International Business Machines Corporation

Mark Duane Seaborn

Jason K Resch

Ilya Volvovski

Hugo M Krawczyk

Amit H Lamba

Wesley B Leggette

Martin L Schmatz

Adam Michael Gray

Scott Michael Horan

Patricia Maria Sagmeister

Andrew George Peake

Teague Scott Algie

Alan M Frazier

Akila Srinivasan

Erlander Lo

Shibhani Rai

Manish Motwani

Nataraj Nagaratnam

Yogesh Ramesh Vedpathak

Daniel J Scholl

Harsha Hegde

Patrick Aaron Tamborski

Karunakar Bojjireddy

Rohan P Shah

Mechanisms are provided for computing resource access security in which a credential of a user agent is authenticated to determine if the user agent is associated with an entity for which an attribute based encryption (ABE) key is to be generated. If so, an ABE key is generated and provided which corresponds to a set of attributes of the entity. Token issuance logic receives a token request and the ABE key from a relying party computing device and executes a decryption operation on locking metadata associated with at least one attribute value based on the ABE key. The token issuance logic, in response to the decryption operation successfully decrypting the locking metadata, issues a generated token to the relying party computing device based on the at least one attribute value. The relying party computing device accesses the computing resources using the generated token.

Attribute based encryption key based third party data access authorization

Session resumption for cryptographic communications is provided. Session data and encrypted early data are received from a client. A key is derived using the session data and a one-time pad. The early data is decrypted using the derived key.

Session resumption with derived key

Resource user authentication and authorization is provided. An authentication code is generated based on using a retrieved attribute-based encryption user key as a secret key for a keyed-hash message authentication code digital signature over a set of header fields of a protected resource access request received from a client device of a resource user via a network. The generated authentication code is compared with an authentication code read within an embedded header field of the protected resource access request. It is determined whether a match exists between the generated authentication code and the authentication code read within the embedded header field. In response to determining that a match does exist, the resource user is authenticated. Decryption of an encrypted protected resource corresponding to the protected resource access request is performed using the retrieved attribute-based encryption user key corresponding to the resource user in response to authentication of the resource user.

Attribute-based encryption keys as key material for key-hash message authentication code user authentication and authorization

A data packet transits through a series of network nodes (a series of intermediate hops) while being transmitted from a source node to a destination node. A network node (router, gateway, server, or any network device) that handles the data packet, adds new information to the file header of the data packet. The new header information identifies the previous and next network nodes in the transmission path. The network node further validates information provided by a previous node, and generates further new header information that attests as to the validity of the information provided by the previous node. The network node secures and signs the new information cryptographically, and adds the new information to the file header. If a malicious actor attempts to tamper with the data packet, or routing thereof, the secured header information renders such tampering discoverable, enabling performance of a responsive action.

Network transmission path verification

A key management service creates a key upon user request. The key management service receives a request for a first cryptographic operation. The key management service performs the first cryptographic operation. The key management service returns results of the first cryptographic operation to a dependent service. The key management service receives a notification of key rotation. The key management service receives a request for a second cryptographic operation. The key management service performs the second cryptographic operation. The key management service returns results of the second cryptographic operation to the dependent service. The key management service returns updated key metadata to the dependent service.

Automatic provisioning of key material rotation information to services

A method for execution by a computing device includes determining a set of actor parties required to authorize a change of protection status of a stored resource from a protected status to an unprotected status. A minimum quorum is determined for each of the set of actor parties. A plurality of authorizations to change the protection status of the resource to the unprotected status are received from a plurality of requestors via the network. A plurality of subsets of the plurality of requestors corresponding to the set of actor parties are identified. The protection status of the resource is set to the unprotected status in response to determining, for every one of the set of actor parties, that a number of requestors in a corresponding one of the plurality of subsets is greater than or equal to the minimum quorum for the one of the set of actor parties.

Authorizing modification of resources

Methods and apparatus for isolating the introduction of software defects in a dispersed storage network (DSN) are disclosed. In various embodiments, a search strategy is employed whereby after identifying a test failure in a current version of the memory software code, a sequence of interim versions of the code between the current version of the memory software code and a previous successfully tested version of the code is determined. A first version of the memory software code is selected from the sequence of interim versions (e.g., from the middle of or approximately in the middle of the sequence) and tested. When testing of the first version does not result in a test failure, a second version of the memory software code is tested, the second version selected from a sub-sequence of the sequence of interim versions between the first version of the code and the current version of the code.

