Dell Products Inc.

Marshal F Savage

Jason Matthew Young

Mukund Purshottam Khatri

Cyril Jose

Eugene David Cho

Michael Emery Brown

Yee Ja

Akkiah Choudary Maddukuri

Sudhir Vittal Shetty

Timothy Michael Lambert

Elie Antoun Jreij

Wei G Liu

Paul W Vancil

Muhammed K Jaber

William Carl Munger

Prakash Nara

Choudary Maddukuri

Charles E Rose

Madhav Karri

Jitendra Gul Jagasia

Rhushabh Bhandari

Santosh Kumar

Chandrashekar Nelogal

Michael A Brundridge

Chandrasekhar Puthillathe

Jianwen Yin

Charles Terrence Perusse, Jr

Sanjeev Dambal

Prashanth Giri

Terry Wayne Liles

Abhay Arjun Salunke

Sruthi Reddy Mothukupally

Gang Liu

Sreeram Veluthakkal

Anto DolphinJose Jesurajan Marystella

Darrell Rosser

Jason C Dale

Yong Cao

Mario Alberto Sanchez

Kevin Thomas Marks

Yogesh Prabhakar Kulkarni

Chandrasekhar Mugunda

Jeffrey M Lairsey

Jon Robert Hass

Viswanath Ponnuru

Bhavesh Govindbhai Patel

Sundar Dasar

Balaji Bapu Gururaja Rao

Kyle Eric Cross

Robert Talbott Stevens, Iv

Wayne Robert Weilnau, Jr

Aaron Michael Rhinehart

Santosh Kumar Bidaralli

Ashok Narayanan Potti

Christopher Abella Poblete

Patrick Oliver Boyd

Vigneswaran Ponnusamy

Khachatur Papanyan

Farhan Mohammed Syed

David Matthew Warden

Huijun Xie

Joshua M Pennell

Srihari Srirangam

Nagendra Varma Totakura

Senthilkumar Ponnuswamy

Jacob R Hutcheson

My Tran

Senthil Kumar

Jack Elmer Fewx

Kiran George Vetteth

Nikhil Swarnakumar

Ching-Jye Chang

Michael Brown

Michael Daniele

Thi D Hyunh

Heidi Ding

William James Widener

Michael W Daniele

Josh M Pennell

Techniques are provided for security key integrity verification using inventory certificates. One method comprises receiving a user request to perform an action: obtaining an inventory certificate associated with a device; extracting a security key identifier from a security key corresponding to the device; validating the security key by comparing the extracted security key identifier to a security key identifier in the inventory certificate; and authorizing a performance of the action based on a result of the comparison. A validity of the inventory certificate may be evaluated (e.g., by evaluating a signature associated with the inventory certificate). The inventory certificate may be stored in a secure memory of the device prior to a delivery of the device to a purchaser of the device.

Security key integrity verification using inventory certificates

An information handling system may include a host system; and a management controller comprising at least one management controller processor and a management controller storage resource. The management controller may be configured to: install a firmware image onto the management controller storage resource; subsequent to installing the firmware image, receive a plugin application; cryptographically verify a source of the plugin application; install the plugin application onto the management controller storage resource; and execute the plugin application.

Secure management controller enhancement with containerized applications

Embodiments of systems and methods for intelligent accelerator license management are described. In some embodiments, a High Performance Computing (HPC) platform may include: a first Baseboard Management Controller (BMC), and a hardware accelerator comprising a second BMC, where at least one of the first or second BMCs is configured to: identify a type of a workload to be executed, at least in part, by the hardware accelerator, and retrieve a license corresponding to the workload.

