Motorola Corporation

Temic Automotive of North America, Inc.

Motorola Mobility LLC

Motorola Solutions, Inc.

Larry C Puhl

Ezzat A Dabbish

Louis D Finkelstein

Thomas S Messerges

Walton L Fehr

Jurgen Reinold

Stephen N Levine

Samuel M Levenson

Daniel P Brown

John David Bruner

Douglas A Kuhlman

Harry M Bliss

Dean H Vogler

Yi Q Li

Mary B Flanders

Mary Beth Flanders

Lawrence Edwin Connell

Richard A Comroe

Duane C Rabe

James C Baker

Michael W Bright

Richard J Vilmur

Jose Gutman

Robert W Furtaw

Eric F Ziolko

Scott N Carney

Robert L Geiger

John Paul Byrns

Ronald F Buskey

Gerald Edward Corrigan

Carl M Danielsen

Robert David Frith

Ronald J Webb

Michael J McClaughry

Jim Wright

Paul A Kasley

John F Smedinghoff

Samual M Levenson

Tracey L Cantarutti

William L Brendle

Louis David Finkelstein

The identity of a user of a mobile device is verified by the mobile device accessing the location of the mobile device over recent time to obtain a current route, comparing a feature of the current route to characteristic features of previous routes stored on the mobile device. The user is verified if the feature of the current route matches a characteristic feature of previous routes. The previous routes may be obtained by tracking the location of the mobile device over time to obtain a number of routes, identifying characteristic features of the routes, and storing the characteristic features of the routes.

Identity verification using location over time information

New devices () are added to an existing domain by obtaining domain information (e.g., domain name and private domain password) from devices () already in the domain that preferably are in close proximity. Once the domain information has been transferred from the device already in the domain to the device being added to the domain, the device being added to the domain contacts a key issuer () to complete its registration into the domain. The key issuer returns a DRM domain private key () as well as a DRM certificate (). Both are utilized by the device to obtain and render digital content ().

Domain-based digital-rights management system with easy and secure device enrollment

A device () performs a methodfor authentication and Ad Hoc network setup. The device () receives () a first security configuration; receives () a second security configuration based on location; authenticates () at least a second node () having the first security configuration and the second security configuration; and forms () a network with the at least a second node ().

Authentication for Ad Hoc network setup

A vehicle authenticates a service technician and accesses a technician database to determine whether the service technician is indicated as authorized to perform the service operation. If the service technician is indicated as authorized to perform the service operation, the vehicle allows the service technician to perform the service operation.

Method and system for vehicle authorization of a service technician

A communications device () enabled to support both external voice communications functionality () (or other external communications of interest and choice) and other functionality () has at least a first and second mode of operation (and). The first mode of operation permits essentially all functionality while the second mode of operation precludes at least much of the other functionality in favor of preserving the viability of at least some of the external communications functionality. A selector () can select a given mode of operation based, at least in part, on a triggercomprising, for example, a user input and/or detection of a condition of concern.

Method and apparatus to facilitate alternative modes of operation for a portable communication device

A method and apparatus authenticates a component () for use in a device (). The device memory () stores a predetermined challenge and a predetermined response () associated with the predetermined challenge. The method detects whether the component has been coupled to the device. If the component has been detected (), the predetermined challenge is provided to the component (). If a component response is received within a predetermined response time (), it is compared to the predetermined response. The component is disabled () if either the component response is not received within the predetermined response time or the component response is received within the predetermined response time but the component response is not equivalent to the predetermined response. The component is enabled () if the component response is received within the predetermined response time and the component response is equivalent to the predetermined response.

Method and apparatus for authenticating components

Authentication is performed to a confidence level (CL) desired by a verifier (). A prover () picks and sends certain same size, square matrices to the verifier (). A random request bit is sent () from the verifier () to the prover () after the receipt of a certain square matrix. Depending on the request bit, calculations are made () by the verifier () to determine if the matrices sent from the prover are verifiable. The prover () is iteratively authenticated by the verifier (). Iterations are continued until () a count of the iterations (IL) reaches a number sufficient to achieve the desired confidence level (CL). After a delay, more iterations can achieve a higher confidence level by building on previous result of authentication without having to begin at zero. During this delay, the verifier () can perform tasks in reliance on the result of authentication. Digital logic can perform the authentication.

