonathan D Schwartz

Magnus Nyström

Hakki Tunc Bostanci

Peter Novotney

Narendra Shripati Acharya

Magnus Nystrom

Nir Ben Zvi

Yashar Bahman

Robert Bradley Gilbert

Haitao Wang

Andrey V Lelikov

Sekhar Poornananda Chintalapati

Scott Miller

Manoj R Mehta

Matthew Jonathan Joplin

Shawn Corey

Aspects of the present disclosure include systems and methods for generating and managing user authentication rules of a computing device. In an example, a computing device may include a memory storing instructions and a processor communicatively coupled with the memory and configured to execute the instructions. The processor may determine a state of the computing device, wherein the state of the computing device is one of a locked state or an unlocked state. The processor may determine a user authentication rule corresponding to the state of the computing device. The processor may also identify whether a combination of signals associated with the user authentication rule of the computing device are received by the computing device. The processor may also change or maintain the state of the computing device based on the combination of signals being received.

Authentication rules for locked and unlocked states

Techniques for secure data synchronization are described. In one or more implementations, a determination is made as to whether enterprise data is stored locally on a first device corresponding to an enterprise device. Based on a determination that the second device is a non-enterprise device, a determination is made as to whether a permission associated with the first device indicates that the first device is permitted to propagate the enterprise data to non-enterprise devices. If the first device lacks permission to propagate the enterprise data to non-enterprise devices, the enterprise data is prevented from being propagated to the second device.

Secure data synchronization

Systems and methods for generating and managing user authentication rules of a computing device

Methods and devices for using candidate accounts on a computer device may include creating on the computer device, a candidate account representing a blank user profile for use on the computer device. The methods and devices may include automatically logging in the candidate account and locking the computer device. The methods and devices may include creating a user specific isolated environment on the computer device for the candidate account.

Candidate user profiles for fast, isolated operating system use

In one embodiment, a user device may reestablish access to a user resource while forgoing use of a user credential during a system reboot. The user device may receive the user credential from a user during an initial login to access the user resource. The user device may create an ephemeral entropy to access the user resource. The user device may access the user resource using the ephemeral entropy.

Resumption of logon across reboots

In one embodiment, a client devicemay use an attestation serviceto verify a secure serverThe secure servermay receive a signed trusted credentialfrom an attestation servicevalidating the secure serveras trustworthy to a client deviceseeking access. The secure servermay protect the signed trusted credentialin a server secure module

Verifying the security of a remote server

Techniques for providing security policy for device data are described. In implementations, data on a device is stored in an encrypted form. To protect the encrypted data from being decrypted by an unauthorized entity, techniques enable a decryption key to be occluded if an attempt to gain unauthorized access to device data is detected. In implementations, a decryption key can be occluded in a variety of ways, such as by deleting the decryption key, overwriting the encryption key in memory, encrypting the encryption key, and so on. Embodiments enable an occluded decryption key to be recovered via a recovery experience. For example, a recovery experience can include an authentication procedure that requests a recovery password. If a correct recovery password is provided, the occluded decryption key can be provided.

Security policy for device data

Aspects of the subject matter described herein relate to clusters. In aspects, an image is created to install software onto nodes of the cluster. A root secret of the cluster is injected into the image. After installing the software of the image onto a node of the cluster, the node may boot into a secure mode, detect that individualization is needed for the node to join a cluster, create an identity for authenticating with other nodes of the cluster, chain the identity via the root secret, and then securely erase the root secret from the node prior to assuming node duties. Among other things, this allows a single image to be used for installing software on all nodes of a cluster without the compromise of a single node compromising the entire cluster.

Automatic strong identity generation for cluster nodes

An application on a device can communicate with organization services. The application accesses a protection system on the device, which encrypts data obtained by the application from an organization service using an encryption key, and includes with the data an indication of a decryption key usable to decrypt the encrypted data. The protection system maintains a record of the encryption and decryption keys associated with the organization. The data can be stored in various locations on at least the device, and can be read by various applications on at least the device. If the organization determines that data of the organization stored on a device is to no longer be accessible on the device (e.g., is to be revoked from the device), a command is communicated to the device to revoke data associated with the organization. In response to this command, the protection system deletes the decryption key.

Data protection for organizations on computing devices

Techniques for secure data synchronization are described. In one or more implementations, techniques may be employed to conserve high cost data storage by storing larger portions of encrypted data in low cost storage, while storing relatively smaller encryption keys in higher cost storage. A device that is granted access to the encryption keys can retrieve the encrypted data from the low cost storage and use the encryption keys to decrypt the encrypted data.

Methods and a tool or instrument for performing the methods of protecting a computer program with a parameter cloud are disclosed. A parameter cloud comprising a plurality of elements may be created. Called functions of a computer program may have defined expected parameter cloud states so that proper behavior of the called function is achieved when the parameter cloud state is the expected parameter cloud state. An expected parameter cloud state may include a selected set of elements of the parameter cloud having assigned values. Static portions of the called functions may depend on a current parameter cloud state, and calling functions may transform the parameter cloud state prior to calling their respective called functions. The methods and instrument may operate on original source code or post-binary targets of the computer program. A fingerprint may be used to identify a specific computer program from a sequence of state transitions.

Software protection through interdependent parameter cloud constrained software execution

An event log can comprise, not only entries associated with components instantiated since a most recent power on of a computing device, but also entries of components instantiated prior to that power on, such as components that were instantiated, and represent, a state of the computing device prior to hibernation that has now been resumed. Upon hibernation, the current values of the Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) of a Trusted Platform Module (trusted execution environment), as well as a quote of those current values, and a current value of a monotonic counter of the trusted execution environment can be logged. The monotonic counter can be incremented at each power on to track successive generations of the computing device and to guard against an intervening, not-logged generation. A subsequent parsing of the event log can verify the prior generational entries with reference to the PCR values in the log that are associated with those generations.

Globally valid measured operating system launch with hibernation support

Presented is an anti-tampering method that validates and protects specific sections of a binary file. In one embodiment, this method permits a proxy engine to execute (via emulation by a virtual machine) the protected code on behalf of the binary in kernel mode upon successful completion of an integrity check. The integrity check can optionally check only the specific parts of code that the developer wishes to validate. The integrity check can cross binary boundaries. Moreover, the integrity check can be done on a hard drive or in memory. Furthermore, since the encrypted code is executed by the proxy engine in kernel mode, hackers are further deterred from modifying the code. Additionally, a method of creating a protected binary file is described herein.

Authentication of binaries in memory with proxy code execution

Growing community of inventors

Bothell, WA, United States of America

Nathan Jeffrey Ide