Intel Corporation

Michael Lemay

David M Durham

Ravi L Sahita

Barry E Huntley

Vedvyas Shanbhogue

Gilbert A Neiger

Sergej Deutsch

Andrew V Anderson

Deepak K Gupta

Karanvir S Grewal

Jason W Brandt

Michael E Kounavis

Santosh Ghosh

Baiju V Patel

Men Long

David A Koufaty

Mingwei Zhang

Ramya Jayaram Masti

Vadim Sukhomlinov

Asit K Mallick

Scott H Robinson

Beeman C Strong

Salmin Sultana

Joseph Frank Cihula

Arumugam Thiyagarajah

Kshitij Arun Doshi

Jr-Shian Tsai

Stanislav Shwartsman

Jacob Doweck

Ido Ouziel

Krishna Bhuyan

Ye Zhuang

Geoffrey S Strongin

Milind Baburao Girkar

Howard C Herbert

Jason Martin

Keith L Shippy

Yuriy Bulygin

Josh Triplett

Dmitry Babokin

Amitabh Das

Enrico Perla

Areg Melik-Adamyan

James C Farwell

Karanvir Ken S Grewal

Hans Goran Liljestrand

Willem Pinckaers

Mohan J Kumar

Siddhartha Chhabra

Rita H Wouhaybi

Manoj R Sastry

Ravishankar Iyer

Andrew J Herdrich

Sara S Baghsorkhi

Sreenivas Subramoney

Ravi Rajwar

Alexander Bachmutsky

Mingqiu Sun

Ian M Steiner

Xiaoning Li

Jayesh Gaur

Ofer Levy

Steffen Schulz

Anant V Nori

Jeffrey D Chamberlain

Eric Dahlen

Nilesh K Jain

Mohammad R Haghighat

Anna Trikalinou

Amin Firoozshahian

Richard T Beckwith

Jose K Sia, Jr

Vinay Phegade

Yeluri Raghuram

Markus T Metzger

Anil Rao

Kai Cong

Leeor Peled

Scott Constable

John M Esper

Maria Bezaitis

Thilo Schmitt

Teck Joo Goh

Joydeep Rakshit

Harshad S Sane

Anup Mohan

Michael Prinke

Timothy G Coppernoll

Jonathan Edwards

David D Durham

Peiming Liu

Wenyong Huang

Yonghae Kim

Methods, apparatus, systems, and articles of manufacture are disclosed that perform bounds checking on authorized memory allocations during pointer arithmetic. In some examples, instruction decode circuitry decodes an update pointer instruction for a pointer. In some examples, bounds checking circuitry determines an authorized allocation for the pointer, determines one or more exclusion zones and poison zones for the pointer. In some examples, bounds checking circuitry updates the pointer and generates a fault if the pointer points to one of the exclusion zones and poisons the pointer if the pointer points to one of the poison zones.

Apparatus, computer-readable medium, and method for reducing bounds checking overhead by instrumenting pointer arithmetic

Techniques disclosed include selecting a first key identifier (ID) for a first compartment of a compartmentalized process of a computing system, the first compartment including first private data; assigning a first extended page table (EPT) having at least one memory address including the first key ID; encrypting the first private data with a first key associated with the first key ID; and storing the encrypted first private data in a memory starting at the at least one memory address of the first EPT.

Fast key ID switching via extended paging for cryptographic intra-process isolation

An apparatus includes circuitry to receive a memory access request based on a memory address in a memory allocation of a program. The memory allocation is assigned to a slot of memory apportioned into a plurality of slots. The circuitry is to calculate an index based, at least in part, on whether a size of the slot exceeds a slot threshold size, and determine whether a buffer communicatively coupled to the circuitry includes a buffer entry corresponding to the index and containing a set of metadata associated with the memory allocation. Based on the slot size, the circuitry is to calculate the index by either determining a metadata virtual address or by determining a virtual address of a midpoint of the slot. The indexed data may include bounds and tag information for the circuitry to determine if a memory access is within the bounds and matches the tag value.

Efficient caching and queueing for per-allocation non-redundant metadata

An example method comprises storing, in a register, an encoded pointer to a memory location, where first context information is stored in first bits of the encoded pointer and a slice of a memory address of the memory location is encrypted and stored in second bits of the encoded pointer. The method further includes decoding the encoded pointer to obtain the memory address of the memory location, using the memory address obtained by decoding the encoded pointer to access encrypted data at the memory location, and decrypting the encrypted data based on a first key and a first tweak value. The first tweak value includes one or more bits derived, at least in part, from the encoded pointer.

Pointer based data encryption

Techniques for cryptographic computing isolation are described. A processor includes circuitry to be coupled to memory configured to store one or more instructions. The circuitry is to execute the one or more instructions to instantiate a first process based on an application. To instantiate the first process is to include creating a context table to be used by the first process, identifying a software component to be invoked during the first process, encrypting the software component using a first cryptographic key, and creating a first entry in the context table. The first entry is to include first context information identifying the encrypted software component and second context information representing the first cryptographic key. In more specific embodiments, third context information representing a first load address of the encrypted software component is stored in the first entry of the context table.

Cryptographic computing isolation for multi-tenancy and secure software components

Technologies provide domain isolation using encoded pointers to data and code. A system may be configured for decoding an encoded pointer to obtain a linear address of an encrypted code block of a first software component in memory. The first software component shares a linear address space of the memory with a plurality of software components. A processor uses the linear address to access the encrypted code block, determines a relative position of the encrypted code block within a memory slot of the linear address space, and decrypts the encrypted code block to generate a decrypted code block using a code key and a code tweak. The code tweak includes a relative position of the encrypted code block in the address space and domain metadata that uniquely identifies the software component. In some scenarios, the software component may be position independent code and may be relocatable to different address spaces.

