Certivox Ltd.

Dublin City University

Miracl Limited

General Electric Capital Corporation

Omlis Limited

Michael Scott

Brian Spector

Kealan McCusker

Neil Costigan

Noel McCullagh

Brian P Spector

Gene Meyers

Kevin M Casey

Patrick M Daley

Brian John Mellen

A method in a first entity for authenticating itself to a second entity by proving to the second entity that it is in possession of a full secret without sending the full secret to the second entity, the method comprising: receiving in the first entity an input from a user, the full secret having been divided into at least a first factor and a second factor and the input relating to the second factor of the full secret; reconstructing in the first entity the full secret from at least the first factor and the input; and carrying out a calculation in the first entity using the reconstructed full secret and sending the results of the calculation to the second entity, wherein the results provide an input to a pairing calculation in the second entity.

Authentication

There is disclosed a method of authenticating a client computing device to a server, the client computing device and the server both parties to a common authentication approach, the client computing device including an encrypted identifier containing a secret, in which the client computing device cannot decrypt the encrypted identifier, in which the client computing device encrypts the encrypted identifier using the common authentication approach and sends the encrypted encrypted identifier to the server, and in which the server decrypts the encrypted encrypted identifier, using the common authentication approach and a server secret, so as to determine the secret. Related systems, servers, client computing devices, pairs of computer program products comprising a server program product and a client computing device program product, the server program product, or the client computing program product, are disclosed.

Authentication methods, systems, devices, servers and computer program products, using a pairing-based cryptographic approach

A system and method of authenticated ID-based key exchange and remote login with insecure token and PIN number can provide an authenticated key agreement protocol based on an elliptic curve bilinear type-3 pairing. A server acts as an Authentication Service to Clients and a Trusted Authority (TA) issues identity based secret numbers to Clients and Authentication Services. Included in the system and method is the capability for the Client to split their secret number into two parts, a Client selected PIN number, and the larger number, the Token.

System and method for secure two-factor authenticated ID-based key exchange and remote login using an insecure token and simple second-factor such as a PIN number

A method in a first entity for authenticating itself to a second entity by proving to the second entity that it is in possession of a full secret without sending the full secret to the second entity, the method comprising: receiving in the first entity an input from a user, the full secret having been divided into at least a first factor and a second factor and the input relating to the second factor of the full secret; reconstructing in the first entity the full secret from at least the first factor and the input; and carrying out a calculation in the first entity using the reconstructed full secret and sending the results of the calculation to the second entity, wherein the results provide an input to a pairing calculation in the second entity. The second entity carries out the pairing calculation to determine whether the client is in possession of the secret. The first entity may be a client and the second entity may be a server. A trusted authority may have issued the client with the secret and may also have issued the server with another secret to allow it to carry out the calculation to determine whether the client is in possession of its secret.

A system and method where the 'dealer' of a split Master Secret becomes the Master Key Server, whose role is to initially compute the Master Secret, create and distribute shares of the Master Secret to two Distributed Private Key Generators (D-PKG), initialize and route the inter-process communication between the nodes, co-ordinate and computationally participate in the User System's IBE Private Key generation process.

System and method for securing private keys issued from distributed private key generator (D-PKG) nodes

An apparatus, computer product, and a method for use in association with a joint venture are disclosed. The method including receiving information associated with a joint venture; determining an amount of a distribution based at least in part on an agreement; determining financial information for the joint venture based at least in part on the amount of the distribution; storing the financial information in a database; retrieving the financial information from the database using a processing system; providing a graphical user interface to allow a user to define a hurdle set; defining one or more hurdle sets in response to input to the graphical user interface; and determining, in the processing system, an amount of a distribution based at least in part on the financial information and one or more hurdle set.

Methods, apparatus and computer program products for use in association with joint ventures and/or potential joint ventures

A database management system () comprises up to fifty or more workstations (), each for a user. The environment may, for example, be a hospital and the system manages medical records in a secure manner. Each user has a private key issued by a KGC (). A database controller () updates a secure database () with data and associated signatures generated by the user workstations (). Thus every record of the secure database () has a signature to provide full traceability and non-repudiation of data edits/updates. It is important for the system () that the signatures are verified on a regular basis, say every hour. Such a task would be extremely processor-intensive if the database () is large. However this is performed by a verification processor () of the system () in a much shorter time than heretofore, t+n(&Dgr;), where tis the time for one verification, n is the number of signatures, and &Dgr; is a time value which is a very small proportion of t(less than 1%).

Verification of identity based signatures

A method of performing IBE cryptography comprising the steps of a key generation server transmitting a master public key to a processor, the processor generating or retrieving a fresh master public key derived from the master public key transmitted by the key generation centre, and the processor using the fresh master public key to generate a public key for transmitting a message to a recipient device having a corresponding private key. The processor may store the fresh master public key in a read only memory for repeated use or it may dynamically generate it. To dynamically generate the fresh master public key the processor multiplies the original master public key by a curve co-factor. The processor may be incorporated into a hand-held card, and it may transfer information to a linked second processor for performing some of the calculations.

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London, United Kingdom

Michael Scott