Method for zero-knowledge authentication of a prover by a verifier providing a user-selectable confidence level and associated application devices

A vehicle accesses a configuration database to determine whether a reconfiguration function is authorized. The reconfiguration function may involve, for example, installing the component in the vehicle, removing the component from the vehicle, replacing the component with another component in the vehicle, replacing another component in the vehicle with the component, modifying the component, upgrading the component and rendering the component operable. Upon determining that the reconfiguration function is authorized, the vehicle allows the reconfiguration function to be performed. The reconfiguration function may be authorized based on a type of the vehicle, a type of the component or a combination of configuration elements in a current configuration of the vehicle.

Method and system for authorizing reconfiguration of a vehicle

The service technician accesses the prospective vehicle and obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic vehicle is associated with a cryptographic key. The service technician utilizes the cryptographic key in cryptographic communication with the prospective vehicle via a secure device having limited accessibility but being accessible by the service technician. The service technician determines whether the prospective vehicle is the authentic vehicle based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication with the prospective vehicle.

Method and system for technician authentication of a vehicle

A vehicle authenticates a first prospective component by obtaining from a certification authority a certification that an authentic component is associated with a cryptographic key unique to the first prospective component and determining whether the first prospective component is the authentic component based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in cryptographic communication with the first prospective component. The vehicle authenticates a component class of a second prospective component by obtaining from a certification authority a certification that an authentic component of the component class is associated with a second cryptographic key unique to the component class and determining whether the second prospective component is an authentic component of the component class based on whether the second cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication with the second prospective component.

Authentication of vehicle components

A vehicle authenticates a prospective component for use in the vehicle by obtaining from a certification authority a certification that an authentic component is associated with a cryptographic key. The vehicle obtains the certification separately from the component. The certification certifies that the cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic component. The vehicle utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the prospective component, and determines whether the prospective component is the authentic component based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication.

Method and system for vehicle authentication of a component using key separation

A component for use in a prospective vehicle obtains from a certification authority a certification that an authentic vehicle is associated with a cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic vehicle. The component utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the prospective vehicle, and determines whether the prospective vehicle is the authentic vehicle based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication. Upon determining the prospective vehicle is the authentic vehicle, the component may allow the prospective vehicle to operate the component.

Method and system for component authentication of a vehicle

A vehicle authenticates a component class of a prospective component for use in the vehicle by obtaining from a certification authority a certification that an authentic component of the component class is associated with a second cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the second cryptographic key is bound to information identifying an authentic component of the component class. The vehicle utilizes the second cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the prospective component, and determines whether the prospective component is an authentic component of the component class based on whether the second cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication.

Method and system for vehicle authentication of a component class

A vehicle authenticates a prospective component for use in the vehicle by obtaining from a certification authority a certification that an authentic component is associated with a cryptographic key. The certification certifies that the cryptographic key is bound to information identifying the authentic component. The vehicle utilizes the cryptographic key obtained from the certification authority in cryptographic communication with the prospective component, and determines whether the prospective component is the authentic component based on whether the cryptographic key is successfully utilized in the cryptographic communication.

Method and system for vehicle authentication of a component

An apparatus and method for preventing information leakage attacks on a microelectronic assembly is described for performing a cryptographic algorithm by transforming a first function, used by the cryptographic algorithm, into a second function. The method includes receiving (,) a masked input data having n number of bits that is masked with an input mask, wherein n is a first predetermined integer. The method also includes processing (,) the masked input data using a second function based on a predetermined masking scheme, and producing (,) a masked output data having m number of bits that is masked with an output mask, wherein m is a second predetermined integer.

Method and apparatus for preventing information leakage attacks on a microelectronic assembly

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Sleepy Hollow, IL, United States of America

Larry C Puhl