Telefonaktiebolaget Lm Ericsson (publ)

Vodafone Group Plc.

Ericsson Ab

Unwired Planet, LLC

Mats Näslund

Rolf Blom

Göran Selander

Jari Arkko

Yi Cheng

Gunnar Mildh

Jari Tapio Vikberg

Magnus Stattin

Karl Norrman

Elena Dubrova

Fredrik Lindholm

Bengt Sahlin

Vesa Lehtovirta

Wassim Michel Haddad

Makan Pourzandi

John Mattsson

Luis Barriga

Lars Westberg

Stefan Rommer

Bernard Smeets

Fredrik Lindqvist

Vesa Torvinen

Pekka Nikander

Michael Liljenstam

Marcos Antonio Simplicio Junior

Prajwol Kumar Nakarmi

John Michael Walker

Tereza Cristina Melo De Brito Carvalho

Monica Wifvesson

Robert Bengt Skog

Noamen Ben Henda

Susana Fernandez Alonso

Tomas Hedberg

Qian Chen

Christian Gehrmann

Mikael Wass

Gang Ren

Salvatore Loreto

András Méhes

Per-Olof Nerbrant

Tereza Cristina Carvalho

Bulent Ozgur Gurleyen

Pubudu Chandrasiri

Annika Jonsson

Lars G Magnusson

Yeda Regina Venturini

Jari Arrko

Christian Schaefer

Hans Spaak

Leonardo Horn Iwaya

Cristina Dominicini

Konstantinos Dimou

Niklas Johansson

Magnus Norberg Olsson

Magnus K Almgren

Alex Krister Raith

Per Skillermark

Tommy Arngren

Oscar Ohlsson

Harald Kallin

Göran Rune

András Császár

Magnus Lindström

András Rácz

Vincent Huang

Vlasios Tsiatsis

Shingo Murakami

Frank Hartung

Per Ernström

Thomas Johansson

Marcos Antonio Simplicio, Jr

Maurizio Iovieno

Jukka Ylitalo

Johan Lundsjö

Mattias Eld

Håkan Englund

John Fornehed

Peter Bleckert

Martin Hell

Kiran Thakare

Frederic Rossi

Micael Martell

Tomas Goldbeck-Löwe

Mikko Särelä

Kristoffer Gronowski

Peter Håkansson

Diego Gallo

Pasi Ahonen

Enrique Cobo Jimenez

Rony Sakuragui

Andras Czaszar

Jonathan Cederberg

Vlad Constantin Coroama

Elisabetta Carrara

Yashar Shahabi

Ilkka Uusitalo

Boman Krister

Gunnar Carlsson

Freyr Saevarsson

A message authentication code, for a message transmitted and received over a communications network, is formed by applying inputs to an integrity algorithm acting on the message. The inputs comprise: an integrity key; a value indicating a transfer direction; and a frame-dependent integrity input, wherein the frame-dependent integrity input is a frame-dependent modulo count value that also depends on a random value and on a frame-specific sequence number.

Integrity protection

A communication device of a communication network receives, via a network, a challenge, generates a first Diffie Hellman, DH, parameter, a first verification code for the first DH parameter, forwards the challenge or a derivative thereof to an identity module, receives at least one result parameter as response from the identity module, determines, based on the result parameter, whether the first DH parameter is authentic, and if the first DH parameter is authentic, generates and sends a second DH parameter to the network device for session key generation based on the first DH parameter and the second DH parameter.

Communication between a communication device and a network device

A method for cryptographic key management for managing access control is provided. A key is divided into a plurality of portions of the key. Pre-encryption contextual data is received for each of a plurality of devices. The pre-encryption contextual data indicates at least one attribute of a respective device of the plurality of devices before an encryption of the plurality of portions of the key is performed. The plurality of portions of the key are encrypted based at least on the pre-encryption contextual data of the plurality of devices to make the plurality of the portions of the key dependent at least on contextual data corresponding pre-encryption contextual data. Each of the plurality of encrypted portions of the key is distributed to a respective device of the plurality of devices for storage and retrieval.

Cyber-physical context-dependent cryptography

A method performed by a resolver in a core network of a wireless communication system, where the method comprise: receiving, from a requester in the core network, a request to resolve a provided identifier that is one of a subscription identifier and a pseudonym identifier serving in the core network as a pseudonym for the subscription identifier; and transmitting, to the requester as a response to the request, a resolved identifier that is the other of the subscription identifier and the pseudonym identifier.

Identifiers in a wireless communication system

A method () is provided for performing a trustworthiness test on a random number generator, RNG, () comprising a physical unclonable function, PUF-module (). The trustworthiness test is implemented as a known answer test, KAT, and the method () comprises: receiving (), in the PUF-module (), an input based on test data, T, received from a verifier () provided with at least one test data-test result pair, (T, R), providing () an output from the PUF-module (), determining () a test result, R', based on the output from the PUF-module (), and providing () the test result, R&#x2032;, to the verifier (). A random number generator (), computer program and computer program products and a method performed by or in a verifier are also provided.

