Amazon Technologies, Inc.

Certicom Corporation

Pitney Bowes Inc.

Blackberry Corporation

Matthew John Campagna

Gregory Alan Rubin

Gregory Branchek Roth

Eric Jason Brandwine

Nicholas Alexander Allen

Robert A Cordery

Daniel Richard L Brown

Bertrand Haas

Scott Alexander Vanstone

Gregory Marc Zaverucha

Marinus Struik

Frederick W Ryan, Jr

Mark Pecen

Herbert Anthony Little

Allan Henry Vermeulen

Leon A Pintsov

Shay Gueron

Shalini Suresh Periyalwar

Michael Eoin Buckley

Matthew Shawn Wilson

Nevine Maurice Nassif Ebeid

Niels Peter Skov Andersen

Benjamin Elias Seidenberg

Robert John Lambert

William Lundy Lattin

Yuri Poeluev

Daniel O'Loughlin

Mihal Lazaridis

Nachiketh Rao Potlapally

Cristian Marius Ilac

Douglas B Quine

Thomas J Foth

Andrew Paul Mikulski

Ron Diamant

Nima Sharifi Mehr

Judith D Auslander

Peter Zachary Bowen

Todd Lawrence Cignetti

Christopher Richard Jacques De Kadt

Claude Zeller

Andrei Obrea

Brian M Romansky

William Frederick Hingle Kruse

Robert Henderson Wood

Jay Reichelsheimer

Alexander Truskovsky

Easwaran C Nambudiri

Van Quy Tu

Daniel Richard Brown

Roger Paul Bowman

Bradley R Hammell

Anthony Rosati

Andrew Kyle Driggs

Colm Gearóid MacCárthaigh

Petr Praus

Jay Scott Fuller

Gary G Hansen

Keelan Smith

Thomas Rudolf Stiemerling

Marguerite Marie Nathalie Delcourt

Danny Lelli

Derek Del Miller

Slavka Praus

Yiqun Yin

Aleksandrs J Rudzitis

Alexis Lynn Carlough

James Robert Alfred

Avinash Chidambaram

Xianrui Jeri Meng

Justin Lee Werner

Michael Bentkofsky

Erik D N Monsen

Arthur J Parkos

Timothy William Bray

George M Macdonald

Daniel R L Brown

Luis A Sanchez

John E Massucci

Hanson Char

Ronald Reichman

Anand V Chhatpar

Sean Alexander Courtney

Michael P Swenson

Christopher C Lang

Hardik Navin Nagda

Brian Lamb

Cindy Mangiameli

George Ross Staikos

Weicheng Joseph Ku

Jin Peng

Wei Cheng Joseph Ku

Joseph Ku

Radu Mihai Berciu

Amit Sethi

Trevor Simon Roger Dyck

Jill Boncek

Jason Wrang

Gergory Branchek Roth

Mark E Pecen

Daniel O'loughlin

Techniques for using a key management service to provide K of N threshold encryption and decryption in a provider network. The techniques encompass a K of N threshold encryption process and a K of N threshold decryption process. The encryption process can include encrypting a plaintext datum using a first key to produce a ciphertext datum. A secret sharing algorithm can be used to produce N plaintext shares of the first key. The N plaintext shares can be encrypted using N public keys of N asymmetric key pairs to produce N ciphertext shares. The decryption process can include recovering K plaintext shares from K of the N ciphertext shares. The K ciphertext shares can be recovered by the key management service decrypting the K ciphertext shares using K private keys of the N asymmetric key pairs to recover the K plaintext shares. The first key can be recovered from the K plaintext shares. The plaintext datum can be recovered by decrypting the ciphertext datum using the recovered first key.

Threshold encryption and decryption using a key management service in a provider network

A customer of a computing resource provider is associated with a key provided by a key management system. When the key is generated, a value is generated and encrypted with the key. In response to a detection of a trigger to re-encrypt the customer's key, the encrypted value is used to verify validity of the re-encrypted customer's key before committing it to storage and made available for use.

Data integrity checks for reencryptions

A first computing system establishes a cryptographically protected communication session with a second computing system by proposing a hybrid cryptographic scheme. In response to the proposed hybrid cryptographic scheme, a second computing system transmits cryptographic materials to the first computing system, and the first computing system transmits cryptographic materials to the second computing system. Using the cryptographic materials, two or more cryptographic keys are derived. One cryptographic key is used to perform an inner cryptographic operation on one or more data items, and another cryptographic key is used to perform an outer cryptographic operation on the one or more data items that have been cryptographically protected by the inner cryptographic operation.

Hybrid key exchanges for double-hulled encryption

A plaintext and cryptographic key are used to generate an initialization vector to be used in a cryptographic algorithm, such as an encryption algorithm. In some examples, the plaintext and cryptographic key are input into an effectively one-way function, such as a cryptographic hash function, the output of which is usable as an initialization vector. Cryptographic keys may be rotated probabilistically based at least in part on probabilities of output collisions of the effectively one-way function to ensure a low probability of two different plaintexts resulting in calculation of the same initialization vector for use with the same cryptographic key.

