Gemplus

Gemalto Sa

Thales Dis France Sa

Nathalie Feyt

Olivier Benoit

David Naccache

Pascal Paillier

Marc Joye

Karine Villegas

Pascal Guterman

Christophe Arnoux

Florence Ques-Rochat

Benoit Chevallier Mames

Sébastien Petit

Christophe Clavier

The invention relates to an integrated circuit comprising at least one microprocessor [linked to at least one non-volatile memory [that can be accessed by sectors. The integrated circuit comprises a detector [for discovering when a threshold number of bad sectors has been exceeded in said non-volatile memory [

Detector of abnormal destruction of memory sectors

A countermeasure method in an electronic component using a secret key algorithm K on an input message M executes an operation O(D) on input data D. A random value, of one first random information U, is generated that is of identical size as the input information D. A second random information V, is calculated by performing an exclusive OR operation between the input information and the first random information U. The operation Oor the sequence of operations are successively executed on the first input information U and to the second random information V, supplying respectively a first random result O(U) and a second random result O(V).

Method for countermeasure in an electronic component using a secret key algorithm

The invention concerns a method for implementing in an electronic component a cryptographic algorithm using calculating means. The invention is characterized in that it consists in carrying out the following steps: a) selecting a value e among a specific number of values e, ebeing integers, b) checking if everifies a predetermined relationship: if so, then e=e, and storing e for use in calculating said cryptographic algorithm.

Method of implementing in an electronic component a cryptographic algorithm for finding the public exponent

A countermeasure method for a microcontroller that executes sequences of instructions. The instructions are executed according to a pipeline method. At least one waiting time is randomly introduced between two consecutive instructions and/or within at least one instruction. The method is implemented by the electronics of the microcontroller rather than by software addition.

Countermeasure method for a microcontroller based on a pipeline architecture

The invention concerns microprocessor cards and, in such cards, various devices for hiding operations performed in the card against fraudulent breaches by analysing the current consumed. The invention is characterised in that it consists in adding in the card a device ( ) modifying the consumed current, either by averaging it by integration, or by adding thereto random values by a random signal generator ( ) so as to hide the operations performed. In another embodiment, it consists in carrying out simultaneously an operation for making secure and writing in an EEPROM memory, the latter generating chaotic current variations which hide the operation to be made secure.

Devices for hiding operations performed in a microprocesser card

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Cuges les Pins, France

Nathalie Feyt