Koninklijke Philips Corporation N.v.

Muhammad Asim

Milan Petkovic

Jin Qu

Tanya Ignatenko

Sandeep Shankaran Kumar

Petrus Johannes Lenoir

Jorge Guajardo Merchan

Changjie Wang

Sye Loong Keoh

Luan Ibraimi

A domain authorityfor use in a hierarchy of domain authorities in a hierarchical cryptographic system. The domain authoritycomprises a user secret key generatorfor generating a user secret key based on a domain secret key and one or more attribute representations, to obtain a user secret key associated with a set of attributes corresponding to the attribute representations, and wherein the domain secret key is based on a domain secret key of a parent domain authority or a root secret key of a root authority of the hierarchy of domain authorities, and wherein the attribute representations are independent of the hierarchy. A decrypter makes use of the user secret key. An encrypter generates ciphertext decryptable by the decrypter.

Hierarchical attribute-based encryption and decryption

An attribute-based digital signature system comprises a signature generation unit () for signing a message (m) by generating a signature (&#x3c3;) based on a user secret key (SK) associated with a set of user attributes, wherein the signature generation unit () is arranged for combining the user secret key (SK) with revocation data (R) to form at least part of the signature (&#x3c3;), wherein the revocation data (R) complements respective ones of a plurality of valid user secret keys and wherein the revocation data (R) prevents a revoked user secret key (SK) from being used to validly sign a message (m) with the set of user attributes. The system further comprises a revocation unit () for selectively removing at least part of the signing capability of a to-be-revoked user secret key (SK), by generating updated revocation data (R), wherein the updated revocation data (R) is based on at least part of the to-be-revoked user secret key (SK). A plurality of attribute authoritiesmay independently issue cryptographic keys.

Attribute-based digital signature system

A system for attribute-based encryption comprises a first encrypter () and a second encrypter (). The first encrypter () comprises an input unit () for determining a message and a policy over a set of attributes, wherein the policy comprises a plurality of components, and a first cryptographic unit () for generating an encrypted representation of the message and an encrypted representation of the plurality of components. The second encrypter () comprises a receiving unit () for receiving the encrypted representation of the message and the encrypted representation of the plurality of components, and a second cryptographic unit () for transforming the encrypted representation of the message and the encrypted representation of the plurality of components into an attribute-based encrypted message associated with the policy.

Attribute-based encryption

A method of dynamically determining the access rights of a client to a record comprises receiving an access request from the client with respect to the record, determining one or more contexts relating to the access request, calculating a score for each determined context, calculating an overall score from the context scores, accessing a rights policy for the record, the rights policy defining a plurality of different rights with respect to the record, each with a respective minimum score, and determining the client's access rights according to a comparison of the overall score to the score for each right in the rights policy.

Dynamic determination of access rights

An attribute-based digital signature system is disclosed. A first signature generating unit () is used for generating a first signature () for a document (), based on a first signature key () and the document (). A re-signing unit () is used for generating a second signature () for the document (), based on the first signature () and a re-signing key (), wherein the re-signing unit () is arranged for handling attributes () associated with the first signature () and/or the second signature (). The second signature () is associated with a second set of attributes () determined by the re-signing key (), wherein the second set of attributes () comprises a plurality of attributes. The first signature () is associated with a first set of attributes (), wherein the first set of attributes () comprises a plurality of attributes, and the re-signing unit () is arranged for generating the second signature () only if the first set of attributes () satisfies a set of conditions ().

Attribute-based digital signatures

A system is disclosed for providing interoperability between a plurality of data protection systems. The system includes an ontology () configured to store definitions () of concepts () relating to interface elements of at least two different data protection systems including a first data protection system () and a second data protection system (); and a mapping generator () configured to generate a mapping between at least one interface element of the first data protection system () and at least one interface element of the second data protection system (), based on the ontology (). The system comprises a message converter () configured to receive a message generated by the first data protection system (), convert the message based on the mapping to obtain a converted message, and transmit the converted message to the second data protection system ().

Interoperability between a plurality of data protection systems

A system including a server system, a user terminal and a hardware token, for providing secure access to a data record. The server system comprises storage means () for storing a plurality of data records, a data record () having associated therewith a sequence of secrets () shared with a hardware token () corresponding to the data record (), the server system () further being arranged for storing user authentication information (). User authenticating means () are provided for receiving authentication credentials () of a user from a user terminal () and authenticating the user as an authorized user, based on the authentication credentials () of the user and the stored authentication information (). Secret-receiving means () are provided for receiving a representation of a secret () revealed by a hardware token () and information identifying the data record corresponding to the hardware token from the terminal. Marking means () are provided for marking the unused secret (s) as used.

Secure access to personal health records in emergency situations

A method of authenticating a device and a user comprises obtaining a device ID for the device, performing a biometric measurement of the user, obtaining helper data for the user, and generating a key from the biometric measurement and helper data. There is then generated a message comprising the key or a component derived from the key, which transmitted to a remote service, and at the service there is carried out the step of authenticating the device and the user with the message. In a preferred embodiment, the generating of the key further comprises generating the key from the device ID.

Growing community of inventors

Eindhoven, Netherlands

Muhammad Asim