Freescale Semiconductor,inc.

Interdigital Patent Holdings, Inc.

Nxp Usa, Inc.

Nxp B.v.

Freescale Semiconductors Inc.

Lawrence Loren Case

Thomas E Tkacik

Inhyok Cha

Yogendra C Shah

Rodney D Ziolkowski

Andreas U Schmidt

Andreas Leicher

Carlin R Covey

David H Hartley

Louis J Guccione

Dolores F Howry

Mark D Redman

Joseph Charles Circello

Mohit Arora

Michael Victor Meyerstein

Yousif Targali

Douglas Allan Hardy

Michael D Fitzsimmons

David G Greiner

Sudhir B Pattar

Matthew W Brocker

David J Schimke

Mingle Sun

Charles E Cannon

Darrell L Carder

John E Spittal, Jr

Jonathan Lutz

Gregory Schmidt

Mark Norman Fullerton

John J Vaglica

Jeffrey C Cunningham

Nihaar N Mahatme

Jayanta Bhadra

Asaf Ashkenazi

Simon Gallimore

Steven R Tugenberg

Wen Chen

Joel Feldman

Sebastian Stappert

Glen G Wienecke

Ruchir Chhabra

Thomas Ernst Friedrich Wille

Troy E Mackie

Alistair N Muir

Aditi Dinesh Shah

Erik D Swanson

Steven Tugeberg

Michael Charles Elsasser

Sheilah Credo Phan

Geoffrey Mark Lees

Andreas Schmidit

Methods and systems for multi-modal security access control for a System on a Chip (SoC) are disclosed herein. In an example embodiment, a method includes providing a secure enclave including a plurality of bus masters and a Sentinel Resource Domain Controller (SRDC), and receiving a request to access a control, asset, or resource. The method further includes assessing a plurality of attributes that include each of: a first attribute that is a privilege mode attribute; a second attribute that concerns an applicability or inapplicability of a Runtime Root of Trust (RRoT) mode; a third attribute relating to a bus master type; and a fourth attribute related to a security state. The method additionally includes determining, based upon the attributes, whether the request is granted or denied, and causing the control, asset, or resource to which the request is directed to be accessible or inaccessible based upon the determining.

Methods and systems for multi-modal security access control based on details of security circumstances

In an embodiment, a System-on-Chip (SoC) may include: a plurality of core domains, and a memory coupled to the plurality of core domains through a hardware firewall, wherein the hardware firewall is configured to enforce an adaptive Deny-By-Default (DBD) access policy in response to an event. In another embodiment, a circuit, may include: an access control policy generator configured to produce an adaptive DBD policy, and a hardware firewall coupled to the access control policy generator, the hardware firewall configured to enforce the adaptive DBD policy. In yet another embodiment, a method may include: storing an indication of a first DBD configuration state, the first DBD configuration state usable to enforce a first DBD access control policy, and changing the stored indication to a second DBD configuration state, the second DBD configuration state usable to enforce a second DBD access control policy.

Hardware firewalls with adaptive deny-by-default (DBD) access control

A data processing system includes a plurality of subsystems, a plurality of local security controllers, and a central security controller. Each subsystem of the plurality of subsystems has a security component for providing a security function. A local security controller corresponds to each one of the subsystems. Each local security controller ensures compliance of the security component with local security policies of the subsystem to which the local security controller corresponds. The central security controller is coupled to the local security controller of each of the plurality of subsystems. The central security controller ensures data processing system compliance with system wide security policies. In the event of a detected security violation, the local security controller may respond automatically, without involvement of the central security controller. A method for securing the data processing system is also provided.

Data processing system having distributed security controller with local control and method for securing the data processing system

A data system includes an information bus, a volatile memory located on the information bus, and an MRAM located on the information bus. The data system includes threat detection circuitry. In response to a threat condition to the MRAM, data is transferred via the information bus from the MRAM to the volatile memory for storage during a threat to the MRAM as indicated by the threat condition. In some examples, the threat condition is characterized as a magnetic field exposure.

Tamper protection of memory devices on an integrated circuit

A runtime security system, including: a shared core configured to execute processes having varying levels of trustworthiness configured to receive security services requests; an execution monitor configured to monitor the execution of the shared core further comprising a timer, a policy table, and an execution monitor state machine; secure assets including cryptographic keys; and immutable security service functions configured to enable access to the secure assets in response to secure services requests; wherein the execution monitor is configured to: detect that the shared core has received a secure boot request; verify that the secure boot request is valid; allow the shared core to securely boot when the secure boot request valid.

