International Business Machines Corporation

Mark Owen Maxson

Gerald Keith Bartley

Darryl John Becker

Philip Raymond Germann

Paul Eric Dahlen

Andrew Benson Maki

Matthew Stephen Doyle

Mark James Jeanson

John Michael Borkenhagen

John Edward Sheets, Ii

Trevor Joseph Timpane

William Paul Hovis

Roger John Gravrok

Adam James Muff

Eric Oliver Mejdrich

David Arnold Luick

Todd Alan Christensen

Giora Biran

Clarence Rosser Ogilvie

Jamie Randall Kuesel

James Anthony Marcella

Robert Allen Drehmel

Charles S Woodruff

Todd Arthur Cannon

David Lawrence Pease

William James Csongradi, Jr

Ryan James Schlichting

Mark E Kautzman

Dennis Martin Rickert

Ming-i Mark Lin

Carl-Otto Nilsen

Patrick Evarist Sobotta

David Loren Heckmann

Matthew Adam Cushing

Allen James Gavin

Disclosed aspects relate to connector structures and a card. A first connector structure is to join a first subset of a set of electrical connections. A second connector structure is to join a second subset of the set of electrical connections. The card manages the set of electrical connections and is located between the first and second connector structures to connect with the first and second connector structures.

Electrical connection management using a card

An optical electromagnetic radiation (EM) emitter and receiver are located upon a printed circuit board (PCB) glass security layer. A predetermined reference flux or interference pattern, respectively, is an expected flux or reflection pattern of EM emitted from the EM emitter, transmitted by the glass security layer, and received by the EM receiver. When the PCB is subject to an unauthorized access thereof the optical EM transmitted by glass security layer is altered. An optical monitoring device that monitors the flux or interference pattern of the optical EM received by the EM receiver detects a change in flux or interference pattern, in relation to the reference flux or reference interference pattern, respectively, and passes a tamper signal to one or more computer system devices to respond to the unauthorized access. For example, one or more cryptographic adapter card or computer system functions or secured crypto components may be disabled.

Secure crypto module including optical glass security layer

A conductor on glass security layer may be located within a printed circuit board (PCB) of a crypto adapter card or within a daughter card upon the crypto adapter card. The conductor on glass security layer includes a glass dielectric layer that remains intact in the absence of point force loading and shatters when a point load punctures or otherwise contacts the glass dielectric layer. The conductor on glass security layer also includes a conductive security trace upon the glass dielectric layer. A physical access attempt shatters a majority of the glass dielectric layer, which in turn fractures the security trace. A monitoring circuit that monitors the resistance of the conductive security trace detects the resultant open circuit or change in security trace resistance and initiates a tamper signal that which may be received by one or more computer system devices to respond to the unauthorized attempt of physical access.

Secure crypto module including conductor on glass security layer

Systems and methods to safeguard data and hardware may include a memory configured to store a first image and sensitive data, and an optical sensor configured to capture a second image. A sensor signal comprising the captured second image may be generated. A controller having access to the memory may be configured to receive the sensor signal. The controller may be further configured to compare the stored first image to the captured second image, and based on the comparison, to determine whether the sensitive data is accessible.

Authentication using optically sensed relative position

A method of fabricating a printed circuit board (PCB) is presented. The PCB includes a glass security layer. The method includes forming the glass security layer upon a PCB wiring layer. The method includes optically attaching an optical electromagnetic radiation (EM) emitter upon the glass security layer. The method includes optically attaching an optical EM receiver upon the glass security layer. The method further includes electrically connecting an optical monitor device to the optical EM receiver.

A security apparatus that can detect unauthorized alterations of physical arrangement of a computing system or unauthorized movements of a computing system through the use of acoustic signals is designed. Modules of a computing system including the security apparatus are able to generate acoustic measurements from received returned acoustic signals. Also, the modules are able to derive baseline acoustic measurements based on stored acoustic profiles. If, for any module of the computing system, its generated acoustic measurements do not substantially match its baseline acoustic measurements, the mismatch may indicate that there is an unauthorized alteration of physical arrangement of the computing system or an unauthorized movement of the computing system. Thus, the security apparatus in the module may take actions to prevent access to the sensitive data stored in the module.

Security apparatus for computing systems

Systems and methods to safeguard data and hardware may include a memory configured to store a first image and sensitive data, and an optical sensor configured to capture a second image. A sensor signal comprising the captured second image may be generated. A controller having access to the memory may be configured to receive the sensor signal. The controller may be further configured to compare the stored first image to the captured second image, and based on the comparison, to determine whether the sensitive data is accessed.

A lane within a processor bus that communicatively connects a transmitter and a receiver is dynamically assigned as a clock lane. The clock lane subsequently transmits a reference clock signal to coordinate data communications from the transmitter to the receiver. The clock lane may be assigned by determining signal margins of various lanes of the processor bus. The signal margins are determined by the transmitter sending a test pattern upon the various lanes and analyzing the received test pattern at the receiver. A dynamically assigned clock lane results increased overall signal integrity of communications between the transmitter and receiver. Further, a dynamically assigned clock lane may result in different lanes being assigned as the clock lane at distinct boot up instances, adding to the complexity of the unauthorized user determining the operational logic of the transmitter.

Dynamic clock lane assignment for increased performance and security

A bus communicates bits in parallel between a transmitter and receiver. A selected set of bits has its bits scrambled. Scrambling the bits includes assigning two or more bits of the selected set of bits to atypical lanes of the bus. By scrambling the bits, the order in which the bits of the selected set of bits are ready by a processer are obscured. The set of bits is transmitted to the receiver with one or more delays. The delays are on one or more of the lanes of the bus. The delays indicate the order of the bits. The receiver is configured to use the delays to identify the order of the bits and unscramble the set of bits.

Scrambling bit transmissions

A stub of a via formed in a printed circuit board is backdrilled to a predetermined depth. A capacitance probe is positioned within the via. Then the capacitance probe is used to obtain a test capacitance measurement. The test capacitance measurement is compared to a predetermined baseline capacitance measurement. Residual conductive plating material in the backdrilled stub causes the test capacitance measurement to exceed the predetermined baseline capacitance measurement. An indication is made that the predetermined baseline capacitance measurement has been exceeded.

Residual material detection in backdrilled stubs

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Mantorville, MN, United States of America

Mark Owen Maxson