Stateless and low-overhead domain isolation using cryptographic computing

Technologies disclosed herein provide cryptographic computing with cryptographically encoded pointers in multi-tenant environments. An example method comprises executing, by a trusted runtime, first instructions to generate a first address key for a private memory region in the memory and generate a first cryptographically encoded pointer to the private memory region in the memory. Generating the first cryptographically encoded pointer includes storing first context information associated with the private memory region in first bits of the first cryptographically encoded pointer and performing a cryptographic algorithm on a slice of a first linear address of the private memory region based, at least in part, on the first address key and a first tweak, the first tweak including the first context information. The method further includes permitting a first tenant in the multi-tenant environment to access the first address key and the first cryptographically encoded pointer to the private memory region.

Cryptographic computing using encrypted base addresses and used in multi-tenant environments

This disclosure is directed to a system for address mapping and translation protection. In one embodiment, processing circuitry may include a virtual machine manager (VMM) to control specific guest linear address (GLA) translations. Control may be implemented in a performance sensitive and secure manner, and may be capable of improving performance for critical linear address page walks over legacy operation by removing some or all of the cost of page walking extended page tables (EPTs) for critical mappings. Alone or in combination with the above, certain portions of a page table structure may be selectively made immutable by a VMM or early boot process using a sub-page policy (SPP). For example, SPP may enable non-volatile kernel and/or user space code and data virtual-to-physical memory mappings to be made immutable (e.g., non-writable) while allowing for modifications to non-protected portions of the OS paging structures and particularly the user space.

System for address mapping and translation protection

A processor is to execute a first instruction to perform a simulated return in a program from a callee function to a caller function based on a first input stack pointer encoded with a first security context of a first callee stack frame. To perform the simulated return is to include generating a first simulated stack pointer to the caller stack frame. The processor is further to, in response to identifying an exception handler in the first caller function, execute a second instruction to perform a simulated call based on a second input stack pointer encoded with a second security context of the caller stack frame. To perform the simulated call is to include generating a second simulated stack pointer to a new stack frame containing an encrypted instruction pointer associated with the exception handler. The second simulated stack pointer is to be encoded with a new security context.

Updating encrypted security context in stack pointers for exception handling and tight bounding of on-stack arguments

Methods and apparatus relating to techniques for region-based deterministic memory safety are described. In some embodiment, one or more instructions may be used to encrypt, decrypt, and/or check a pointer to a portion of the data stored in memory. The portion of the data is stored in a first region of the memory. The first region of the memory includes a plurality of identically sized allocation slots. Other embodiments are also disclosed and claimed.

Region-based deterministic memory safety

A method comprises receiving, in a store buffer, at least a portion of a store instruction, the at least a portion of the store instruction comprising a data operand and a first object capability register operand which comprises a first object type identifier for a first object, obtaining, from a corresponding load instruction, a second object capability register operand which comprises a second object type identifier, and determining whether the first object type identifier matches the second object type identifier.

Typed store buffers for hardening store forwarding

Technologies disclosed herein provide cryptographic computing. An example method comprises executing a first instruction of a first software entity to receive a first input operand indicating a first key associated with a first memory compartment of a plurality of memory compartments stored in a first memory unit, and execute a cryptographic algorithm in a core of a processor to compute first encrypted contents based at least in part on the first key. Subsequent to computing the first encrypted contents in the core, the first encrypted contents are stored at a memory location in the first memory compartment of the first memory unit. More specific embodiments include, prior to storing the first encrypted contents at the memory location in the first memory compartment and subsequent to computing the first encrypted contents in the core, moving the first encrypted contents into a level one (L1) cache outside a boundary of the core.

Cryptographic isolation of memory compartments in a computing environment

Embodiments are directed to tagless implicit integrity with multi-perspective pattern search for memory safety. An embodiment of an apparatus includes one or more processors comprising hardware circuitry to: access encrypted data stored in a memory hierarchy using a pointer; decrypt the encrypted data using a current version of a pointer tag of the pointer to yield first decrypted data; perform an entropy test on the first decrypted data; responsive to the entropy test failing to detect patterns in the first decrypted data, re-decrypt the encrypted data using one or more different versions of the pointer tag of the pointer to yield one or more other decrypted data; perform the entropy test on the one or more other decrypted versions; and responsive to the entropy test detecting the patterns in the one or more other decrypted data, signal an exception to the one or more processors with respect to the encrypted data.

Tagless implicit integrity with multi-perspective pattern search

A method comprises receiving, in a store buffer, at least a portion of a store instruction, the at least a portion of the store instruction comprising a data operand, receiving, a load instruction for execution; and determining whether the store instruction and the load instruction are in different compartments.

Compartment isolation for load store forwarding

The technology includes allocating an object in a memory and setting an ownership identifier (ID) in the allocated object, the allocated object being associated with a first variable in a program and setting a matching ownership ID in a pointer to the allocated object. When the allocated object is accessed during execution of the program by a processor, an exception is generated when the ownership ID in the allocated object does not match the ownership ID in the pointer, and execution of the program is continued when the ownership ID in the allocated object does match the ownership ID in the pointer.

Cryptographic enforcement of borrow checking

Growing community of inventors

Hillsboro, OR, United States of America

Michael Lemay