Bundesdruckerei Gmbh

Nxp B.v.

Quotainne Enterprises LLC

Kim Nguyen

Manfred Paeschke

Jörg Fischer

Frank Byszio

Oliver Muth

Thomas Ernst Wille

Michael Knebel

Mathias Wagner

Volker Timm

Claus Freytag

Carsten Schwarz

Martin Fröhlich

Steffen Scholze

Enrico Entschew

Frank Steinfeldt

Jan Hill

Gunnar Osterode

Toralf Chryselius

A system includes a first computer system (FCS) configured to receive an authentication request of a user with respect to the first authentication system (FAS), and communicate an unsuccessful authentication attempt. In response, a bridge computer system (BCS), is configured to request a user ID and receive at least the user ID; identify an address of a second computer system (SCS) based on the user ID; and initiate the second authentication system (SAS) using the address. The SCS, if the user has been successfully authenticated with respect to the SAS, is configured to communicate successful authentication to the BCS; and in response, the BCS is configured to send the FAS a confirmation message, and the FCS is configured to treat the user as authenticated.

System and methods for performing distributed authentication using a bridge computer system

A system includes a first computer system (FCS) configured to receive an authentication request of a user with respect to the first authentication system (FAS), and communicate an unsuccessful authentication attempt. In response, a bridge computer system (BCS), is configured to request a user ID and receive at least the user ID; identify an address of a second computer system (SCS) based on of the user ID; and initiate the second authentication system (SAS) using the address. The SCS, if the user has been successfully authenticated with respect to the SAS, is configured to communicate successful authentication to the BCS; and in response, the BCS is configured to send the FAS a confirmation message, and the FCS is configured to treat the user as authenticated.

Systems and methods for performing disturbed authentication using a bridge computer system

To provide an identification document, particularly a passport, in which at least one contactless RFID chip () and an antenna () connected thereto are integrated on a page of the identification document, an additional layer () mechanically reinforcing the RFID chip is situated at the area of the RFID chip () on the page, thus providing an arrangement with which the RFID chip can withstand mechanical stress for years on end.

Identification document with a contactless RFID chip

The invention relates to a data carrier () with a chip () which stores energy () as well as information for contact-bound or contactless inductive communication, and with a plurality of excitable chip sensors () integrated in the chip (), which, after excitation (), pass on a signal () to a CPU () of the chip (), in which the signal () is processed. The invention is characterized in that, independently of storing energy () as well as information by the chip (), the excitation () is specifically adjustable by the chip () for the purpose of additionally storing information and is adaptable to the requirements of processing the signal () in the CPU ().

Data carrier with a chip and a plurality of sensors

This invention pertains to methods and apparatus for accessing an electronic device by a data terminal, as well as a computer program product, an electronic device and a data terminal.

Method and apparatus for accessing an electronic device by a data terminal

A method for protection of a chip card from unauthorized use includes: inputting a first identification into a chip card terminal, producing a cipher of at least one first communication parameter using a first symmetric key derived from the first identification, a protected first communication channel being definable between the chip card terminal and the chip card, using the communication parameter, transmitting the cipher via a predefined communication channel from the chip card terminal to the chip card, attempting to decrypt the cipher using a second symmetric key by means of the chip card, the result of decryption only being the first communication parameter if the first symmetric key is identical to the second symmetric key so that the protected first communication channel can only be defined between the chip card terminal and the chip card if the first identification is correct.

Method for protection of a chip card from unauthorized use, chip card and chip card terminal

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Berlin, Germany

Kim Nguyen