Fisher Controls International LLC

Gm Global Technolgoy Operations, Inc.

Fisher Controls Llc.

Kenneth William Junk

Annette Lynn Latwesen

Michel Ken Lovell

Shannon Eugene Jelken

Annette L Latwesen

Jimmie Lee Snowbarger

Bruce Frederick Grumstrup

Ryan J Jwanouskos

Kurtis K Jensen

Brian Farrell

Gary L Scott

Richard Jay Winkler

Christopher Steven Metschke

John S Fuller

Christopher J Mack

Eugene R Taylor, Jr

Francis C Roessler

Thomas M Forest

Paul Taylor Alman

Michael R Fontaine

David Lee Smid

Duncan Schleiss

Ronald Francis Hurd

Peter Zornio

Manohar Reddy Nanjundappa

Mark Stiehl

Jeffrey Dean Seyller

Karl B Leboeuf

Gregory Robert Bulleit

Steven B Paullus

Christopher J Kloote

Steven Burl Paullus

Paul T Alman

Bruce F Grumstrup

Michael Ken Lovell

An apparatus includes a compute device having a microcontroller unit circuit, multiple processing circuits, and a backplane bus. Initial unsecured communications through the backplane bus are restricted. The microcontroller unit circuit is operational to authenticate the processing circuits with a plurality of processor attestations over a local area network bus based on a secure onboard communication protocol of an automotive open system architecture, a symmetric key, and a message authentication code. The processing circuits are operational to reply to the processor attestations over the local area network bus, and verify the microcontroller unit circuit based on the secure onboard communication protocol, the symmetric key, and the message authentication code received from the microcontroller unit circuit. Secure communications through the backplane bus among the processing circuits is enabled based on the authentications of the processing circuits and the verifications of the microcontroller unit circuit.

Symmetric key attestation of removable circuits

A method and system for public key infrastructure (PKI) in software defined vehicles enables secure communication between electronic components. The method includes establishing trust between multiple electronic components through a certificate history comprising signed public keys stored on each component. Once trust is established through attestation between components, the method utilizes signed Diffie-Hellman key exchange to securely distribute symmetric keys to the trusted components. These symmetric keys enable authenticated communication between the components to control vehicle systems and functions. The system operates locally without requiring internet connectivity or specialized service tools, allowing for secure field replacement and upgrading of components while maintaining system security through verification of component authenticity and prevention of counterfeit hardware.

Method and system for symmetric key distribution between electronic vehicle components

Methods and system for minor loop feedback fallback are disclosed. An example method includes controlling a process control device using first values from a first sensor; comparing the first values to reference values to identify a difference; and in response to the difference being outside of a threshold, controlling the process control device using second values from a second sensor.

Methods and system for minor loop feedback fallback

A method for attestation of electronic components includes operating a system including the components. The components are configured for electronic communication with each other. A first electronic component provides plug-in hardware and/or configurable software. The method includes utilizing a second electronic component to perform attestation upon the first component using asymmetric key cryptography to verify authenticity. When using the asymmetric key cryptography successfully verifies the authenticity, the method includes selectively enabling one of power or data to the first component and communicating between the first component and the plurality of components to achieve tangible functions. When the cryptography fails to successfully verify the authenticity, the method includes selectively withholding one of power or data connection the first component.

Method for attestation of an electronic component on a circuit board

Systems and techniques for accessing and controlling field devices to collect data and convert protocols are disclosed herein. An example system to access a field device includes one or more processors, a transmitter, a wireless network interface controller, and a memory storing instructions that, when executed, may cause the field communicator device to retrieve process parameter data encoded in a field device transmission protocol. The field communicator device may retrieve the process parameter data at a plurality of time intervals from a field device, and the process parameter data may correspond to a process parameter for the field device. The field communicator device may also store at least some of the process parameter data, analyze the process parameter data over the plurality of time intervals to identify a condition of the field device, and transmit an indication of the condition of the field device to a remote device.

Wireless universal interface

An apparatus has a communication bus, a first circuit, and a second circuit. The first circuit is operational to generate a package, calculate a check value of payload data in the package with a particular cyclic redundance check variant and an obfuscation type, store an encrypted check value in a footer of the package, store an encrypted obfuscation code in a header of the package, and transmit the package on the communication bus. The second circuit is operational to receive the package from the communication bus, decrypt the encrypted check value to determine the check value calculated by the first circuit, determine an obfuscation type from the encrypted obfuscation code, perform a payload verification of the payload data with the particular cyclic redundancy check variant with the obfuscation type applied and the check value, and signal that the payload data is valid in response to passage of the payload verification.

