Intel Corporation

Mcafee, Inc.

Mark E Scott-Nash

Ned M Smith

Glen J Anderson

Igor G Muttik

Simon R Hunt

Howard C Herbert

Cedric Cochin

Sanjeev N Trika

Tobias Max Kohlenberg

Geoffrey S Strongin

Uttam K Sengupta

Katalin Klara Bartfai-Walcott

Willard M Wiseman

Richard Paul Mangold

Scott H Robinson

Rameshkumar G Illikkal

Paritosh Saxena

Nicholas D Triantafillou

Venkata Ramanan Sambandam

Paul J Thadikaran

Karthikeyan Vaidyanathan

Akshay Ramesh Kadam

Jennifer Eligius Mankin

Stephen J Allen

Annapurna Dasari

Particular embodiments described herein provide for modular device assemblies and methods for enabling maintenance and servicing, particularly by an unmanned aerial vehicle. A device assembly comprises a plurality of modules, each module having control circuitry, a communications port and contact points to couple the modules. When the modules are coupled, the communications ports are connected to create a bus for communications between the modules. The modular device structure where modules are removable and replaceable allows for an unmanned aerial vehicle to perform maintenance on the device.

Apparatus and methods for unmanned aerial vehicle servicing of modular device assembly

There is disclosed in an example, a pourable smart matter having a plurality of compute nodes, the compute nodes having: a mechanical structure having a plurality of faces, the faces having abutting face detectors; a network interface; and one or more logic elements comprising a positional engine to: identify a neighbor compute node abutting at least one of the faces; and build an individual positional profile based at least in part on the identifying. The pourable smart matter may be used, for example, to determine the geometry or volume of a container.

Pourable smart matter

In an example, there is disclosed a computing apparatus, having a computing resource; a bespoke sensor for measuring at least one parameter of usage of the computing resource; and one or more logic elements providing a trusted compute meter (TCM) agent to: receive an external workload; provision a workload enclave; execute the external workload within the TCM enclave; and measure resource usage of the external workload via the bespoke sensor. There is also disclosed a computer-readable medium having stored thereon executable instructions for providing a TCM agent, and a method of providing a TCM agent.

Trusted computing resource meter

Technologies for sensor privacy on a computing device include receiving, by a sensor controller of the computing device, sensor data from a sensor of the computing device; determining a sensor mode for the sensor; and sending privacy data in place of the sensor data in response to a determination that the sensor mode for the sensor is set to a private mode. The technologies may also include receiving, by a security engine of the computing device, a sensor mode change command from a user of the computing device via a trusted input/output path of the computing device; and sending a mode command to the sensor controller to set the sensor mode of the sensor based on the sensor mode change command, wherein the sending the mode command comprises sending the mode command over a private bus established between the security engine and the sensor controller. Other embodiments are described herein.

Sensor privacy mode

Embodiments of techniques and systems associated with roots-of-trust (RTMs) for measurement of virtual machines (VMs) are disclosed. In some embodiments, a computing platform may provide a virtual machine RTM (vRTM) in a first secure enclave of the computing platform. The computing platform may be configured to perform an integrity measurement of the first secure enclave. The computing platform may provide a virtual machine trusted platform module (vTPM), for a guest VM, outside the first secure enclave of the computing platform. The computing platform may initiate a chain of integrity measurements between the vRTM and a resource of the guest VM. Other embodiments may be described and/or claimed.

Roots-of-trust for measurement of virtual machines

In an embodiment, at least one computer readable medium has instructions stored thereon for causing a system to cryptographically sign, at a secure platform services enclave (PSE) of a computing system and using a secure attestation key (SGX AK), a public portion of a trusted platform module attestation key (TPM AK) associated with a trusted computing base of a physical platform, to form a certified TPM AK public portion. Also included are instructions to store the certified TPM AK public portion in the PSE, and instructions to, responsive to an attestation request received from a requester at a virtual trusted platform module (vTPM) associated with a virtual machine (VM) that has migrated onto the physical platform, provide to the requester the certified TPM AK public portion stored in the PSE. Other embodiments are described and claimed.

Trusted computing base evidence binding for a migratable virtual machine

An anti-malware approach uses a storage drive with the capability to lock selected memory areas. Platform assets such as OS objects are stored in the locked areas and thus, unauthorized changes to them may not be made by an anti-malware entity.

Storage drive based antimalware methods and apparatuses

Growing community of inventors

Boulder, CO, United States of America

Mark E Scott-Nash