Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Magnus Nystrom

Stefan Thom

Alastair Wolman

Mark Fishel Novak

Stefan Saroiu

Himanshu Raj

Innokentiy Basmov

Robert Karl Spiger

Scott Daniel Anderson

David John Linsley

David Michael Robinson

Jeremiah J Cox

Rob Spiger

Benjamin E Nick

Peter Novotney

Michael J Grass

Himanshu Soni

Jonathan D Schwartz

Nathan Jeffrey Ide

Dayi Zhou

Anooshiravan Saboori

Peter Dawoud

Jonathan David Schwartz

Andrew John Layman

In one embodiment, an encryption system may protect user login metadata from hammering attacks. A data storage may store an integrity protected data set for an operating system in a storage location. A processor may register a counter reading from a remote counter in a secure location separate from the storage location. The processor may determine a lockout state of the integrity protected data set based on the counter reading.

Rollback protection for login security policy

In one embodiment, an encryption system may protect user login metadata from hammering attacks. A data storagemay store an integrity protected data setfor an operating system in a storage location. A processormay register a counter reading from a remote counterin a secure locationseparate from the storage location. The processormay determine a lockout state of the integrity protected data setbased on the counter reading.

A system for bootstrap provisioning of a device is provided. A vouching device is provisioned to access a bootstrap account of a bootstrap account provider and a secondary account of a secondary account provider. The bootstrap account provider stores an indication of the secondary account, and the secondary account provider stores verification data to verify a certification of the vouching device. A target device is provisioned to access the bootstrap account of the bootstrap account provider. The target device receives from the bootstrap account provider an indication that the target device is provisioned with the secondary account provider. The target device directs generation of a certification by the vouching device of target authentication data of the target device. The target device then sends the certification to the secondary account provider to effect the provisioning of the target device to access the secondary account.

Automatic provisioning of a device to access an account

Briefly, aspects of the subject matter described herein relate to virtual machines. In aspects, when a host is reset or powered on, a measured boot is performed. If the measured boot indicates that the host is in a state that satisfies a policy for gaining access to a cryptographic key, the cryptographic key may be obtained. The cryptographic key may be used, directly or indirectly, to decrypt data of a virtual storage device. This decrypted data may then be used to instantiate a virtual machine.

Virtual machine assurances

A 'Firmware-Based TPM' or 'fTPM' ensures that secure code execution is isolated to prevent a wide variety of potential security breaches. Unlike a conventional hardware based Trusted Platform Module (TPM), isolation is achieved without the use of dedicated security processor hardware or silicon. In general, the fTPM is first instantiated in a pre-OS boot environment by reading the fTPM from system firmware or firmware accessible memory or storage and placed into read-only protected memory of the device. Once instantiated, the fTPM enables execution isolation for ensuring secure code execution. More specifically, the fTPM is placed into protected read-only memory to enable the device to use hardware such as the ARM&#xae; architecture's TrustZone&#x2122; extensions and security primitives (or similar processor architectures), and thus the devices based on such architectures, to provide secure execution isolation within a &#x201c;firmware-based TPM&#x201d; without requiring hardware modifications to existing devices.

Trustzone-based integrity measurements and verification using a software-based trusted platform module

Aspects of the subject matter described herein relate to clusters. In aspects, an image is created to install software onto nodes of the cluster. A root secret of the cluster is injected into the image. After installing the software of the image onto a node of the cluster, the node may boot into a secure mode, detect that individualization is needed for the node to join a cluster, create an identity for authenticating with other nodes of the cluster, chain the identity via the root secret, and then securely erase the root secret from the node prior to assuming node duties. Among other things, this allows a single image to be used for installing software on all nodes of a cluster without the compromise of a single node compromising the entire cluster.

Automatic strong identity generation for cluster nodes

Software-based trusted platform module

Firmware-based trusted platform module for arm processor architectures and trustzone security extensions

Growing community of inventors

Sammamish, WA, United States of America

Magnus Nystrom