Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Salesforce Com, Inc.

Michael J Grass

Innokentiy Basmov

Octavian Tony Ureche

Nathan Jeffrey Ide

Preston Derek Adam

Peter Novotney

Christopher R Macaulay

Carl Melvin Ellison

Benjamin E Nick

Vijay G Bharadwaj

Charles Glenn Jeffries

Dustin Michael Ingalls

Magnus Nystrom

Sai Vinayak

Matthew Charles Setzer

Gaurav Sinha

Emily Nicole Wilson

Scott Daniel Anderson

David John Linsley

Alex Mark Semenko

Alain Franck Gefflaut

Richard Allen Pletcher

Saurav Sinha

Arthur Zwiegincew

Gopinathan Kannan

Narendra Shripati Acharya

Kinshuman Kinshumann

Malcolm James Smith

Dhiraj Hegde

Alex Bendetov

Andrey Shedel

James Aaron Holmes

Ian Chakeres

Aaron M Farmer

Troy E Shaw

Techniques are disclosed relating to provisioning fault domain sets (FDS). In some embodiments, a computer server system implements an FDS for disseminating a storage service across a plurality of fault domains. To implement the FDS, in some embodiments, the computer server system access FDS data specifying a desired state of the FDS in which the storage service is disseminated across at least a particular number of fault domains. The computer server system may determine available resources of the plurality of fault domains and determine a current state of the FDS based on fault domains that have already been provisioned to the FDS. Based on at least the desired state of the FDS, the current state of the FDS, and the available resources, the computer server system provisions one or more additional fault domains to the FDS to reconcile the FDS's current state with the FDS's desired state.

Techniques for implementing fault domain sets

In one embodiment, an encryption system may protect user login metadata from hammering attacks. A data storage may store an integrity protected data set for an operating system in a storage location. A processor may register a counter reading from a remote counter in a secure location separate from the storage location. The processor may determine a lockout state of the integrity protected data set based on the counter reading.

Rollback protection for login security policy

In one embodiment, an encryption system may protect user login metadata from hammering attacks. A data storagemay store an integrity protected data setfor an operating system in a storage location. A processormay register a counter reading from a remote counterin a secure locationseparate from the storage location. The processormay determine a lockout state of the integrity protected data setbased on the counter reading.

Techniques for providing security policy for device data are described. In implementations, data on a device is stored in an encrypted form. To protect the encrypted data from being decrypted by an unauthorized entity, techniques enable a decryption key to be occluded if an attempt to gain unauthorized access to device data is detected. In implementations, a decryption key can be occluded in a variety of ways, such as by deleting the decryption key, overwriting the encryption key in memory, encrypting the encryption key, and so on. Embodiments enable an occluded decryption key to be recovered via a recovery experience. For example, a recovery experience can include an authentication procedure that requests a recovery password. If a correct recovery password is provided, the occluded decryption key can be provided.

Security policy for device data

Embodiments of the disclosure provide access to data in a compressed container through dynamic redirection, without storing decompressed data in persistent memory. The compressed container is stored in a first portion of memory. User data and reference files, with redirect pointers, for accessing corresponding files in the compressed container are stored in a second portion of memory. A command to access data is detected by a computing device. The redirect pointer in the reference file associated with the command redirects access to the corresponding compressed version of data stored in the compressed container. The corresponding accessed compressed version of data is decompressed on the fly and provided in response to the command without storing the decompressed data in persistent memory. Some embodiments provide integrity protection to validate the data coming from the compressed container.

Accessing data in a compressed container through dynamic redirection

An application on a device can communicate with organization services. The application accesses a protection system on the device, which encrypts data obtained by the application from an organization service using an encryption key, and includes with the data an indication of a decryption key usable to decrypt the encrypted data. The protection system maintains a record of the encryption and decryption keys associated with the organization. The data can be stored in various locations on at least the device, and can be read by various applications on at least the device. If the organization determines that data of the organization stored on a device is to no longer be accessible on the device (e.g., is to be revoked from the device), a command is communicated to the device to revoke data associated with the organization. In response to this command, the protection system deletes the decryption key.

Data protection for organizations on computing devices

A portable secure data file includes an encrypted data portion and a metadata portion. When a request associated with a current user of a device to access a portable secure data file is received, one or more records in the metadata portion are accessed to determine whether the current user is permitted to access the file data in the encrypted data portion. If a record indicates the user is permitted to access the file data, a content encryption key in that record is used to decrypt the encrypted data portion.

Portable secure data files

Growing community of inventors

Kenmore, WA, United States of America

Michael J Grass