Google Inc.

Kenneth Root

Adrian L Ludwig

Curtis Gerald Condra

Dianne K Hackborn

Amith Yamasani

Andrew Devron Stadler

Colin Cross

Richard G Cannings

Nicholas Neil Kralevich, Iv

Sebastian Johannes Porst

Peter Valchev

Richard Cannings

Dianne Kyra Hackborn

Nicholas Neil Kralevich Iv

A user-provided keystore may be utilized in a boot process to verify a boot image as disclosed herein. A device may be determined to be in a locked or verified state. A selected keystore may be determined to not verify against a first key such as a root key. A user may provide a keystore to a device. The system may display a prompt to the user which asks whether the user would like to continue to boot or not, if the system determines that the keystore does not verify against the first key. The user may respond to the prompt by indicating a desire to continue booting. The system may determine that the boot image verifies against the keystore and finish booting the device. Thus, the prompt may alert the user to a threat to the integrity of the boot process or device.

Verifying boot process of electronic device

A computing device has multiple user profiles. While a particular user profile is the currently-active user profile of a computing device, the computing device determines whether a binary that is not associated with the particular user profile is already stored at the computing device. In response to determining that the binary is not already stored at the computing device, the computing device downloads the binary from a computing system other than the computing device and associates the binary with the particular user profile. If the binary is already stored at the computing device, the computing device associates the binary with the particular user profile without downloading the binary again.

Re-use of binaries for multiple user accounts

Verified boot

Systems, methods, routines and/or techniques for time delay on services (e.g., verification services) that detect undesirable content are described. In some embodiments, a flexible verification service prevents users (e.g., hackers) from using the verification service 'as an oracle' to predict whether the user's application or software program will be detected by the verification service. The verification service, after receiving a verification request from a client device, may delay or prevent the communication of a verification response to the client device. The verification service may evaluate a verification request to determine a level of risk associated with the request. The verification service may communicate an initial response to the client device that submitted the verification request. The verification service may eventually communicate the verification response to the client device, for example, after a period of delay.

Detecting undesirable content

Growing community of inventors

Menlo Park, CA, United States of America

Kenneth Root