Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Jpmorgan Chase Bank, N.a.

Mark Fishel Novak

Stefan Thom

Paul J Leach

Niels Thomas Ferguson

Nir Ben-Zvi

Christopher Warner McCarron

Yevgeniy Anatolievich Samsonov

Andrew Layman

Yi Zeng

Magnus Nyström

Paul England

David Matthew Kruse

Anders Bertil Vinberg

Robert Karl Spiger

David John Linsley

Samartha Chandrashekar

Qiang Wang

Saurav Sinha

Gopinathan Kannan

Kinshuman Kinshumann

Amitabh Prakash Tamhane

Yair Tor

Scott Field

Arun K Nanda

Anil Francis Thomas

Vishal Agarwal

Yoav Yassour

Dave M McPherson

Nir Ben Zvi

Daniel Alon

David Benson Cross

Thomas C Jones

Liqiang Zhu

Scott Daniel Anderson

Khaja Ehteshamuddin Ahmed

Nathan Jeffrey Ide

Eugene (John) Neystadt

Magnus Nystrom

John Anthony Messec

Benjamin Seth Moore

K Michiko Short

Kinshumann

David McPherson

Pranav Kukreja

Amos Ortal

Alexey Efron

Marshall C McCain

Todd Hrycenko

Roy E Crowder, Iii

Andrey Popov

Ramaswamy Ranganathan

Ming Tang

Sunil P Gottumukkala

Jignesh Shah

Karanbir Singh

Eugene John Neystadt

Jingbo Wu

Andreas K Luther

Paul J Miller

Jeremy Dominic Viegas

Alexandru Hanganu

Ran Didi

Oded Ye Shekel

Daniel Kaminsky

Benjamin Moore

Yevgeniy A Samsonov

Christopher Mccarron

Andrew John Layman

Dave M Mcpherson

Eugene Neystadt

Techniques are described herein that are capable of provisioning a trusted execution environment (TEE) based on (e.g., based at least in part on) a chain of trust that includes a platform on which the TEE executes. Any suitable number of TEEs may be provisioned. For instance, a chain of trust may be established from each TEE to the platform on which an operating system that launched the TEE runs. Any two or more TEEs may be launched by operating system(s) running on the same platform or by different operating systems running on respective platforms. Once the chain of trust is established for a TEE, the TEE can be provisioned with information, including but not limited to policies, secret keys, secret data, and/or secret code. Accordingly, the TEE can be customized with the information without other parties, such as a cloud provider, being able to know or manipulate the information.

Provisioning trusted execution environment(s) based on chain of trust including platform

Provisioning trusted execution environment based on chain of trust including platform

Integrated controls frameworks are disclosed. In one embodiment, in an information processing apparatus comprising at least one computer processor, a method for using an integrated control framework for an application comprising a plurality of application modules may include: (1) defining an application profile, an application model, and a target cloud environment for an application; (2) identifying a plurality of security, resiliency, and controls requirements for the target cloud environment; (3) configuring a plurality of security controls for the application based on the plurality of security, resiliency, and controls requirements; and (4) deploying the security controls to the target cloud environment.

Integrated control frameworks

A method for providing graph-based application modeling to facilitate application lifecycle management is disclosed. The method includes receiving, via a graphical user interface, an input, the input relating to a request to design and develop an application; determining, based on the input, a model development plan, the model development plan including a universal schema that is compatible with a variety of application development schemas; generating a model based on the model development plan and the input, the model relating to an illustration of a topology corresponding to the application; associating the model with the application; storing the model and the association in a model repository; and exposing the model via a network interface.

Method and system for graph-based application modeling

Methods, systems, and devices are described herein for delivering protected data to a trusted execution environment (TrEE) associated with a potentially untrusted requestor. In one aspect, a targeting protocol head may receive a request for protected data from a potentially untrusted requestor associated with a TrEE, and an attestation statement of the TrEE. The targeting protocol head may retrieve the protected data, and obtain a targeting key of the TrEE from, for example, the request in the case of clean room provisioning, or the attestation statement. The targeting protocol head may generate targeted protected data by encrypting the protected data with the targeting key, and provide the targeted protected data to the potentially untrusted requestor, where a private targeting key of the TrEE is required to decrypt the targeted protected data.