Data integrity checking between circuits

An example method to obtain process data associated with a process control system received from a field device includes identifying, at a computing device, associated data and a payload included in the data packet, the associated data including a source bit, determining, at the computing device, a type of connection between the field device and the computing device based on the source bit, determining, at the computing device, an encryption key identifier and an initialization vector based on an auxiliary data packet received prior to the data packet, generating, at the computing device, a nonce value based on the source bit and the initialization vector, the nonce value indicative of an input to a data encryption algorithm used by the field device to encrypt the payload, and extracting, at the computing device, the process data associated with the process control system from the payload.

Methods and apparatus to broadcast data packets in a process control environment

Methods, apparatus, and articles of manufacture are disclosed. An example apparatus includes at least one memory, and at least one processor to execute instructions to at least convert a first data packet to a second data packet, the first data packet having a first format based on an industrial communication protocol, the second data packet having a second format based on a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) communication protocol, the second data packet including a first payload having a first size, remove first data from the second data packet, increase the first size of the first payload to a second size to generate a second payload, add second data to the second payload, and transmit the second data packet to a remote device via a BLE network, the second data packet including the second payload.

Methods and apparatus to bridge communications between devices using low-energy devices

To generate a setpoint signal to stroke a valve during a partial-stroke test, a first target is determined for the setpoint signal based at least on a travel displacement threshold, the travel displacement threshold corresponding to a desired extent of travel of the valve during the partial-stroke test; the setpoint signal is ramped from an initial value to the first target, during a first time interval; subsequently to the first time interval, the setpoint signal is maintained at the first target during a second time interval; a second target is determined for the setpoint signal based at least on the initial value; and during a third time interval subsequent to the second interval, the setpoint signal is ramped from the first target to the second target in a direction opposite to the ramping of the setpoint signal during the first time interval.

Partial stroke tests for shutdown valves

Methods and apparatus to establish secure low energy wireless communications in a process control system are disclosed. An example field device includes a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) interface to receive a first initialization message from a remote device over an unpaired BLE connection. The first initialization message includes a plaintext message containing authentication content. The authentication content is generated based on a private authentication token available to the remote device using middleware. The field device also includes a BLE message analyzer to validate the plaintext message based on the authentication content using the authentication token stored by the field device.

Methods and apparatus to establish secure low energy wireless communications in a process control system

Brackets for amplifying antenna gain associated with mountable radio frequency identification (RFID) tags are disclosed. An example apparatus includes a bracket and an RFID tag. The bracket has a base, a first meandering amplification arm connected to and extending away from the base in a first direction, and a second meandering amplification arm connected to and extending away from the base in a second direction opposite the first direction. The RFID tag is mounted to the base of the bracket. The first meandering amplification arm and the second meandering amplification arm are respectively structured to at least one of: amplify an antenna gain associated with the RFID tag; or increase a communication range associated with the RFID tag.

Brackets for amplifying antenna gain associated with mountable RFID tags

An example method includes, in response to receiving a byte array including process data, determining whether auxiliary data is to be transmitted from a field device based on a counter, the auxiliary data including an encryption key identifier and an initialization vector, when auxiliary data is to be transmitted, transmitting a first data packet including the auxiliary data to the remote device, and determining a value for a source bit based on a type of connection between the field device and the remote device, the source bit and the counter included in associated data. The method further includes generating a nonce value based on the source bit and the initialization vector, encrypting a payload including the byte array based on the encryption key identifier and the nonce value, and transmitting a second data packet to the remote device, the second data packet including the associated data and the encrypted payload.

An example apparatus includes a first sensor tag to retrieve operational data, via a modem and a data bus, from a process control field device, wherein the first sensor tag includes a memory to store the operational data; a first antenna arranged to communicate with the first sensor tag when the first sensor tag receives operational data, the first antenna to communicate with the first sensor tag via a first frequency band; and a first identification device to retrieve the operational data from the first sensor tag, via the first antenna and the first frequency band, while the process control field device is unpowered.

Methods and apparatus for multimode rest communications in process control systems

Methods, apparatus, and articles of manufacture are disclosed to control communication data rates of low-energy devices. An example apparatus includes a Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) radio, and a power manager to determine whether to divide a first computation task into at least a second and a third computation task based on (1) energy stored in a power supply associated with the BLE radio and (2) a charging rate of the power supply, and when the first computation task is to be executed by the BLE radio and the first computation task is divided based on the determination, instruct the BLE radio to enter a sleep mode after the second computation task is executed, and invoke the BLE radio to transition from the sleep mode to an operating mode to execute the third computation task, the invoking in response to a measurement associated with the power supply satisfying an energy threshold.

Growing community of inventors

Marshalltown, IA, United States of America

Kenneth William Junk