Isolating the introduction of software defects in a dispersed storage network

A computing device including a processor, memory, and instructions, interfaces with a key management system (KMS) that provides encryption keys using an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF). The device obtains, based on a type of encryption key being requested, a public key of a public-private key pair. The device creates an Oblivious Key Access Request (OKAR), including a blinded value associated with a requested encryption key. The OKAR is transmitted to the KMS, and a response is received. The response includes a blinded OPRF output, which yields an OPRF output as a result of being subjected to an unblinding operation. The OPRF output is validated using the public key, either directly or via a challenge, and in response to a positive validation, the OPRF output is used as a final key, or an intermediary key used to derive the final key.

Validating keys derived from an oblivious pseudorandom function

A method begins by determining, by an authenticated device of a dispersed storage network (DSN), whether an access request from a requesting device is affiliated with an anonymous user or an authenticated user. When the requesting device is affiliated with the anonymous user, the method continues by determining, by the authenticated device, status of the anonymous user where the status of the anonymous user includes one of minimal threat, non-minimal threat, and significant threat. The method continues by processing, by the authenticated device, the access request in accordance with the status of the anonymous user.

Temporary enrollment in anonymously obtained credentials

A method for execution by one or more processing modules of one or more computing devices of a dispersed storage network (DSN), the method begins by identifying, for data stored within a DSN memory, one or more encryption keys used to encrypt data stored within the DSN memory. The method continues by identifying, for data stored within a portion of the DSN memory requiring sanitization, a master key of the one or more encryption keys that encrypts all of the data stored within the portion to be sanitized. The method continues by determining, if the master key is not used to encrypt data stored outside of the portion to be sanitized. The method continues, if the master key is not used to encrypt data stored outside of the portion to be sanitized, by sanitizing the data stored within a portion of the DSN memory by erasing the master key.

Using a master encryption key to sanitize a dispersed storage network memory

A computing device includes an interface configured to interface and communicate with a communication system, a memory that stores operational instructions, and processing circuitry operably coupled to the interface and to the memory that is configured to execute the operational instructions to perform various operations. The computing device generates a sub-key identifier based on a data ID, which is based on unique ID value(s) associated with an encrypted data object, and a requester secret. The computing device processes the sub-key identifier in accordance with an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) blinding operation to generate a blinded input and an Oblivious Key Access Request (OKAR). The computing device transmits the OKAR to another computing device (e.g., Key Management System (KMS) service) and receives a blinded sub-key therefrom. The computing device processes the blinded sub-key in accordance with an OPRF unblinding operation to generate the key and accesses secure data thereby.

Key identifiers in an obliviousness pseudorandom function (OPRF)-based key management service (KMS)

A computing device includes an interface configured to interface and communicate with a communication system, a memory that stores operational instructions, and processing circuitry operably coupled to the interface and to the memory that is configured to execute the operational instructions to perform various operations. The computing device processes an input value (e.g., associated with a key) based on a blinding key (e.g., homomorphic encryption) to generate a blinded value and generates an Oblivious Key Access Request (OKAR). The computing device transmits the OKAR to another computing device (e.g., associated with a Key Management System (KMS) service) and receives a blinded key therefrom that is based on a Partially-Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (P-OPRF). The computing device processes the blinded key based on the blinding key (e.g., homomorphic decryption) to generate the key (e.g., associated with the input value). In some examples, the computing device accesses secure information based on the key.

Virtualizing a key hierarchy using a partially-oblivious pseudorandom function (P-OPRF)

A computing device includes an interface configured to interface and communicate with a communication system, a memory that stores operational instructions, and processing circuitry operably coupled to the interface and to the memory that is configured to execute the operational instructions to perform various operations. The computing device processes an input value associated with a key based on a blinding key in accordance with an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) blinding operation to generate a blinded value and transmits it to another computing device (e.g., that is associated with a Key Management System (KMS) service). The computing device then receives a blinded key that is based on processing of the blinded value based on an OPRF using an OPRF secret. The computing device processes the blinded key based on the blinding key in accordance with the OPRF unblinding operation to generate the key (e.g., to be used for secure information access).

Oblivious pseudorandom function in a key management system

A computing device is configured to divide an Oblivious Pseudorandom Function (OPRF) key to generate a plurality of N partial keys, distribute a respective one of the plurality of N partial keys to a corresponding plurality of N Key Management System (KMS) units. The computing device receives from a threshold number T of KMS units, a plurality T partial blinded keys, wherein the plurality T partial blinded keys are based on processing of a value of a blinded key received by a respective KMS unit and a corresponding stored partial key of the N partial keys, combines the plurality T of partial blinded keys into the blinded key, processes the blinded key based on the blinding key in accordance with an OPRF unblinding operation to generate a key and accesses secure information based on the key.

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Algonquin, IL, United States of America

Mark Duane Seaborn