Method for performing a trustworthiness test on a random number generator

A wireless device () configured to receive from a network node () a page () that includes a paging identifier (A)for the wireless device (). The paging identifier (A) may identify as a target of the page () a wireless device () associated with a particular subscriber. In fact, in some embodiments, the paging identifier (A) is based on an encrypted subscription identifier for the wireless device () or is a pseudonym subscription identifier for the wireless device (). In any event, the wireless device () is also configured to transmit to the network node () a response () to the page () that indicates the wireless device () was paged but that includes an identifier for the wireless device () that is different than the paging identifier (A) included in the page ().

Method and network node for paging in a wireless communication system

A method for a first network node may protect confidentiality of a first identifier associated by the first network node with a subscription used by a mobile entity. The communications network comprises a home network of the mobile entity and a serving network serving the mobile entity. The first network node, which is part of the home network may: receive, from a second network node which is part of the serving network, a first request for authentication information for the mobile entity, the first request comprising the first identifier; generate a first pseudonym associated with the first identifier; create a link between the first pseudonym and the first identifier; and send, to the second network node, the first pseudonym in response to the first request for authentication information for use as an identifier for the mobile entity in the serving network. A method for a second network node is also provided.

Methods, network nodes, mobile entity, computer programs and computer program products for protecting privacy of a mobile entity

A technique for handling data provided from a source node to a collecting node in a data network is described. As to a method aspect of the technique, the source node generates a sequence of values. The sequence is unrevealed in the data network by the source node in a time interval. An authentication of the sequence is triggered in the data network. The authentication associates the sequence with the source node. One or more signatures for one or more data sets to be sent in the time interval are computed using one or more values of the sequence. The one or more data sets in the time interval are sent from the source node to the collecting node. The source node further provides one or more of the signatures.

Technique for handling data in a data network

A method () of generating a pseudonym associated with a communication device () is disclosed. The method () is performed in a network node () of a communications system () and comprises generating () a pseudonym embryo based on one or more elements of a sequence (S, S, . . . , S), obtaining () the pseudonym as output of a masking operation applied to the pseudonym embryo, wherein the masking operation comprises a one-to-one mapping, and transmitting () the pseudonym to the communication device (). A corresponding network node (), computer program and computer program product are also disclosed.

Method of generating a pseudonym associated with a communication device, a network node, computer program and computer program product

A method of performing an operation on a data storage for storing data being encrypted with a key KD associated with an owner of the data is provided. The method includes deriving, for each authorized client Cj, a first key KCj and a second key KTj, providing the client Cj with the first key KCj, and providing a Trusted Third Party (TTP) with the second key KTj. The method further includes, at a Policy Enforcement Point, receiving a request for performing the operation on the data storage from a client Ck of the authorized clients, acquiring a first key KCk from the client Ck, acquiring a second key KTk from the TTP, deriving the key KD from the first key KCk and the second key KTk, and performing the operation on the data storage using the derived key KD. The disclosed trust model uses two-part secret sharing.

Performing an operation on a data storage

The disclosure relates to a method () for a serving device () of establishing a computational puzzle for use in communication between a client device () and the serving device (). The method () comprises establishing (), in the serving device (), the computational puzzle (p) based on a key shared by the client device () and the serving device () and on a solution (s', s&#x2033;) to the computational puzzle (p). Further method () in a serving device is provided, methods () for client devices (), serving devices (), client devices (), computer programs and computer program products.

Method and device for establishing a computational puzzle for use in communication between a client and a server

A method () of generating a cryptographic checksum for a message M(x) is provided. The method is performed by a communication device, such as a sender or a receiver, and comprises calculating () the cryptographic checksum as a first function g of a division of a second function of M(x), &#x192;(M(x)), modulo a generator polynomial p(x) of degree n, g(&#x192;(M(x))mod p(x)). The generator polynomial is calculated () as p(x)=(1&#x2212;x)&#xb7;P(x), and P1(x) is a primitive polynomial of degree n&#x2212;1. The primitive polynomial is selected (), based on a first cryptographic key, from the set of primitive polynomials of degree n&#x2212;1 over a Galois Field. By replacing a standard checksum with a cryptographic checksum, an efficient message authentication is provided. The proposed cryptographic checksum may be used for providing integrity assurance on the message, i.e., for detecting random and intentional message changes, with a known level of security. The proposed checksum is capable of detecting double-bit errors which may be introduced by a Turbo code decoder.

Generating cryptographic checksums

Growing community of inventors

Bromma, Sweden

Mats Näslund