Intelligent accelerator license management

In drift detection for complex IHS platforms comprised of replaceable components an IHS a security processor may present a number of hieratical sets of Platform Configuration Registers (PCRs) as Virtualized PCR Engines (VPEs) corresponding to IHS platform hardware, sub-domains, and/or central processing units. An IHS aggregation engine may collect measure(s) of platform components, populate the PCRs of the VPEs, and maintain a platform-level VPE and PCR event log from sub-domains of the platform. The measure(s) may be collected indirectly from component Security Protocols and Data Models (SPDM) and/or directly over Management Component Transport Protocol (MCTP), Inter-Integrated Circuit (I2C), Peripheral Component Interconnect Express (PCIe) and/or via Serial Peripheral Interconnect (SPI). The measure(s) may include vendor certificate authority (CA) certificates for feeding into the PCRs. The VPE hierarchy structure enables hardware, firmware, IHS configuration and/or vendor CA certificate drift detection at boot-time and/or component Operating System (OS) measurement during runtime.

Systems and methods to support drift detection in complex information handling system platforms comprised of replaceable components

Embodiments of systems and methods to provide a firmware update to devices configured in a redundant configuration in an Information Handling System (IHS) are disclosed. In an illustrative, non-limiting embodiment, an IHS may include computer-executable instructions to receive a request for a secret known by the IHS, and attest the RAC by verifying that the public key exists in a manifest that is configured to store identifying information about a plurality of devices configured in the IHS. The request is signed using a private key of a first asymmetric key pair generated by a Remote Access Controller (RAC). Using a second public key of a second asymmetric key pair, the instructions encrypt the requested secret; and send the encrypted secret to the RAC, wherein the RAC is configured to use the second private key of the second asymmetric key pair to decrypt the encrypted secret.

Systems and methods for secure secret provisioning of remote access controllers

An information handling system includes a memory and a baseboard management controller (BMC). The memory stores a secure boot policy for multiple input/output (I/O) devices in the information handling system. The BMC extracts a new firmware hash value from a firmware update package. The new firmware hash value is associated with a new firmware image of a first I/O device of the I/O devices. The BMC performs a firmware update for the first I/O device. In response to the firmware update being successfully completed, the BMC replaces an old firmware hash value with the new firmware hash value in the secure boot policy.

Automated update of a customized secure boot policy

Systems and procedures are provided for validating an IHS (Information Handling System) as operating using only factory-provisioned I/O ports. During factory provisioning of the IHS, a signed inventory certificate that includes an inventory of factory-provisioned I/O ports of the IHS is uploaded to the IHS. Upon delivery and initialization of the IHS, the inventory certificate is retrieved by a pre-boot validation process. An inventory of detected I/O ports of the IHS is then collected. The validation process compares the collected inventory of detected I/O ports against the inventory of factory-provisioned I/O ports from the inventory certificate in order to validate the IHS is operating using only factory-provisioned I/O ports. Through embodiments, any I/O ports of the IHS other than the I/O ports validated as factory-provisioned are not usable by any software or hardware of the IHS.

Physical port validation for information handling systems

Various embodiments provide methods for validating secure assembly and delivery of an IHS (Information Handling System) by confirming that the detected hardware components of the IHS include only factory installed hardware components. During factory provisioning of an IHS, an inventory certificate is uploaded to the IHS, where the inventory certificate includes an inventory that identifies the hardware components installed during factory assembly of the IHS. An inventory is collected of the detected hardware components of the IHS. The collected inventory is compared against the inventory from the inventory certificate in order to validate the detected hardware components of the IHS as the same hardware components that were installed during factory assembly of the IHS. Embodiments provide a customer receiving an IHS with a capability of validating that a delivered IHS includes only factory installed hardware components.

Validating secure assembly and delivery of information handling systems

Systems and procedures are provided for tracking hardware components of an IHS (Information Handling System). During factory provisioning of an IHS, an inventory certificate to the IHS is stored to the IHS that includes an inventory identifying factory-installed hardware components of the IHS. Also during the factory provisioning, a record is stored in a component datastore of the factory-installed hardware specified in the inventory certificate. Upon initialization of the delivered IHS, a pre-boot validation environment is initialized on the IHS and the stored inventory certificate is retrieved and used to validate the detected hardware components of the IHS. The results of the validation are then reported to a component datastore, where they are used to identify any transfer of a factory-installed hardware component. The factory datastore is updated in subsequent validations to reflect any detected modifications to the IHS in tracking genuine components.

