Sourcefire, Inc.

Level 3 Communications, LLC

Verizon Corporate Services Group Inc.

Cisco Technology, Inc.

Raytheon Bbn Technologies Corp.

Bbn Technologies Corporation

Martin Frederick Roesch

Ronald A Dempster

Judy Hollis Novak

Ronald J Gula

William Andrew Vogel, Iii

Steven Sturges

Andrew Baker

Eric Gustafson

Matt Watchinski

A system includes a sensor and a processor. The sensor is configured to passively read data in packets as the packets are in motion on a network. The processor is cooperatively operable with the sensor. The processor is configured to receive the read data from the sensor; and originate map profiles of files and file data, both from the read data from the sensor, as the passively read packets are in motion on the network. The processor is also configured to infer a user role for a user who is using the file and the file data and how the user is transferring or accessing the file and the file data. Inappropriate usage being performed by the user can then be detected from the user role and the read data to control access to particular files.

System and method for real time data awareness

A system includes a sensor and a processor. The sensor is configured to passively read data in packets as the packets are in motion on a network. The processor is cooperatively operable with the sensor The processor is configured to receive the read data from the sensor; and originate real-time map profiles of files and file data, both from the read data from the sensor, as the passively read packets are in motion on the network.

A method and apparatus is disclosed for increasing the security of computer networks through the use of an Intrusion and Misuse Deterrence System (IMDS) operating on the network. The IMDS is a system that creates a synthetic network complete with synthetic hosts and routers. It is comprised of a network server with associated application software that appears to be a legitimate portion of a real network to a network intruder. The IMDS consequently invites inquiry and entices the intruder away from the real network. Simulated services are configured to appear to be running on virtual clients with globally unique, class 'C' IP addresses. Since there are no legitimate users of the virtual network simulated by the IMDS, all such activity must be inappropriate and can be treated as such. Consequently, the entire set of transactions by an intruder can be collected and identified rather than just those transactions that meet a predefined attack profile. Also, new exploits and attacks are handled just as effectively as known attacks, resulting in better identification of attack methodologies as well as the identification and analysis of new attack types. Since the IMDS only has to be concerned with the traffic going to its simulated hosts it additionally eliminates the bandwidth limitation that plagues a traditional IDS.

Intrusion and misuse deterrence system employing a virtual network

A packet transmitted on a network is read and decoded. A network device and its operating system are identified by analyzing the decoded packet. If more than one operating system is identified from the decoded packet, the operating system is selecting by comparing confidence values assigned to the operating systems identified. A service running on the network device is identified from the decoded packet or subsequent packets that are read, decoded and analyzed. The network topology of a network is determined by reading, decoding, and analyzing a plurality of packets. A flow between two network devices is determined by reading, decoding, and analyzing a plurality of packets. Vulnerabilities are assigned to operating systems and services identified by reading, decoding, and analyzing packets. Network configuration policy is enforced on operating systems and services identified by reading, decoding, and analyzing packets.

Systems and methods for determining characteristics of a network and enforcing policy

A method and apparatus is disclosed for increasing the security of computer networks through the use of an Intrusion and Misuse Deterrence System (IMDS) operating on the network. The IMDS is a system that creates a synthetic network complete with synthetic hosts and routers. It is comprised of a network server with associated application software that appears to be a legitimate portion of a real network to a network intruder. The IMDS consequently invites inquiry and entices the intruder away from the real network. Simulated services are configured to appear to be running on virtual clients with globally unique, class 'C' IP addresses. Since there are no legitimate users of the virtual network simulated by the IMDS, all such activity must be inappropriate and can be treated as such. Consequently, the entire set of transactions by an intruder can be collected and identified rather than just those transactions that meet a predefined attack profile. Also, new exploits and attacks are handled just as effectively as known attacks, resulting in better identification of attack methodologies as well as the identification and analysis of new attack types. Since the IMDS only has to be concerned with the traffic going to its simulated hosts it additionally eliminates the bandwidth limitation that plagues a traditional intrusion detection system (IDS).

Fragment trains in a communication network are analyzed. A fragment train includes fragments in the same fragment train and associated with the same target system. One or more fragment reassembly policies are identified out of several fragment reassembly policies, where the fragment reassembly policy corresponds to a target system associated with fragments in a fragment train. The data in the fragments in the fragment train are provided in an order indicated by the fragment reassembly policy. The fragment reassembly policy can include determining the order responsive to an offset and a more fragments indication in the fragments, and/or indicating an order specific to overlapped fragments such as comprehensively overlapped fragments.

Device, system and method for analysis of fragments in a fragment train

Systems and methods for determining characteristics of a network based on flow analysis

Systems and methods for determining characteristics of a network

Systems and methods for identifying the services of a network

Systems and methods for determining characteristics of a network and analyzing vulnerabilities

A method performed in an intrusion detection/prevention system, a system or a device for analyzing segments in a transmission in a communication network. The transmission includes segments in the same transmission control protocol (TCP) session. Segments in a transmission are monitored. Data in the segments in the transmission are reassembled in an order indicated by a segment reassembly policy, the segment reassembly policy indicating an order specific to at least comprehensively overlapped segments.

Growing community of inventors

Eldersburg, MD, United States of America

Martin Frederick Roesch