Microsoft Technology Licensing, LLC

Google Inc.

Loren Kohnfelder

Gregory Darrell Fee

Brian LaMacchia

Michael Joseph Toutonghi

Shajan Dasan

Erik B Christensen

Anders Hejlsberg

Gopala Krishna R Kakivaya

Christopher Wellington Brumme

Michael M Magruder

Raja Krishnaswamy

David Bau

Lance Olson

Henry L Sanders

David S Ebbo

Julie D Bennett

Sean Edwin Trowbridge

James S Miller

Travis Muhlestein

Jonathan C Hawkins

Krzysztof J Cwalina

Seth Mitchell Demsey

Brian M Grunkemeyer

Shawn Patrick Burke

Stefan Harrington Pharies

Christopher L Anderson

Yung-Shin Lin

Anthony J Moore

Erik B Olson

Yann Christensen

Jeffrey M Cooperstein

Fabio A Yeon

James H Hogg

Craig T Sinclair

Corina Eva Feuerstein

Adam Wade Smith

David S Mortenson

Caleb L Doise

Alan Geoffrey Boshier

Manish S Prabhu

Radu Rares Palanca

Suzanne Maurine Cook

John I McConnell

Tarun Anand

Joseph L Roxe

Hany E Ramadan

Jesus Ruiz-Scougall

Joe Dennis Long

Ramasamy Krishnaswamy

Daniel Takacs

Jayanth V Rajan

David Owen Driver

Brian Irl Pratt

Sebastian Lange

Michael J Wallent

Yan Valerie Leshinsky

Stephen James Millet

Giovanni Moises Della-Libera

Nikhil Kothari

Scott Randall Shell

Praerit Garg

Yadhu Nandh Gopalan

Scott David Guthrie

Luca Bolognese

Keith W Ballinger

Peter A Hallam

Brian Keith Pepin

Mark T Anders

Rajeev Dujari

Jun Fang

Roderick Adonis Chavez

Anand Ramakrishna

Susan M Warren

Ray Sun

Robert Michael Howard

Nicholas M Kramer

Manu Vasandani

Eric Robert Berman

Upender Sandadi

Sean L Flynn

Andrew D Rogers

Chad W Royal

Sharath Viswanathan

Michael Howard

Mark W Fussell

Mark A Boulter

Sreeram Nivarthi

Omri Gazitt

Eric J Hennings

Sanjay G Shenoy

Nithyalakshmi Sampathkumar

Neetu Rajpal

Daniel Dedu-Constantin

Neil Laurence Coles

Blaine J Dockter

Matthew G Lyons

Ashok Cholpady Kamath

Charles Reis

Angelo Renato Vals

Christopher Ross Jordan

A safe environment is established for running untrusted code in a system whose trusted libraries include native code. Annotations are applied to code in the system libraries to identify safe and unsafe code, and analysis tools reveal whether code outside the system libraries is able to trigger any unsafe behavior.

Code annotations for preventing access to unsafe functionality

This disclosure describes techniques of using a centralized rule database to control the abilities of software processes to perform actions with regard to resources provided by a computer. As described herein, each software process executing in a computer executes within a chamber and each resource provided by the computer is associated with a canonical name that uniquely identifies the resource. Furthermore, the computer stores a set of security rules in a centralized rule database. In addition, this disclosure describes techniques of enforcing the rules stored in the centralized rule database.

Centralized enforcement of name-based computer system security rules

An evidence-based policy manager generates a permission grant set for a code assembly received from a resource location. The policy manager executes in a computer system (e.g., a Web client or server) in combination with the verification module and class loader of the run-time environment. The permission grant set generated for a code assembly is applied in the run-time call stack to help the system determine whether a given system operation by the code assembly is authorized. The policy manager may determine a subset of the permission grant set based on a subset of the received code assembly's evidence, in order to expedite processing of the code assembly. When the evidence subset does not yield the desired permission subset, the policy manager may then perform an evaluation of all evidence received.

Partial grant set evaluation from partial evidence in an evidence-based security policy manager

An isolated persistent storage object accesses an isolated persistent storage region using identities of the application, an underlying component of the application, and optionally the user. Direct access to the isolated persistent storage region is available only to the isolated persistent storage object and is unavailable to other components. Accordingly, other components access the isolated persistent storage region through the isolated persistent storage object, which determines the specific location (e.g., specified by an internally constructed path name) and performs the access operation on behalf of the calling component. The application identity and the component identity are converted to typed identity names for use in the construction of the path name.