Addressing a trusted execution environment

A virtual secure mode is enabled for a virtual machine operating in a computing environment that is associated with a plurality of different trust levels. First, a virtual secure mode image is loaded into one or more memory pages of a virtual memory space of the virtual machine. Then, the one or more memory pages of the virtual memory space are made inaccessible to one or more trust levels having a relatively lower trust level than a launching trust level that is used by a virtual secure mode loader to load the virtual secure mode image. A target virtual trust level is also enabled on a launching virtual processor for the virtual machine that is higher than the launching trust level.

Secure management of operations on protected virtual machines

Methods, systems, and devices are described herein for delivering protected data to a trusted execution environment (TrEE) associated with an untrusted requestor. In one aspect, a targeting protocol head, or other intermediary between a requestor and a key management system or other store of protected data may register a public encryption key of a TrEE that corresponds to a private encryption key held by the TrEE or a symmetric key of the TrEE. The targeting protocol head may receive a request for protected data from a requestor associated with the TrEE, and retrieve the protected data for example, from a key management system or store of protected data. The targeting protocol head may generate targeted protected data by encrypting the protected data with the public encryption key or symmetric key of the TrEE. The targeting protocol head may then send the targeted protected data to the requestor.

Addressing a trusted execution environment using clean room provisioning

Methods, systems, and devices are described herein for delivering protected data to a nested trusted execution environment (TrEE), including a trustlet running on top of secure kernel, associated with a potentially untrusted requestor. In one aspect, a targeting protocol head, or other intermediary between a requestor and a key management system or other store of protected data, may receive a request for protected data from a potentially untrusted requestor, and an attestation statement of the secure kernel. The targeting protocol head may encrypt a transfer encryption key with a second encryption key derived from the attestation statement. The targeting protocol head may retrieve the protected data, and encrypt the protected data with the transfer encryption key and an authentication tag, which binds the requestor with the trustlet ID. The targeting protocol head may provide the encrypted transfer encryption key, the encrypted protected data, and encrypted authentication tag to the requestor.

Addressing a trusted execution environment using encryption key

Techniques are described herein that are capable of establishing system integrity using attestation for a virtual trusted platform module (vTPM). For instance, an endorsement key certificate, including an endorsement key associated with the vTPM, may be signed to issue the endorsement key certificate to the vTPM. The endorsement key certificate may be used to establish a chain of trust with regard to the vTPM. For instance, the endorsement key certificate may be used to attest the vTPM (and measurements provided by the vTPM).

System integrity using attestation for virtual trusted platform module

Techniques for implementing container credentialing by a host are described herein. In one example, a system for providing credentials includes a memory device for storing instructions and a processing device for executing instructions. The system can also include a container to execute a runtime environment for an application through the memory device and processing device, the application to request access to a credential locked resource. The system can also include a host environment to share the memory and the processing device with the container. In an example, the host environment may detect a request for a credential for the credential locked resource from the container. In an example, the host environment may also provide a credential for a credential locked resource to the container if the container is approved to receive the credential based on a policy.

Container credentialing by host

Methods, systems, and devices are described herein for delivering protected data to a nested trusted execution environment (TrEE) associated with an untrusted requestor. The nested TrEE may include a trustlet running on top of secure kernel. In one aspect, a targeting protocol head, or other intermediary between a requestor and a key management system or other store of protected data, may receive a request for protected data from a potentially untrusted requestor, an attestation statement of the secure kernel, and a key certification statement. The key certification statement may bind a trustlet public encryption key and a trustlet ID. The targeting protocol head may retrieve the protected data, and encrypt the protected data with the trustlet public encryption key. The targeting protocol head may then send the encrypted protected data to the requestor.

Addressing a trusted execution environment using signing key

A keying infrastructure may generate and/or manage cryptographic keys. The cryptographic keys may include identity keys, encryption keys, and a variety of other types of keys. The cryptographic keys may be derived or created with a key derivation function (KDF) or other one-way function. The cryptographic keys may include keys that are accessible to a boot loader, keys that are accessible to particular components of a Trusted Execution Environment (TrEE), and so on. In some examples, a key may be derived from a preceding key in a sequence of keys. The preceding key may be deleted when the key is derived.

Keying infrastructure

Growing community of inventors

Newcastle, WA, United States of America

Mark Fishel Novak