Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Morgan Asher Brown

David Charles Wrighton

John Lawrence Hamby

Mircea Trofin

Michal Strehovsky

Fadi M Hanna

Turgut Isik

Fatma Didem Gokbulut

Robert Yung-Yi Fu

Dharshan Rangegowda

Anthony S Chavez

Jiazhen Chen

Jeremy Scott Barton

Yi Zhang

Anatoliy Panasyuk

Geoffrey Hugh Outhred

David Mitford Gillies

Hasan Alkhatib

Murali Krishna Sangubhatla

Ram Viswanathan

Shawn Farkas

Mei-Chin Tsai

Ian Michael Bearman

Levi P Broderick

Gabriel Alexandru Ghiondea

Erdembilegt Janchivdorj

Barry Dorrans

David Adam Hartglass

Shah Mohammad Faizur Rahman

Levi Broderick

Techniques are described herein that are capable of providing security for code between a code generator and a compiler. The code generator generates source code. The code generator generates a first checksum of a file that includes the source code. The code generator provides the first checksum to the compiler via a secure channel. The compiler generates a second checksum of the file that includes the source code. The compiler determines whether to compile the source code based at least in part on whether the first checksum and the second checksum are the same. The first checksum and the second checksum being the same indicates that the source code is to be compiled. The first checksum and the second checksum being different indicates that the source code is not to be compiled.

Security of code between code generator and compiler

The present concepts relate to erasing the delay effects caused by latency. A server may model an environment. The server may transmit a series of state information relating to the state of the environment to a client. The client may receive an input provided by a user. In response, the client may transmit the input along with the state information to the server, where the state information corresponds to the state of the environment from the user's perspective at the time the user provided the input. The server may process the input according to the state information received with the input rather than the state of the environment being modeled by the server at the time the input is received by the server. Accordingly, the user may experience that the server is responsive to her inputs as though there were no latency.

Latency erasure

The authenticity of a compressed archive is verified without decompressing the files and/or directories contained therein and without impeding existing archive reader tools and utilities. A container is produced that includes a signature component and a compressed archive component. The signature component contains a digital signature of the compressed archive and the compressed archive component contains the compressed archive. The signature component and the compressed archive component are constructed as independent components so that existing software tools that operate on a compressed archive can still function in their normal course of operation.

Cryptographic verification of a compressed archive

A mechanism for generating optimized native code for a program having dynamic behavior uses a static analysis of the program to predict the likelihood that different elements of the program are likely to be used when the program executes. The static analysis is performed prior to execution of the program and marks certain elements of the program with confidence indicators that classify the elements with either a high level of confidence or a low level of confidence. The confidence indicators are then used by an ahead-of-time native compiler to generate native code and to optimize the code for faster execution and/or a smaller-sized native code.

Differentiated static analysis for dynamic code optimization

Support for dynamic behavior is specified while reducing reliance on JIT compilation and large runtimes; semantic characteristics are selectively attached to types and type members outside source code. A directives document contains human-readable directives in a parsable format for submission to an innovative compiler. The directives specify whether a type T or type member M is required, optional, or prohibited in a runtime environment. Some reference an application, library, assembly, or namespace group, and others reference group components: type, type instantiation, method, method instantiation, field, property, or event. Some directives force a generic instantiation. Some directives indirectly reference a type through a parameter, type parameter, or generic directive. Some directives reference degrees to manage runtime activation of type instances, runtime introspection over types, reflection, and/or runtime or static serialization. Degrees may enable or disable types, instance constructors, property setters, property getters, fields, or all type members. Directives may be composed.

Hierarchical directives-based management of runtime behaviors

Architecture that facilitates the virtual specification of a connection between physical endpoints. A network can be defined as an abstract connectivity model expressed in terms of the connectivity intent, rather than any specific technology. The connectivity model is translated into configuration settings, policies, firewall rules, etc., to implement the connectivity intent based on available physical networks and devices capabilities. The connectivity model defines the connectivity semantics of the network and controls the communication between the physical nodes in the physical network. The resultant virtual network may be a virtual overlay that is independent of the physical layer. Alternatively, the virtual overlay can also include elements and abstracts of the physical network(s). Moreover, automatic network security rules (e.g., Internet Protocol security-IPSec) can be derived from the connectivity model of the network.

Model-based virtual networking

In a multi-tenant environment, machines across the Internet, belonging to a particular subscription are securely enrolled with the tenant's subscription. Authentication of the machines is delegated to each of the tenant's own on-premise authentication mechanism The trust relationship with the tenant's authentication service is used to validate the security token presented by the machine being authenticated. Once authenticated, the machine has authorization (e.g. SSL machine cert for identity, security token, etc.,) to access the subscription. Each tenant within the multi-tenant environment can provide its own level of authentication. The machine presents the security token to the multi-tenant environment for requests for resources (e.g. services/content) from a user. When a request is received from a machine to access a resource, the multi-tenant environment determines from the issued token whether or not the machine is authorized to access the requested resources.

Secure machine enrollment in multi-tenant subscription environment

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Redmond, WA, United States of America

Morgan Asher Brown