Visa International Service Association

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Yuexi Chen

Hao Ngo

Marc B Kekicheff

Christian Aabye

Kiushan Pirzadeh

Kenneth M Sippola

Aparna Krishnan Girish

Sonia Reed

Brian Sullivan

Dinah Sloan

William B Bedwell

Steven Crouch-Baker

Esperanza Alvarez

John Stephens Stotts

Mark Rigby

Francis Louis Tanzella

William Thaw

NFC terminal devices and corresponding integrated circuit cards (ICCs) use NFC Type 4 tags as a protocol interface for complex or encrypted communication protocols that are not natively supported by the NFC terminal devices. A smartphone acting as an NFC terminal may block applications and/or protocols other than NFC data exchange formatted (NDEF) messages. An ICC applet supporting an advanced function uses designated memory locations for the transfer of commands normally supported at an application level. Both the terminal side and the ICC applet may check the designated memory locations for updated data in the absence of protocol-level message controls.

Type 4 NFC tags as protocol interface

Embodiments provide for a method of allowing for communication between a portable device comprising a portable device NFC antenna and a user device comprising a user device NFC antenna using a bridge apparatus comprising a large coil, a small coil, and an amplifier circuit electrically coupling the large coil and the small coil. The method includes the small coil in the bridge apparatus receiving a near field communication (NFC) signal from the user device NFC antenna. The amplifying circuit can amplify the NFC signal to obtain an amplified NFC signal. The large coil in the bridge apparatus can transmit, to the portable device NFC antenna, the amplified NFC signal.

Powered NFC communication booster and extender

Provided are methods, systems, and computer program products for verifying a payment device using a magnetometer. The method includes detecting a magnetic signature of a payment device based on a magnetic field of the payment device affecting the magnetometer. The magnetic signature may be determined based on the structural composition of the payment device or a circuit arranged on or embedded in the payment device. The method also includes receiving payment device data for a transaction requested between an account associated with the payment device and an account of a merchant. The method further includes comparing the magnetic signature detected from the payment device with a stored magnetic signature associated with the payment device. The method further includes, in response to determining that the magnetic signatures match, approving the transaction.

System, method, and computer program product for verifying a payment device using a magnetometer

A method is disclosed. The method includes generating, by a communication device during an interaction with an access device, a cryptogram using transaction level data and interoperability level data; transmitting the transaction level data and interoperability level data to the access device; and transmitting the cryptogram the access device, wherein the access device or a remote server computer in communication with the access device validates the received cryptogram before allowing the transaction to proceed.

Binding cryptogram with protocol characteristics

A method includes forming a communication channel between a user device and an access device. The communication channel is then secured using a user device key pair in the user device and an access device ephemeral key pair in the access device. The access device then generates a session key using at least a private cryptographic key in the access device ephemeral key pair, and a public key in the user device key pair. The access device then uses the session key to secure an ultra-wideband communication channel between the user device and the access device.

Secure on-demand ultra-wideband communication channels systems and methods

Systems and methods for securing data transmissions using distance measurements are disclosed. A mobile device (such as a smart phone) and a base station can use ultra-wideband technology to determine the distance between the two devices. The distance measurements produced by the mobile device and the base station can be compared, directly or indirectly by the mobile device, the base station, and/or an access device to determine whether the mobile device is present at an access device or if the mobile device is not present at the access device (as expected during a relay attack). If the mobile device is not present at the access device, the access device can prevent or cancel an interaction based on the data transfer (e.g., opening a locked door of a secure building in response to receiving an access credential from the mobile device).

System and methods for data security using distance measurement

Growing community of inventors

San Ramon, CA, United States of America

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