Freescale Semiconductor,inc.

Nxp Usa, Inc.

Mark D Redman

Thomas E Tkacik

Lawrence Loren Case

Douglas Allan Hardy

Michael D Fitzsimmons

Carlin R Covey

Darrell L Carder

John E Spittal, Jr

Jonathan Lutz

Gregory Schmidt

John J Vaglica

Asaf Ashkenazi

David H Hartley

Rodney D Ziolkowski

Steven R Tugenberg

Joel Feldman

Ronald B Harvey

Steven Tugeberg

Alistair N Muir

Troy E Mackie

Ruchir Chhabra

Under the direction of a first party, an integrated circuit (IC) device is configured to temporarily enable access to a debug interface of the IC device via authentication of the first party by a challenge/response process using a key of the IC device and a challenge value generated at the IC device. The first party then may conduct a software evaluation of the IC device via the debug interface. In response to failing to identify an issue with the IC device from the software evaluation, the first party can permanently enable open access to the debug interface while authenticated and provide the IC device to a second party. Under the direction of the second party, a hardware evaluation of the IC device is conducted via the debug interface that was permanently opened by the first party.

Authenticated debug access for field returns

A computing device () includes a trusted execution environment (TEE) manager () that manages a switchover from non-trusted software () to trusted software (). The TEE manager () includes memory () configured to store password-bearing, immediate-operand instructions (). At the point of switching between the non-trusted software () and the trusted software () the memory () may be accessed as instruction fetches, and its contents fetched into a CPU core () as instructions. Immediate-operand portions () of the immediate-operand instructions () provide passwords, which are written back into guess registers () within the TEE manager (). When a predetermined relationship between the instructions () and guesses in guess registers () is identified, actual execution of the immediate-operand instructions () is verified, the TEE mode of operation is signaled, and security-sensitive hardware () is enabled for use by a privileged routine () portion of the trusted software ().

Computing device with entry authentication into trusted execution environment and method therefor

A processor, scan controller, and method for protecting sensitive information from electronic hacking is disclosed. To maintain the security of the sensitive data present in a processor, the scan controller denies access to the scan chain until data is cleared from scan-observable portions of the processor, then clears the scan chain again prior to exiting test mode and resuming normal operation. Clearing or otherwise modifying data stored in the scan-observable portions of a processor when transitioning to and/or from a test mode will prevent unauthorized personnel from simply shifting secure data out of the scan chain, and from pre-loading data into the scan chain prior to normal operation in an attempt to set sensitive state information.

Method and apparatus for secure scan testing

Methods and apparatus are provided for an electronic device having an autonomous memory checker for runtime security assurance. The autonomous memory checker comprises a controller, a memory reference file coupled to the controller, and an authentication engine coupled to the controller. A check is performed during runtime operation of the electronic device. The autonomous memory checker generates runtime reference values corresponding to trusted information stored in memory. The runtime reference values are compared against memory reference values stored in the memory reference file. The memory reference values are generated from the trusted information stored in memory. An error signal is generated when the runtime reference values are not identical to the memory reference values thereby indicating that the trusted information has been modified.

Autonomous memory checker for runtime security assurance and method therefore

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Gilbert, AZ, United States of America

Mark D Redman