Secure initialization vector generation

Systems and processes are described for establishing and using a secure channel. A shared secret may be used for authentication of session initiation messages as well as for generation of a private/public key pair for the session. A number of ways of agreeing on the shared secret are described and include pre-sharing the keys, reliance on a key management system, or via a token mechanism that uses a third entity such as a hub to manage authentication, for example. In some instances, the third party may also perform endpoint selection (e.g., load balancing) by providing a particular endpoint along with the token.

Hub-based token generation and endpoint selection for secure channel establishment

A web of trust in a distributed system is established. A root of trust for at least two components in the distributed system validates information for the distributed system. The validated information is then used to create additional information for the distributed system. Versions of the information are usable to validate subsequent versions of the information such that validation of a version of the information can be performed by using one or more previous versions to verify that the version is a valid successor of a previously validated previous version.

Distributed system web of trust provisioning

A service provider provides virtual computing services using a fleet of one or more host computer systems. Each of the host computer systems may be equipped with a trusted platform module ('TPM'). The service provider, the host computer systems, and the virtual computing environments generate attestations that prove the integrity of the system. The attestations are signed with a one-time-use cryptographic key that is verifiable against the public keys of the service provider, a host computer system, and a virtual computing environment. The public key of the host computer system is integrated into a hash tree that links the public key of the host computer system to the public key of the service provider. The public key of the virtual computing environment is signed using a one-time-use graphic key issued to the host computer system that hosts the virtual computing environment.

Host attestation

A first entity having a first set of tagged data and a second entity having a second set of tagged data share data that is selected based on a set of common tags present in both the first and second sets of tagged data. The set of common tags is determined using a private set intersection protocol that, in many examples, preserves the privacy of the two entities. In an embodiment, each entity identifies a set of data objects associated with the set of common tags, and another private set intersection protocol is performed to identify a set of common data objects available to both entities. Each entity provides, to the other entity, those data objects associated with the set of common tags that are not in the set of common data objects available to both entities thereby providing a matching set of data objects to both entities.

Data sharing method

Performing cryptographic operations such as encryption and decryption may be computationally expensive. In some contexts, initialization vectors and keystreams operable to perform encryption operations are generated and stored in a repository, and later retrieved for use in performing encryption operations. Multiple devices in a distributed system can each generate and store a subset of a larger set of keystreams.

Efficient use of keystreams

A computer system performs cryptographic operations as a service. The computer system is configured to allow users of the service to maintain control of their respective cryptographic material. The computer system uses inaccessible cryptographic material to encrypt a user's cryptographic material in a token that is then provided to the user. The user is unable to access a plaintext copy of the cryptographic material in the token, but can provide the token back to the service to cause the service to decrypt and use the cryptographic material.

Key export techniques

A request to perform a cryptographic operation is received, the request including a first identifier assigned to a key group, the key group comprising a plurality of second identifiers, with the plurality of second identifiers corresponding to a plurality of cryptographic keys. A second identifier is determined, according to a distribution scheme, from the plurality of second identifiers, and the cryptographic operation is performed using a cryptographic key of the plurality of cryptographic keys that corresponds to the second identifier that was determined.

Supporting a fixed transaction rate with a variably-backed logical cryptographic key

A device is provisioned and authorized for use on a network. The device may generate a cryptographic key and provide a digital certificate the cryptographic key, a hardware identifier, and attribute information and provide such information to an authorization host as part of the provisioning process. The authorization host may use attribute information to determine whether to authorize the device for use on the network, and whether the generated cryptographic key should be trusted for use on the network.

Provisioning network keys to devices to allow them to provide their identity

A first public key is generated based at least in part on a first plurality of signing keys and a second public key is generated based at least in part on a second plurality of signing keys. The signing keys may be used to generate digital signatures. The second public key may be made available to verify a digital signature generated using a signing key from the second plurality of signing keys. In some cases, a first Merkle tree may be formed by the first public key and the first plurality of signing keys, and a second Merkle tree may be formed by the second public key, the first public key, and the second plurality of signing keys.

Merkle signature scheme tree expansion

Protection against the obsolescence of cryptographic algorithms is provided by generating a cryptographic key pair for future use and storing the public key on a device. The cryptographic key pair supports a signature scheme that is potentially resistant to quantum computing attacks. In an embodiment, a key management server generates a set of one-time use keys sufficient to sign the anticipated number of software updates to be applied to a device. The key management server provides a public key which is stored on the device for later use. In an embodiment, an update to the device us signed with the one-time-use private key, and can be authenticated by the device using the public key. In an embodiment, the key pair supports the use of a one-time signature technique such as a Merkle signature scheme, Winternitz signature, or Lampert signature.

Cryptographic key generation and deployment

Growing community of inventors

Bainbridge Island, WA, United States of America

Matthew John Campagna