Cryptography Research, Inc.

Altera Corporation

Xilinx, Inc.

Groq, Inc.

Rambus Inc.

Matthew Pond Baker

Michael Hutter

Steven L Teig

Andrea Olgiati

Elena Trichina

Jean-Michel Cioranesco

Weiguang Lu

Elke De Mulder

Pankaj Rohatgi

Srivathsa Dhruvanarayan

Chen Wei Tseng

Rodrigo Portella Do Canto

Boone Jared Severson

Systems and methods for protecting block cipher computation operations, from external monitoring attacks. An example apparatus for implementing a block cipher may comprise: a first register configured to store a first pre-computed mask value represented by a combination of a first random value and a second random value; a second register configured to store an output mask value, wherein the output mask value is an inverse permutation function of the first random value; a third register configured to store a second pre-computed mask value represented by a combination the first pre-computed mask value and a permutation function of the output mask value; a fourth register configured to store an input mask value, wherein the input mask value is a combination of an expansion function of the first random value and a key mask value; a non-linear transformation circuit configured to apply the expansion function to a masked round state, perform a non-linear transformation of a combination of a masked key with an output of the expansion function, and apply the permutation function to the output of the non-linear transformation, wherein the non-linear transformation is defined using the input mask value stored in the fourth register and the output mask value stored in the second register; and two round feedback circuits configured to swap the masked round state produced by the non-linear transformation and combine the masked round state with the first pre-computed mask value stored in the first register and the second pre-computed mask value stored in the third register.

Protecting block cipher computation operations from external monitoring attacks

Disclosed is a method and a system to execute the method to perform a first hashing operation to compute a first hash value, store the first hash value in a plurality of output registers, store a second message in a plurality of input registers, perform a first iteration of a second hashing operation, with an input to the second hashing operation including the second message and the first hash value, determine that a first portion of the second message, stored in a first register of the plurality of input registers, has been processed in course of the second hashing operation, and move a first portion of the first hash value stored in a first register of the plurality of output registers to the first register of the plurality of input registers.

Memory optimization for nested hash operations

An indication of a mode of operation to be performed with a block cipher may be received. Logic associated with the block cipher may be configured based on the indicated mode of operation to be performed with the block cipher. Furthermore, an input data and a mask data may be received. The input data may be combined with the mask data to generate a masked input data based on the configured logic. The masked input data may be provided to the block cipher based on the configured logic and an output data may be generated with the block cipher based on the provided masked input data.

Programmable block cipher with masked inputs

A first plurality of logic gates and a second plurality of logic gates may be associated with a symmetric configuration. A first output at a first value may be generated by the first plurality of logic gates based on a first portion of input signals. A second output may be generated by the second plurality of logic gates at the first value based on a second portion of the input signals. A subsequent first output at a particular value may be generated by the first plurality of logic gates based on a first portion of a second plurality of input signals and a subsequent second output may be generated by the second plurality of logic gates based on a second portion of the second plurality of input signals. A value of the subsequent second output may be complementary to the particular value of the subsequent first output.

Freeze logic

An indication of an operating mode of an asynchronous circuit may be received. A determination may be made as to whether the operating mode of the asynchronous circuit corresponds to a self-test of the asynchronous circuit. In response to determining that the operating mode of the asynchronous circuit corresponds to the self-test, a first clock signal may be provided to a first portion of a self-test component in a feedback path of the asynchronous circuit and a second clock signal may be provided to a second portion of the self-test component in the feedback path of the asynchronous circuit. Furthermore, a test value may be generated based on the first clock signal and the second clock signal.

Self-test of an asynchronous circuit

Embodiments of the present disclosure pertain to improved circuit and system architectures for identifying and managing operating statuses and faults in a system having multiple processing circuit chips. Each of the multiple processing circuit chips includes multiple signal rings, one to provide internal communications among circuitry within the circuit chip, and another with inter-chip communications circuitry to provide communications with neighboring circuit chips. One of the multiple processing circuit chips further includes external communications circuitry to provide communications with an external host.

Multichip fault management

An integrated circuit may implement a masked substitution box that includes substitution function components, a decoder, and a logic component. Each of the substitution function components may receive a same input value and a different mask value and may generate a respective output mask value based on the same input value and respective different mask value The decoder may receive an input mask value and generate a decoded output value that is based on the received input mask value. The logic component may select one of the output mask values from one of the substitution function components based on the decoded output value.

Hardware masked substitution box for the data encryption standard

A first hash value is calculated by using a first input value that is stored in a first set of registers. The first hash value is then stored in a second set of registers. A second input value is stored in the first set of registers after calculating the first hash value. The second hash value is calculated based on the first hash value and the second input value. During the calculating of the second hash value, the first hash value is shifted from the second set of registers to a portion of the first set of registers when the calculating of the second hash value has reached a state where the portion of the first set of registers is no longer used to store the second input value.

A first plurality of logic gates and a second plurality of logic gates may be associated with a symmetric configuration. A first output at a first value may be generated by the first plurality of logic gates based on a first portion of input signals. A second output may be generated by the second plurality of logic gates at the first value based on a second portion of the input signals. A subsequent first output at a particular value may be generated by the first plurality of logic gates based on a first portion of a second plurality of input signals and a subsequent second output maybe generated by the second plurality of logic gates based on a second portion of the second plurality of input signals. A value of the subsequent second output may be complementary to the particular value of the subsequent first output.

An integrated circuit may implement a masked substitution box that includes a counter that generates counter values. An input mask component may generate unmasked input values based on a combination of respective counter values and an input mask value. Furthermore, a substitution function component may receive the unmasked input values and may generate output values based on respective unmasked input values and a substitution function. An output mask component may generate masked output values based on a combination of respective output values and an output mask value. The masked output values may be stored at memory elements.

A method of monitoring operations of a set of ICs. The method loads a first set of configuration data into a first IC for configuring a group of configurable circuits of the first IC to perform operations of a user design. The method receives a definition of an event based on values of a set of signals in the user design and a set of corresponding actions to take when the event occurs. The set of signals includes at least one signal received from a second IC. The method generates an incremental second set of configuration data based on the definition of the event and the set of corresponding actions. While the first IC is performing the operations of the user design, the method loads the incremental second set of configuration data into the first IC and monitors the signals received from the second IC at the first IC.

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Matthew Pond Baker