Honeywell International Inc.

Michal Hojsik

Harshal Haridas

Lukas Pohanka

Alexander Chernoguzov

Stanley Robert Gorzelic

Mukunda Gudi

Jiri Findejs

Systems for communicating over a network and between two or more network connected devices. In particular, the disclosure reveals systems which may utilize multicast communication protocols to facilitate secure communication among one or more network connected devices. A system for secured messaging may include a network system including a first server, a second server and a first node. Further, the first server is configured to authenticate the first node for secure multicast messaging, and the second server is configured to authenticate the first node for secure multicast messaging.

System for communication on a network

Systems for communicating over a network and between two or more network connected devices. In particular, the disclosure reveals systems which include a first node having a first node message sequence counter, a second node having a second node message sequence counter, and wherein the second node is configured to synchronize the first node message sequence counter based on the second node message sequence counter.

Method for node message synchronization

A method includes securely booting a device using a bootloader, where the bootloader is digitally signed using a first cryptographic key associated with the bootloader. The method also includes executing one or more kernel or user applications using the device, where the one or more kernel or user applications are digitally signed using one or more second cryptographic keys associated with the one or more kernel or user applications. In addition, the method includes using an in-band channel to update or replace the first cryptographic key.

Secure in-band upgrade using key revocation lists and certificate-less asymmetric tertiary key pairs

A method includes receiving, from a device, (i) a certificate request for a certification authority and (ii) a first digital certificate. The certificate request is digitally signed by the first device, and the first digital certificate is stored in the device. The method also includes verifying, at the certification authority, the first digital certificate using a second digital certificate of another certification authority. The method further includes verifying a digital signature of the certificate request using the first digital certificate. In addition, the method includes, after verifying the first digital certificate and the digital signature, transmitting a second digital certificate to the device.

Automated certificate enrollment for devices in industrial control systems or other systems

A method includes verifying that firmware of a device is trusted and contains a root of trust. The method also includes verifying that a protected storage of the device contains a private or secret key associated with a device certificate that is stored in a persistent storage of the device. The method further includes verifying the device certificate of the device using the root of trust. In addition, the method includes, in response to verifying that the protected storage contains the private or secret key associated with the device certificate and verifying the device certificate, determining that the device is a genuine device. The root of trust could include a trusted certificate or a trusted public key.

Techniques for genuine device assurance by establishing identity and trust using certificates

An apparatus includes a first distributed control system (DCS) node. The first DCS includes at least one interface configured to communicate, over a network, with a second DCS node. The first DCS node also includes at least one processing device. The processing device is configured to exchange a security association policy with the second DCS node. The processing device is also configured to exchange public keys with the second DCS node using the security association policy. The processing device is also configured to send a public key of the second DCS node to a field programmable gate array of the first DCS node. The processing device is also configured to receive a shared secret from the field programmable gate array. The processing device is also configured to generate a hash of a message using the shared secret.

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Prague, Czechia

Michal Hojsik