Landis+gyr Innovations, Inc.

Lenovo (singapore) Pte. Ltd.

Lenovo Global Technology (united States) Inc.

Landis+gyr Technology, Inc.

Michael Gerard Demeter

Igor Stolbikov

Stephen John Chasko

Makoto Ono

Fred Allison Bower, Iii

Joseph Michael Pennisi

Scott Alan Piper

John Bettendorff

Pushpesh Kumar Deshmukh

Ashok Mahadevan

Timothy James Rutten

Rod D Waltermann

Ming Lei

William Laurence Jaeger, Jr

Pierre Mouallem

Douglas Beloskur

Sudhir Shetty

Timothy Rutten

Target data may be associated with a location requirement established by a data owner. A data access module may be used to attempt access to the target data. Location requirement and provenance metadata associated with the target data are obtained. The provenance metadata must be validated, and evidence only approved data access locations identified in the location requirement. A current location of a computing device attempting access to the target data must also meet the location requirement. The computing device is allowed to access the target data only in response to the current location and each location identified in the provenance metadata meeting the location requirement. The provenance metadata is updated to include a new record including the current data access location.

Securing data via encrypted geo-located provenance metadata

Baseboard management controller ('BMC') group administration includes: receiving, by a member BMC from a leader BMC, a leader certificate and a request to join a group of the leader BMC, where the request is signed by the leader BMC and the leader certificate is signed by a certificate authority; authenticating, by the member BMC, the leader certificate and the request; and sending, by the member BMC, an acknowledgement to the leader BMC to join the leader BMC's group.

Baseboard management controller group administration

One embodiment provides a method, including: receiving, at a server from a device, a request for device authentication across an unsecure network, the request including a device registration token; generating, at the server, a shared registration key utilizing the device registration token; verifying, at the server, the device registration token by comparing the device registration token to a function of the shared registration key; and producing, at the server and responsive to verifying the device registration token, a one-time activation token and sending the one-time activation token to the device. Other aspects are described and claimed.

Device authentication across unsecure network

Techniques for secure team-based communication on existing wireless mesh networks are disclosed. In an example, a first network node receives a network encryption key from a headend system. The first network node receives a sub-group encryption key that is unique to a sub-group of nodes, a sub-group identifier, and a sub-group node list that lists the sub-group of nodes associated with the sub-group identifier. The first network node generates an application layer message for a second node of the sub-group of nodes at an application layer. The first network node encrypts the application layer message using the sub-group encryption key. The first network node generates a team packet that is addressed to a selected node and includes the encrypted application layer message and the sub-group identifier. The first network node encrypts the team packet using the network encryption key and transmits the encrypted team packet to the selected node.

Secure peer-to-peer communication over wireless mesh networks

One or more device(s) is identified for which ownership of the device(s) is to be transferred from an identified transferor system to an identified transferee system. An ephemeral device transfer token is generated for the transferor using an elliptic-curve Diffie-Hellman cryptographic function, wherein the ephemeral device transfer token is only valid over a limited period of time to authorize a transfer of ownership of the device from the transferor to the transferee. The transferor then delivers the ephemeral device transfer token to the transferee. A device ownership record may be modified to transfer ownership of the device from the transferor to the transferee in response to receiving the ephemeral device transfer token from the transferee during the limited time period.

Secure device ownership transfer using an ephemeral device transfer token generated using elliptic curve cryptography

A method for performing a blockchain operation includes receiving an indication of a number of a plurality of endpoints in a processing network. The method further includes assigning nonce offsets to each endpoint of the plurality of endpoints and assigning communication randomization windows to each endpoint of the plurality of endpoints. The communication randomization windows stagger communication windows of the endpoints to a head-end. Additionally, the method includes sending a message to each of the endpoints indicating an operation to perform and an expected result. Further, the method includes receiving a success indication from a first endpoint of the plurality of endpoints. The success indication including a nonce match value from the nonce offset of the first endpoint. Furthermore, the method includes verifying a nonce match value with the expected result.

Cryptographic operations using internet of things device pool

One embodiment provides a method, including: receiving, at a remote device and from a user, a request to generate a one-time password for accessing a default account of a device, wherein the remote device comprises a device public key corresponding to the device and an account public/private key pair corresponding to the default account; generating, at the remote device, the one-time password utilizing the account private key and the device public key; and providing, from the remote device, the one-time password to the user. Other aspects are described and claimed.

Default account authentication

Systems and methods for secure team-based communication on existing wireless mesh networks are disclosed. In an example network with multiple network nods, a headend system designates a first network node and a second network node as a sub-group of nodes, generates a sub-group encryption key that is unique to the sub-group of nodes, and transmits the sub-group encryption key and the sub-group node list and to the first node and the second node. The first node encrypts an application layer message with the sub-group encryption key and sends the message to the second node. The second node decrypts the application layer message with the sub-group encryption key and performs an action based on the message.

Systems and methods are provided for generating subsequent encryption keys by a client device as one of a plurality of client devices across a network. Each client device is provided with the same key generation information and the same key setup information from an authentication server. Each client device maintains and stores its own key generation information and key setup information. Using its own information, each client device generates subsequent encryption keys that are common or the same across devices. These subsequent encryption keys are generated and maintained the same across devices without any further instruction or information from the authentication server or any other client device. Additionally, client devices can recover the current encryption key by synchronizing information with another client device.

System and method for updating an encryption key across a network

Systems and methods for detecting intrusion into a data network are disclosed. Such intrusion can be detected, for example, by providing at least two network devices in a data network. Each of the network devices has a decoy cryptographic key that is used to detect unauthorized data and an authentic cryptographic key that is used to encrypt authorized data. The first network device receives data from the second network device that is encrypted using the decoy cryptographic key. The first network device determines that the data is encrypted using the decoy cryptographic key. The first network device deletes or otherwise discards the data encrypted using the decoy cryptographic key. The first network device can generate an alert message instructing other network devices that the second network device is generating the unauthorized data. The alert message also instructs the other network devices to ignore data originating from the second network device.

Growing community of inventors

Roswell, GA, United States of America

Michael Gerard Demeter