Oracle International Corporation

Mauruthi Geetha Mohan

Tony Long

Anthony Long

Mina Anes

David Dale Becker

Bill Chau

Thomas James Andrews

Deepak Kumar

Jun Tong

Sanjeeb Kumar Sahoo

Karthik Venkatesh

Madhu Manjunath

Frederick Anthonisamy Bosco

Burak Uzun

Geetha Ravi

Jodi Robertson

Adam Franklin Wilford

Haya Majeed

Mina Michel Gorgy Anes

Saranya Mani

Timothy Kraus

Yingyu Yang

Raj Miglani

Bharat Shivram

Bakhtiyar Uddin

Mayank Bajpai

Akshay Mall

Apurv Awasthi

Brady Turner

Mukesh Shah

An identity service in a cloud environment is communicatively coupled to a proxy key vault in the cloud environment and to an external key manager (EKM) located outside of the cloud environment. The identity service receives a token request for a communication credential from the proxy key vault and verifies the request based on a client credential associated with the proxy key vault. The identity service generates the client credential and signs the communication credential with a private key associated with the EKM. The identify service transmits the signed communication credential to the proxy key vault. The communication credential can be used to substantiate cryptographic operation requests to the EKM.

System and method for two way trust between an external key management system and a cloud computing infrastructure

Operations of a digital signature manager may include detecting, in a certificate repository on a first virtual cloud network, set of one or more new certificate authority (CA) certificates; transmitting, to a key management service hosted on a second virtual cloud network, a CA dataset that includes the set of one or more new CA certificates; receiving, from the key management service, a digital signature of the CA dataset generated based at least on a global private key stored on the second virtual cloud network in a private key repository associated with the key management service; and storing the digital signature in the certificate repository in a data structure that associates the digital signature with the CA dataset.

Authenticating certificate bundles with asymmetric keys

Operations may include receiving, from a first network entity, a first request for a first certificate revocation list (CRL) that identifies a first CRL distribution point (CDP) corresponding to the first CRL; mapping the first CDP to a first CRL identifier of a set of available CRL identifiers; locating, in a CRL repository, a first CRL based on the first CRL identifier; and transmitting the first CRL to the first network entity.

Certificate revocation list management services

Operations of a certificate authority (CA) service may include aggregating in a certificate repository, a plurality of sets of CA certificates, in which each set of CA certificates is issued by a particular CA that is associated with a particular trust zone and that is trusted by a particular set of network entities located in the particular trust zone. The operations may further include distributing for access by an additional set of network entities, an aggregate set of CA certificates that includes the plurality of sets of CA certificates. The additional set of network entities may utilize the plurality of sets of CA certificates to authenticate network entities located in different trust zones.

Aggregating certificate authority certificates for authenticating network entities located in different trust zones

Operations of a certificate bundle distribution service may include: detecting a trigger condition to distribute a certificate bundle that includes a set of certificate authority certificates; determining, for each of a plurality of network entities associated with a computer network, a fault domain representing at least one single point of failure; partitioning the plurality of network entities into a plurality of certificate distribution groups, based on a set of partitioning criteria that includes a fault domain of each particular network entity, in which each particular certificate distribution group includes a particular subset of network entities, and the particular subset of network entities are associated with a particular fault domain; selecting a particular certificate distribution group, of the plurality of certificate distribution groups, for distribution of the certificate bundle; and transmitting the certificate bundle to the particular subset of network entities in the particular certificate distribution group.

Distributing certificate bundles according to fault domains

A method may include transmitting a request for metadata associated with a compute instance and receiving, by a computing system, metadata associated with the compute instance signed with a private key. The private key may be associated with a public key. The method may include receiving a request to access a cloud resource and transmitting the request for the metadata. The method may also include receiving the metadata. The metadata may indicate that the compute instance is hosted on the computing system. The method may also include transmitting, to an instance principal service, a request for an instance principal certificate. The request may include the metadata signed with the private key and be cryptographically verified by the instance principal service using the public key. The method may also include receiving the instance principal certificate and providing access to the could resource based on the instance principal certificate.

Secure instance metadata as cryptographic identity

Techniques described herein relate to authorization between integrated cloud products. An example includes receiving, by a computing device and from a first resource, a first request for permission to access a certificate to verify a requestor's identity. The computing device can transmit a second request to a second resource to authorize permitting access to the certificate. The computing device can receive a response from the second resource comprising an authorization to permit access to the certificate. The computing device can grant permission to the first resource to access the certificate, wherein the first resource is configured to verify the requestor's identity based on accessing the certificate. The computing device can receive a third request from the first resource to generate an association object between the first resource and the certificate. The computing device can generate the association object, wherein the association object associates the first resource and the certificate.

Authorization between integrated cloud products using association

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Seattle, WA, United States of America

Mauruthi Geetha Mohan