Method for securing runtime execution flow

A method of encrypting data on a memory device includes receiving a memory transaction request at an inline encryption engine coupled between a processing core and switch fabric in a system on a chip (SOC). The memory transaction request includes a context component and a data component. The context component is analyzed to determine whether the data component will be stored in an encrypted memory region. If the data component will be stored in an encrypted memory region, the data component is encrypted and communicated to a location in the encrypted memory region. The location is based at least on the context component.

Systems and methods for data encryption

Methods, components and apparatus for implementing platform validation and management (PVM) are disclosed. PVM provides the functionality and operations of a platform validation entity with remote management of devices by device management components and systems such as a home node-B management system or component. Example PVM operations bring devices into a secure target state before allowing connectivity and access to a core network.

Platform validation and management of wireless devices

A resource domain controller in a data processing system stores information that is used to group various resources, such as bus masters and peripherals, into common domains. Each group can be referred to as a resource domain and can include one or more data processor and peripheral devices. The resource domain information is then used to determine whether a particular access request from a data processor is authorized to access its intended target, e.g., one of the peripheral devices, by determining whether the access request and the intended target each belong to a common resource domain. If so, the access request is allowed, otherwise the access request is prevented from being successfully completed.

Resource domain partioning in a data processing system

A runtime classifier hardware circuit is incorporated into an electronic device for implementing hardware security by storing a support vector model in memory which is derived from pre-silicon verification data to define secure behavior for a first circuit on the electronic device; monitoring input and/or output signals associated with the first circuit using the runtime classifier hardware circuit which compares the input and/or output signals to the support vector model to detect an outlier input signal and/or outlier output signal for the first circuit; and blocking the outlier input and/or output signal from being input to or output from the first circuit.

Model-based runtime detection of insecure behavior for system on chip with security requirements

A constrained network entity may determine, via an authentication procedure with a core network entity, the trustworthiness of an endpoint attempting to establish a secure channel with the constrained network entity. The constrained network entity may receive a certificate from the endpoint attempting to establish the secure channel and the constrained network entity may send the certificate asserted by the endpoint to a core network entity for validation. The core network entity may receive the certificate during a key exchange with the constrained network entity and the core network entity may indicate to the constrained network entity the validity of the certificate. The constrained network entity may determine whether to establish the secure channel with the endpoint based on the validity of the certificate.

Certificate validation and channel binding

Methods and systems are disclosed for key management for on-the-fly hardware decryption within an integrated circuit. Encrypted information is received from an external memory and stored in an input buffer within the integrated circuit. The encrypted information includes one or more encrypted key blobs. The encrypted key blobs include one or more secret keys for encrypted code associated with one or more encrypted software images stored within the external memory. A key-encryption key (KEK) code for the encrypted key blobs is received from an internal data storage medium within the integrated circuit, and the KEK code is used to generate one or more key-encryption keys (KEKs). A decryption system then decrypts the encrypted key blobs using the KEKs to obtain the secret keys, and the decryption system decrypts the encrypted code using the secret keys. The resulting decrypted software code is then available for further processing.

Key management for on-the-fly hardware decryption within integrated circuits

Integrity validation of a network device may be performed. A network device comprising a secure hardware module, may receive a root key. The secure hardware module may also receive a first code measurement. The secure hardware module may provide a first key based on the root key and the first code measurement. The secure hardware module may receive a second code measurement and provide a second key based on the first key and the second code measurement. The release of keys based on code measurements may provide authentication in stages.

Staged control release in boot process

A wireless communications device may be configured to perform integrity checking and interrogation with a network entity to isolate a portion of a failed component on the wireless network device for remediation. Once an integrity failure is determined on a component of the device, the device may identify a functionality associated with the component and indicate the failed functionality to the network entity. Both the wireless network device and the network entity may identify the failed functionality and/or failed component using a component-to-functionality map. After receiving an indication of an integrity failure at the device, the network entity may determine that one or more additional iterations of integrity checking may be performed at the device to narrow the scope of the integrity failure on the failed component. Once the integrity failure is isolated, the network entity may remediate a portion of the failed component on the wireless communications device.

Device validation, distress indication, and remediation

Persistent communication layer credentials generated on a persistent communication layer at one network may be leveraged to perform authentication on another. For example, the persistent communication layer credentials may include application-layer credentials derived on an application layer. The application-layer credentials may be used to establish authentication credentials for authenticating a mobile device for access to services at a network server. The authentication credentials may be derived from the application-layer credentials of another network to enable a seamless handoff from one network to another. The authentication credentials may be derived from the application-layer credentials using reverse bootstrapping or other key derivation functions. The mobile device and/or network entity to which the mobile device is being authenticated may enable communication of authentication information between the communication layers to enable authentication of a device using multiple communication layers.

Authentication and secure channel setup for communication handoff scenarios

Growing community of inventors

Austin, TX, United States of America

Lawrence Loren Case