Riverbed Technology, Inc.

Mazu Networks, Inc.

Riverbed Technologies, Inc.

Massimiliano Antonio Poletto

Edward W Kohler, Jr

Andrew Ratin

Anne Elizabeth Dudfield

Andrew Gorelik

Daniel Weber

Prem K Gopalan

Dimitri Stratton Vlachos

Marinus Frans Kaashoek

Robert Nader Nazzal

Benjamin Wilken

Godfrey Tan

Thomer Michael Gil

Benjie Chen

Robert T Morris

A system for detecting network intrusions and other conditions in a network is described. The system includes a plurality of collector devices that are disposed to collect data and statistical information on packets that are sent between nodes on a network. An aggregator device is disposed to receive data and statistical information from the plurality of collector devices. The aggregator device produces a connection table that maps each node on the network to a record that stores information about traffic to or from the node. The aggregator runs processes that determine network events from aggregating of anomalies into network events.

Connection based anomaly detection

Aggregator for connection based anomaly detection

Event detection/anomaly correlation heuristics

Connection based denial of service detection

Techniques to assign nodes in a network to groups of nodes includes grouping nodes on a network into groups based on host connection set data by identifying bi-connected components in the host connection set data; and merging groups with similar connection habits as determined by examining the host connection set data into larger groups.

Role grouping

A plurality of flow collector devices is disposed to collect flow information on a network. Duplicate flow records received from the flow collectors are eliminated by determining whether a pair of flow records has the same, source and destination flow identifiers and were received within a predefined time-period. Non-duplicated flow records received from the plurality of flow collector devices are stored and used to produces a connection table that maps each node on the network to a record that stores information about traffic to or from the node from non-duplicated flow records. The connection table stores statistical information of packets on the network based on a time-slice basis.

Flow logging for connection-based anomaly detection

A system architecture for thwarting denial of service attacks on a victim data center is described. The system includes a first plurality of monitors that monitor network traffic flow through the network. The first plurality of monitors is disposed at a second plurality of points in the network. The system includes a central controller that receives data from the plurality of monitors, over a hardened, redundant network. The central controller analyzes network traffic statistics to identify malicious network traffic. In some embodiments of the system, a gateway device is disposed to pass network packets between the network and the victim site. The gateway is disposed to protect the victim site, and is coupled to the control center by the redundant hardened network.

Device to protect victim sites during denial of service attacks

Connection table for intrusion detection

A system includes a plurality of collector devices that are disposed to collect statistical information on packets that are sent between nodes on a network. The system also includes a stackable aggregator that receives network data from the plurality of collector devices, and which produces a connection table that maps each node on the network to a record that stores information about traffic to or from the node. The stackable aggregator includes a manager blade, a database blade, and two or more, analyzer blades.

Stackable aggregation for connection based anomaly detection

A system architecture for thwarting denial of service attacks on a victim data center is described. The system includes a first plurality of data monitors that monitor network traffic flow through the network. The first plurality of monitors is disposed at a second plurality of points in the network. The system includes a central controller that receives data from the plurality of monitors, over a hardened, redundant network. The central controller analyzes network traffic statistics to identify malicious network traffic. In one embodiment, a gateway device is disposed to pass network packets between the network and the victim site. The gateway includes a computing device executing a process to build a histogram for any attribute or function of an attribute of network packets and a process to determine if the values of the attribute exceed normal, threshold values expected for the attribute to indicate an attack on the site.

Denial of service attacks characterization

Thwarting source address spoofing-based denial of service attacks

Connection based detection of scanning attacks

Techniques for tracking dynamically negotiated port connections in a network include collecting statistical information on packets that are sent between nodes on a network, inspecting packets of control connections to detect payload fragments that denote ephemeral port negotiation and producing a mapping from a ephemeral connection flow_id to a control connection flow_id. The techniques also include checking the flow_id to see whether a flow record maps to a control connection.

Port tracking on dynamically negotiated ports

Statistics collection for network traffic

Data collectors in connection-based intrusion detection

Growing community of inventors

Cambridge, MA, United States of America

Massimiliano Antonio Poletto