Mcafee, Inc.

Lu Deng

Lixin Lu

Ravi L Sahita

Xiaoning Li

Alexander Shepsen

Vedvyas Shanbhogue

Igor Tatourian

Xiang Xu

Liangjun Huang

Hua Liu

Kai Huang

Bing Sun

Haifei Li

Particular embodiments described herein provide for an electronic device that can be configured to receive data related to execution of a sandboxed process, determine if a high privileged process was created by the sandboxed process, and block the sandboxed process from executing if the high privileged process was created by the sandboxed process and the data indicates the sandboxed process is attempting a sandbox bypass attack. In an example, the high privileged process was created by the sandboxed process if a resource folder is associated with a sandbox folder. In another example, the high privileged process was created by the sandboxed process if a resource folder was created by a broker process in response to a request by the sandboxed process.

System and method to detect bypass of a sandbox application

Particular embodiments described herein provide for an electronic device that can be configured to identify regions of code to be monitored, probe and lock code pages that include the identified regions of code, and remap the code pages as execute only. The code pages can be remapped as execute only in an alternate extended page table view.

Detection and mitigation of malicious invocation of sensitive code

Embodiments include identifying, at a logical path node, a first logical path and a second logical path; executing, by a processor implemented at least partially in hardware, a first set of instructions to follow the first logical path; storing, in a memory, a first set of information obtained from following the first logical path; evaluating, by a malware handler module implemented at least partially in hardware, the first set of information for malware; restoring, from the memory, environmental data for the first logical path node; executing, by the processor, a second set of instructions to follow the second logical path; storing, in a memory, a second set of information obtained from following the second logical path; and evaluating, by the malware handler module, the second set of information for malware.

Executing full logical paths for malware detection

Particular embodiments described herein provide for an electronic device that can be configured to receive a function call for a function, determine a current stack pointer value for the function call, and determine if the current stack pointer value is within a pre-defined range. The electronic device can include a stack pivoting logging module to log a plurality of function calls. The electronic device can also include a stack pivoting detection module to analyze the log of the plurality of function calls to determine, for each of the plurality of function calls, if the current stack pointer value is within a pre-defined range.

Detection of stack pivoting

Embodiments are directed to hooking a call for a malware monitoring logic into a JavaScript API engine interpreter. Upon JavaScript being placed into heap memory, the malware monitoring logic can initiate an evaluation or analysis of the heap spray to determine whether the JavaScript includes malware or other malicious agents prior to execution of the JavaScript shell code. Upon execution of the JavaScript within the sandbox, the malware monitoring logic can initiate monitoring of the JavaScript using malware analysis and/or execution profiling techniques. Inferences can be made of the presence of malware based on a start and end time of the JavaScript execution.

Monitoring executed script for zero-day attack of malware

Particular embodiments described herein provide for an electronic device that can be configured to identify regions of code to be monitored, probe and lock code pages that include the identified regions of code, and remap the code pages as execute only to assist with the mitigation of malicious invocation of sensitive code. The code pages can be remapped as execute only in an alternate extended page table view to allow for the detection and mitigation of malicious invocation of sensitive code.

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Santa Clara, CA, United States of America

Lu Deng