Rockwell Collins, Inc.

Matthew M Wilding

David S Hardin

David A Greve

James A Marek

Allen P Mass

Mark A Bortz

T Douglas Hiratzka

John K Gee

Sung J Kim

Philippe M T Limondin

Nick M Mykris

Michael H Masters

Raymond J Richards

Cross-Domain guard with authentication and authorization function used to protect data transferred between two separate and secure networks. The guard utilizes an existing audit port to provide the capability augment or replace data-forwarding decisions, which were previously being based solely on whether the data is in a well-formed packet. The authentication and authorization may be resident in a partition, a side car processor or a separate network.

High assurance guard for security applications utilizing authentication and authorization services for sources of network data

The present invention is directed to routing information between networks of differing security level. Communication to/from each network is handled by a dedicated Offload Engine (OE). Each OE interfaces to a Guard Engine through a Guard Data Mover (GDM) and includes an interface for connecting to an external network. A first OE receives a data packet from a first network intended to be transmitted to a second network. The Guard Engine analyzes the data packet. The Guard Engine includes an ACL (Access Control List) which are rules data packets must meet before being passed onto a destination network. If allowed, the Guard Engine delivers the data packet to the second network via a second OE utilizing a GDM associated with the first OE and a GDM associated with the second OE. The architecture of the present invention reduces the time and effort needed to attain high-assurance certification.

High-assurance architecture for routing of information between networks of differing security level

The present invention is a method for providing a high-assurance guard in a partitioned processing system, the partitioned processing system including a first input/output partition, a guard function partition and a second input/output partition, the method including the steps of: receiving a data packet from the first input/output partition of the partitioned processing system via a first I/O interface; determining if the data packet is well-formed as defined by an interface control document; and forwarding the data packet to the second input/output partition of the partitioned processing system and to a second I/O interface only when the data packet is well-formed.

Evaluatable high-assurance guard for security applications

Multiple Java Virtual Machines (JVMs) operate on a single direct execution JAVA processor with each JVM operating in a separate time slice called a partition. Each JVM has its own data and control structures and is assigned a fixed area of memory. Each partition is also allotted a fixed period of time in which to operate, and, at the end of the allotted time, a context switch is forced to another JVM operating in the next partition. The context switch does not transfer control directly from one JVM to another JVM. Instead, at the end of a partition time period control is switched from the currently operating JVM to a &ldquo;master JVM&rdquo; during a time period called an &ldquo;interstice.&rdquo; The master JVM handles system interrupts and housekeeping duties. At the end of the interstice time period, the master JVM starts a proxy thread associated with the next JVM to become operational. The proxy thread handles JVM-specific interrupts and checks the status of the associated JVM. If the JVM appears operational the proxy thread transfers control to the JVM thread. Time intervals such as partition times and interstice times are enforced by hardware timers and memory accesses are checked by address comparison circuitry to prevent a system failure due to a malfunction in either the master JVM or another JVM.

Real time processor capable of concurrently running multiple independent JAVA machines

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Cedar Rapids, IA, United States of America

Matthew M Wilding