Intel Corporation

Mcafee, Inc.

Other

Kirk D Brannock

William A Stevens, Jr

Yuriy Bulygin

Barry E Huntley

Stephen Anthony Fischer

Kevin Gotze

Vincent J Zimmer

Jesse R Walker

John I Garney

Joseph A Schaefer

Antonio S Cheng

William J Chalmers

David W Grawrock

Sven Schrecker

Richard L Coulson

Howard C Herbert

Geoffrey Cooper

Andrew J Fish

Sergiu D Ghetie

Ramamurthy Krithivas

Douglas Raymond Moran

Ulhas S Warrier

Michael Neve De Mevergnies

Robert Patrick Hale

Robert L Huff

Kimberly A Davis

Adil Karrar

Allen R Wishman

Michael F Kartoz

Donald Hewett

David A deVries

David M Amols

Stephen H Price

Barnes Cooper

Mallik Bulusu

Rahul Khanna

Robert Charles Swanson

Mahesh S Natu

Stephen S Pawlowski

Robert J Royer, Jr

Robert E Gough

Madhusudhan Rangarajan

Dimitrios Ziakas

Sham M Datta

Michael Kinney

Jeanna N Matthews

Robert W Cone

Russell J Wunderlich

Shanwei Cen

C Brendan Traw

Babak B Nikjou

Daniel A Rich

John R Lindsley

Miles F Schwartz

Isaac W Oram

Dave Edwards

Matthew L King

Various embodiments are generally directed to an apparatus, method and other techniques to detect an access request to access a computing resource while in a system management mode (SMM), determine a bit of a lock register is set to enable access to a bitmap associated with the computing resource, the bitmap to indicate an access policy for the computing resource, and determine whether the access request violate the access policy set in the bitmap. Embodiments may also include performing the access request if the access request does not violate the access policy, and causing a fault if the access request does violate the access policy.

Techniques to provide hardware enforced protection environment for a system management mode

Various embodiments are generally directed to an apparatus, method and other techniques for determining a region of the memory for which to store information, inserting the information into the region of the memory, and applying one or more characteristics to the region of the memory via an instruction set architecture (ISA) operation, the one or more characteristics comprising an immutable characteristic to prevent modification of the information in the region of the memory.

Techniques to provide run-time protections using immutable regions of memory

Various embodiments are generally directed to an apparatus, method and other techniques for allocating a portion of the memory as system management random access memory (SMRAM) including a system management interrupt (SMI) handler for a system management mode (SMM), the SMI handler to handle SMIs for the SMM, generating a page table for the SMM, the page table comprising one or more mapped pages to map virtual addresses to physical addresses for the SMM, and setting one or more page table attributes for the page table to prevent a malicious code attack on the SMM.

Techniques to provide a secure system management mode

Various embodiments are generally directed to an apparatus, method and other techniques for gathering configuration information of a computer system during a system management mode of the computer system and exposing the gathered configuration information to securely attest to the configuration of the system.

Method and apparatus to gather platform configuration profile in a trustworthy manner

A custody transfer of a device can include sending a start of transfer request to an attestation device over a short range wireless communication channel, a nonce is received from the attestation device in association with the start of transfer request, and the nonce is signed at the particular gateway device. The signed nonce is sent to the attestation device, a transfer confirmation message is received from the attestation device, and a transfer message is sent to a management system to report a transfer in custody of the attestation device involving the particular gateway device and another gateway device.

Attestation device custody transfer protocol

Methods and systems may provide for receiving at a secure element of a system, during a boot process of the system, a first pairing authentication value from a pairing agent. In addition, a pairing key may be received from the pairing agent, wherein the first pairing authentication value and the pairing key may be used to establish a trusted channel between the secure element and an input output (IO) device coupled to the system. In one example, the first pairing authentication value is accepted only if the first pairing authentication value is received prior to a predetermined stage of the boot process.

Automatic pairing of IO devices with hardware secure elements

Platform controller, computer-readable storage media, and methods associated with initialization of a computing device. In embodiments, a platform controller may comprise a boot controller and one or more non-volatile memory modules, coupled with the boot controller. In embodiments, the one or more non-volatile memory modules may have first instructions and second instructions stored thereon. The first instructions may, when executed by a processor of a computing device hosting the platform controller, cause initialization of the computing device. The second instructions, when executed by the boot controller, may cause the boot controller to monitor at least a portion of the execution of the first instructions by the computing device and may generate a trace of the monitored portion of the execution of the first instructions. In embodiments, the trace may be stored in the one or more non-volatile memory modules. Other embodiments may be described and/or claimed.

Initialization trace of a computing device

An apparatus is provided that includes at least one processor device, an energy storage module to power the apparatus, memory to store a secret such that powering down and restarting the apparatus causes the secret to be lost, logic executable by the at least one processor device to generate attestation data using the secret that data abstracts the secret, and a communications interface to send the attestation data to another device.

Simplified sensor integrity

In one embodiment, a processor includes at least one execution unit and Return Oriented Programming (ROP) detection logic. The ROP detection logic may determine a ROP metric based on a plurality of control transfer events. The ROP detection logic may also determine whether the ROP metric exceeds a threshold. The ROP detection logic may also, in response to a determination that the ROP metric exceeds the threshold, provide a ROP attack notification.

Detection of return oriented programming attacks

A method, apparatus, machine-readable medium, and system are disclosed. In one embodiment the method includes a processor. The processor includes switching a platform firmware update mechanism located in a computer platform to a platform firmware armoring technology (PFAT) mode on a boot of the computer platform. The computer platform includes a platform firmware storage location that stores a platform firmware. The method then persistently locks the platform firmware storage location in response to the platform firmware update mechanism switching to the PFAT mode. When persistently locked, writes are only allowed to the platform firmware storage location by an Authenticated Code Module in the running platform and only after a platform firmware update mechanism unlocking procedure.

Platform firmware armoring technology

In an embodiment of the invention an application provider may include 'tracing elements' in a target software application. While working with the application the trace elements are detected and provide a 'baseline trace' indicating proper application execution. The provider then supplies the application, which still includes the trace elements, and the baseline trace to a user. The user operates the application to produce a &#x201c;real-time trace&#x201d; based on the application still having trace elements that produce trace events. A comparator then compares the baseline and real-time traces. If the traces are within a pre-determined range of each other the user has a level of assurance the software is operating correctly. If the level of assurance is low, an embodiment may trigger a hardware interrupt or similar event to prevent further execution of software. Other embodiments are described herein.

System and method for correct execution of software based on baseline and real time information

Growing community of inventors

Hillsboro, OR, United States of America

Kirk D Brannock