Prevoty, Inc.

Imperva, Inc.

Kunal Anand

Joseph Rozner

Itsik Mantin

Richard Meester

Craig Burlingame

Peter Klimek

Ran Rosin

Brian Anderson

Joseph Moore

Joshua Chase

Michael Crampon

Merritt Carl Vincent

Stephen Weinberg

Joe Moore

Martin Ryan

Systems and methods for analyzing SQL queries for constraint violations for injection attacks. Tokenizing a SQL query generates a token stream. A parse tree is constructed by iterating over lexical nodes of the token stream. The parse tree is compared to a SQL schema and access configuration for a database in order to analyze the SQL query for constraint violations. Evaluation flaws are also detected. A step-wise, bottom-up approach is employed to walk through the parse tree to detect types and to ascertain from those types whether the condition for SQL execution is static or dynamic. SQL request security engine logic refers to predetermined protective action data and takes the particular type of action specified by the predetermined protective action data. Security is further enhanced by limiting service of requests to requests of one or more specific, accepted data types. Each request is parsed into individual data elements, each an associated key-value pair. If the key is any data element of the request matches a predetermined allowed key, detection and neutralization of any injection attack in the associated value data of the data element is bypassed. A number of patterns that match information to be obscured in logs are established and any matching information is replaced with obscured data. When recording information to the logs, any data whose key is a predetermined masked key is replaced with obscured data.

Systems and methods for improving accuracy in recognizing and neutralizing injection attacks in computer services

A runtime application self protection (RASP) plug-in logic monitors for, and prevents, outbound network connections that are initiated by server application logic and that are not intended by the application logic. The RASP plug-in has access to information generally available only to the application logic and identifies specific vulnerabilities within the application logic that can be patched. The vulnerabilities are identified by (i) data identifying the portion(s) of the application logic that is the source of the vulnerability and (ii) data identifying the authenticated user, if any, that is the source of the attack. The RASP plug-in catches and identifies specific attacks on the application logic in real-world, production operation.

Monitoring and preventing outbound network connections in runtime applications

A method by one or more computing devices for detecting application user anomalies in audit logs of database operations performed on one or more databases. The method includes obtaining a first audit log of database operations, wherein the first audit log indicates (1) which application users of an application caused which of the database operations to be performed and (2) which functions of the application caused which of the database operations to be performed, generating, for each of the application users indicated in the first audit log, a profile of that application user that indicates which of the functions that application user is expected to touch, and detecting an anomaly in response to a determination that a second audit log indicates that an application user touched a function that is not one of the functions indicated in the profile of the application user.

Detecting behavioral anomalies in user-data access logs

A method by one or more runtime agents protecting a web application for capturing contextual information for data accesses. The method includes determining first metadata associated with a web application layer request sent by a web application firewall to the web application, determining second metadata associated with the web application layer request based on information available to the web application, serializing the first metadata and the second metadata to generate serialized metadata, and adding the serialized metadata to a database query that is to be submitted by the web application to the database server, wherein execution of the database query that includes the serialized metadata by the database server is to cause the database activity monitor to store the serialized metadata and third metadata associated with the database query determined by the database activity monitor in a data storage.

Capturing contextual information for data accesses to improve data security

A runtime application self protection (RASP) plug-in monitors for, and prevents, invocation of unacceptably weak cryptographic processing requested by an application. Since the RASP plug-in is linked to the application, the RASP plug-in has access to information regarding an execution state of the application logic, including interaction with shared libraries, to determine what component of the application requests use of unacceptable cryptographic techniques. Such enables owners/operators of an application to easily detect requests for unacceptable cryptographic techniques, even if such requests originate in a portion of the application that is not under the control of the owners/operators.

Monitoring and preventing use of weak cryptographic logic

A method for detecting anomalies in audit logs of database operations performed on databases. The method includes obtaining a first audit log of database operations performed on one or more databases, generating, for each of a plurality of attribute values associated with a designated attribute appearing in the first audit log, a profile of that attribute value that indicates expected attribute characteristics of one or more attributes when that attribute value is associated with the designated attribute, obtaining a second audit log of further database operations performed on the one or more databases, and detecting an anomaly responsive to a determination that a log entry in the second audit log includes an attribute value associated with the designated attribute but attributes in the log entry deviate from the expected attribute characteristics of the one or more attributes indicated by the profile of the attribute value associated with the designated attribute.

Methods and apparatuses for detecting an evaluation flaw in a SQL query, the SQL query configured to access data in a database table are disclosed. The method includes creating a parse tree from the SQL query and evaluating the parse tree to ascertain whether a condition of the SQL query results in a type or value that is independent of contents of the database table. For type evaluation, if, responsive to the evaluating, the condition is found, designating the SQL query at risk for having the tautology in the SQL query. For value evaluation, if, responsive to the evaluating, the condition is found, determining whether the condition is always true or whether the condition is always false; and if, responsive to the determining, the condition is found to be always true or always false, designating the SQL query at risk for having the evaluation flaw in the SQL query.

Systems and methods for SQL value evaluation to detect evaluation flaws

Systems and methods for SQL type evaluation to detect evaluation flaws

The present invention relates to systems and methods for statistical caching. Inputs are captured via an appropriate network protocol. The input includes statistical data and a corresponding cache key. The values for each cache key within a cache are compacted using the input. The compacting involves determining if the corresponding cache key is already set within the cache, and if the cache key is present, aggregating the statistical data with the value stored within the cache to generate an updated value. The updated cache may be periodically synchronized with a final data store. Additionally, each operation performed by the statistical cache may be recorded in a transaction log for fault tolerance.

Systems and methods for statistical caching

The present invention relates to systems and methods for analyzing SQL queries for constraint violations, which may indicate injection attacks. The systems and methods tokenize a SQL query to generate a token stream. Next, lexical nodes are generated by iterating over the token stream. Then, a parse tree can be constructed by iterating over the lexical nodes. The parse tree may be compared to a SQL schema and access configuration for a database in order to analyze the SQL query for constraint violations, including determining the number of queries in the parse tree, identifying invalid fields and table access, identifying invalid field type comparisons and pattern matches, and identifying early statement termination.

Systems and methods for SQL query constraint solving

The present invention relates to systems and methods for the tokenization of user-generated content in order to prevent attacks on the user-generated content. The systems and methods initially pre-process the user-generated content string utilizing a secondary input of target language. Pre-processing may also include initialization of finite state machines, token markers and string buffers (text, HTML tag name, HTML attribute name, HTML attribute value, CSS selector, CSS property name, and CSS property value). The user-generated content string is scanned by rune, and the system sends each rune to a specific buffer based upon signaling by individual finite state machine states. Buffers are then converted to token stream nodes to be inserted into the token stream. The tokens represent a string of characters and are symbolically categorized according to activated finite state machine states.

Systems and methods for tokenizing user-generated content to enable the prevention of attacks

The present invention relates to systems and methods for parsing of a token stream for user generated content in order to prevent attacks on the user generated content. The systems and methods include a database which stores one or more whitelists, and a parser. The parser removes tokens from the token stream by comparing the tokens against the whitelist. Next, the parser validates CSS property values, encodes data within attribute values and text nodes, reconciles closing HTML tags, and coerces media tags into safe variants. The tokens removed may be any of HTML tags, HTML attributes, HTML protocols, CSS selectors and CSS properties.

Growing community of inventors

Marina Del Rey, CA, United States of America

Kunal Anand