Isolated persistent storage

An application program interface (API) provides a set of functions for application developers who build Web applications on Microsoft Corporation's .NET&#x2122; platform.

Computing system and method for allowing plurality of applications written in different programming languages to communicate and request resources or services via a common language runtime layer

An application program interface (API) provides a set of functions, including a set of base classes and types that are used in substantially all applications accessing the API, for application developers who build Web applications on Microsoft Corporation's .NET&#x2122; platform.

Application program interface for network software platform

A security policy manager generates a permission grant set for a code assembly received from a resource location. The policy manager can execute in a computer system (e.g., a Web client) in combination with the verification module and class loader of the run-time environment. The permission grant set generated for a code assembly is applied in the run-time call stack to help the system determine whether a given system operation by the code assembly is authorized. A permission request set may also be received in association with the code assembly. The permission request set may include a minimum request set, specifying permissions required by the code assembly to run properly. The permission request set may also include an optional request set, specifying permissions requested by the code assembly to provide an alternative level of functionality. In addition, the permission request set may include a refuse request set, specifying permissions that are not to be granted to the code assembly. The permission requests are used to filter a permission set to generate a permission grant set.

Filtering a permission set using permission requests associated with a code assembly

The following subject matter provides for modeling an application's potential security threats at a logical component level early in the design phase of the application. Specifically, in a computer system, multiple model components are defined to represent respective logical elements of the application. Each model component includes a corresponding set of security threats that could potentially be of import not only to the component but also to the application as a whole in its physical implementation. The model components are interconnected to form a logical model of the application. One or more potential security threats are then analyzed in terms of the model components in the logical model.

Rapid application security threat analysis

An evidence-based policy manager generates a permission grant set for a code assembly received from a resource location. The policy manager executes in a computer system (e.g., a Web client or server) in combination with the verification module and class loader of the run-time environment. The permission grant set generated for a code assembly is applied in the run-time call stack to help the system determine whether a given system operation by the code assembly is authorized. Both code assemblies and evidence may be received from a local origin or from a remote resource location via a network (e.g., the Internet). Evidence having different levels of trust may be evaluated in combination so that a permission grant set is associated only with trusted code assemblies. The policy manager may comprise execution modules for parsing a security policy specification, generating one or more code hierarchies, evaluating membership of the received code assembly in one or more code groups, and generating a permission grant set based upon this membership evaluation.

Evaluating initially untrusted evidence in an evidence-based security policy manager

A system and method determine whether a called code frame has a requested permission available to it, so as to be able to execute a protected operation. A code frame is contained within a code assembly received from a remote or local resource location. A policy manager generates a permission grant set containing permission grant objects associated with the code assembly. Both the permission grant set and the code assembly are loaded into a runtime call stack for runtime execution of one or more code frames. Calls to other code frames may involve loading additional code assemblies and permission grant sets into the runtime call stack. In order for a called code frame to perform a protected operation, the code frame demands a requested permission from its calling code frame and all code frames preceding the calling code frame on the runtime call stack as part of a stack walk operation. If the calling code frame and the preceding call frames can satisfy the requested permission, the called code frame can perform the protected operation (absent stack overrides). Otherwise, a security exception is thrown and the called code frame is inhibited from performing the protected operation (absent stack overrides). Stack overrides may be employed to dynamically modify the stack walk operation. To increase performance, a stack walk may be avoided by caching an intersection of the permission grants of all code assemblies in the application.

Applying a permission grant set to a call stack during runtime

An evidence-based policy manager generates a permission grant set for a code assembly received from a resource location. The policy manager executes in a computer system (e.g., a Web client or server) in combination with the verification module and class loader of the run-time environment. The permission grant set generated for a code assembly is applied in the run-time call stack to help the system determine whether a given system operation by the code assembly is authorized. Both code assemblies and evidence may be received from a local origin or from a remote resource location via a network (e.g., the Internet). The policy manager may comprise execution modules for parsing a security policy specification, generating a one or more code hierarchies, evaluating membership of the received code assembly in one or more code groups, and generating a permission grant set based upon this membership evaluation.

Evidence-based security policy manager

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Bellevue, WA, United States of America

Loren Kohnfelder