Component tracking for information handling systems

An Information Handling System (IHS) includes multiple hardware devices, and a baseboard Management Controller (BMC) in communication with the plurality of hardware devices. The BMC includes instructions for executing a first BMC firmware stack that uses certain data for its operation. The data used by the first BMC firmware stack is stored in a first memory location. The instructions are further configured to halt execution of the first BMC firmware stack, and begin execution of a second BMC firmware stack by copying the data from the first memory location to a second memory location used by the second BMC firmware stack.

Data sharing system and method for a multi-boot baseboard management controller (BMC)

Various embodiments provide methods for validating hardware modifications of an IHS (Information Handling System) by confirming that a hardware modification corresponds to a hardware component supplied for installation in the IHS by a trusted entity. During factory provisioning of an IHS, an inventory certificate that specifies the factory installed IHS hardware is uploaded to the IHS and is also stored for ongoing support of the IHS. Upon a hardware component being supplied for installation in the IHS by a trusted entity, the inventory of the stored inventory certificate is updated to identify the supplied component and the updated certificate is transmitted to the IHS. An inventory of detected hardware components of the IHS is compared against the inventory from the updated inventory certificate in order to validate the detected hardware of the IHS includes the component, supplied by the trusted entity, that is identified in the updated inventory certificate.

Validating secure modifications to information handling systems

Systems and procedures are provided for enforcing geographic restrictions on the operation of an IHS (Information Handling System). During factory provisioning of the IHS, a signed inventory certificate is uploaded to the IHS that specifies a plurality of allowed geographic locations at which the IHS is operational. Upon delivery and initial powering of the IHS, a validation environment is instantiated and further initialization of the IHS is halted until a location of the IHS can be determined. Once a geographic location of the IHS has been determined, it is compared to the allowed geographic locations from the inventory certificate stored during factory provisioning. When the location of the IHS is not at an allowed geographic location specified in the inventory certificate, the IHS is rendered non-operational. When the location of the IHS is at an allowed geographic location specified in the inventory certificate, further initialization of the IHS is enabled.

Geographic restrictions for information handling systems

An information handling system includes a memory and a basic input/output system (BIOS). The memory stores a lookup table to associate each of a plurality of device firmware hashes with a corresponding one of a plurality of device identification strings. The BIOS calculates the each of the device firmware hashes. Each device firmware hash is associated with a different device firmware. The BIOS creates the lookup table based on the calculated device firmware hashes and the device identification strings. Based on the lookup table, the BIOS displays a secure boot allowed devices database list on a display device.

Identification of devices in UEFI secure boot databases

An information handling system includes a memory, a baseboard management controller (BMC), and a basic input/output system (BIOS). The memory stores a secure boot policy for a plurality of input/output (I/O) devices in the information handling system. The BMC performs a firmware update for a first I/O device of the I/O devices. In response to the firmware update being completed successfully, the BMC creates a system management task. During a next boot after the creation of the system management task, the BIOS detects the system management task. The BIOS calculates a new hash value for a firmware image of the firmware update. The BIOS replaces a previous hash value with the new hash value in the secure boot policy.

Systems and methods provide validation of hardware components of an IHS (Information Handling System). An attestation certificate stored to the IHS specifies authenticated instructions for operation of a hardware component of the IHS. This attestation certificate is endorsed by a self-signed root attestation certificate. An identity certificate, also stored to the IHS, specifies an identity of the hardware component and is endorsed using an embedded keypair of the hardware component. The root attestation certificate is validated to ensure it corresponds to the hardware component specified in the identity certificate, where this validation confirms that a public key included in the identity certificate is identical to a public key included in the attestation certificate. Through use of the same public key by both certificates, the attestation certificate can be validated as corresponding to the identity certificate without accessing the embedded keypair of the hardware component used to sign the identity certificate.

Split chain of digital certificates for supply chain integrity

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Austin, TX, United States of America

Marshal F Savage