International Business Machines Corporation

Intermec IP Corporation

Intemec IP Corp.

Kenneth Alan Goldman

Dimitrios Pendarakis

Stefan Berger

Reiner Sailer

Elaine Rivette Palmer

Enriquillo Valdez

Harley K Heinrich

Thomas Anthony Cofino

Richard Harold Boivie

David R Safford

Ronald Perez

Mohit Kapur

Daniel Joseph Friedman

Christian Lenz Cesar

Sharon Louise Greene

Peter Grimm Sutton

Donna N Dillenberger

William Eric Hall

John C Dayka

Guerney D H Hunt

James Alan Ruddy

Kevin Patrick McAuliffe

Alyson Comer

George Conerly Wilson

Patrick Joseph Callaghan

Brian D Valentine

Miriam Zohar

Peter Anthony Sandon

Timothy Roy Block

Christopher John Engel

Trent Ray Jaeger

Kattamuri Ekanadham

Bhushan Pradip Jain

Shun Shing Chan

Ramachandra Pai

Ashish Kundu

Jakob Christopher Lang

Philip Shilung Yu

Hui Lei

Bishwaranjan Bhattacharjee

Charles Philippe Tresser

Sriram Kolinjivadi Padmanabhan

Sumeet Kochar

Vijay Krishnarao Naik

Steven A Bade

John Steven Langford

Hugo M Krawczyk

Ramon Caceres

William Bradley Schwartz

Shiva R Dasari

Shu Tao

Naoki Abe

David Dean Sanner

Alwood Patrick Williams, Iii

Li-Cheng Richard Zai

Leendert Peter Van Doorn

Matthias Gruetzner

Lee Hardy Wilson

Chidanand V Apte

Guerney Douglass Holloway Hunt

Jayaram Kallapalayam Radhakrishnan

Charles Campbell Palmer

Simon J Kofkin-Hansen

Deepa Srinivasan

Benno Schuepferling

Dennis Zeisberg

Shun-Shing Chan

David E Dieska

Carl E Abrams

Trenton Ray Jaeger

Richard Michael Smyczynski

Kevin G McAuliffe

Guerney D Hunt

Matthew A Hilbert

Kathleen M Troidle

Scott N Durham

Guerney Dh Hunt

Enriquilo Valdez

A method, system and apparatus for generating a computation such that it will execute in a target trusted execution environment (TEE), including selecting the target TEE, generating an authorization that is satisfied by a TEE, associating the authorization with the computation that executes in the TEE that is authorized, and generating the computation with the associated authorization.

Provisioning secure/encrypted virtual machines in a cloud infrastructure

A method, system and apparatus for provisioning a computation into a trusted execution environment, including verifying the trusted execution environment, generating integrity information of the computation, generating sealed data, sending information of the computation, the sealed data, and integrity information to the trusted execution environment, confirming the sealed data, and verifying integrity of the computation information from the integrity information and the computation information.

An apparatus, system and method for protecting the confidentiality and integrity of a secure object running on a computer system by protecting the memory pages owned by the secure object, including assigning a secure object an ID, labeling the memory pages owned by a secure object with the ID of the secure object, maintaining an Access Control Monitor (ACM) table for the memory pages on the system, controlling access to memory pages by monitoring load and store instructions and comparing information in the ACM table with the ID of the software that is executing these instructions; and limiting access to a memory page to the owner of the memory page.

System and method for supporting secure objects using a memory access control monitor

A service processor is provided that includes a processor, a memory coupled to the processor and having instructions for executing an operating system kernel having an integrity management subsystem, secure boot firmware, and a tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor. The secure boot firmware performs a secure boot operation to boot the operating system kernel of the service processor. The secure boot firmware records first measurements of code executed by the secure boot firmware when performing the boot operation, in one or more registers of the tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor. The operating system kernel enables the integrity management subsystem. The integrity management subsystem records second measurements of software executed by the operating system kernel, in the one or more registers of the tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor.

Service processor and system with secure booting and monitoring of service processor integrity

Method, apparatus, and computer program product are provided for merging multiple compute nodes with trusted platform modules utilizing provisioned node certificates. In some embodiments, compute nodes are connected to be available for merger into a single multi-node system. Each compute node includes a trusted platform module (TPM) provisioned with a platform certificate and a signed attestation key (AK) certificate and is accessible to firmware on the compute node. One compute node is assigned the role of master compute node (MCN), with the other compute node(s) each assigned the role of slave compute node (SCN). A quote request is sent from the MCN to each SCN under control of firmware on the MCN. In response to receiving the quote request, a quote response is sent from each respective SCN to the MCN under control of firmware on the respective SCN, wherein the quote response includes the AK certificate of the respective SCN's TPM.

Merging multiple compute nodes with trusted platform modules utilizing provisioned node certificates

Mechanisms for booting a service processor are provided. With these mechanisms, the service processor executes a secure boot operation of secure boot firmware to boot an operating system kernel of the service processor. The secure boot firmware records first measurements of code executed by the secure boot firmware when performing the boot operation, in one or more registers of a tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor of the service processor. The operating system kernel executing in the service processor enables an integrity management subsystem of the operating system kernel which records second measurements of software executed by the operating system kernel, in the one or more registers of the tamper-resistant secure trusted dedicated microprocessor.

Securely booting a service processor and monitoring service processor integrity

A method and computer system for implementing authentication protocol for merging multiple server nodes with trusted platform modules (TPMs) utilizing provisioned node certificates to support concurrent node add and node remove. Each of the multiple server nodes boots an instance of enablement level firmware and extended to a trusted platform module (TPM) on each node as the server nodes are powered up. A hardware secure channel is established between the server nodes for firmware message passing as part of physical configuration of the server nodes to be merged. A shared secret is securely exchanged via the hardware secure channel between the server nodes establishing an initial authentication value shared among all server nodes. All server nodes confirm common security configuration settings and exchange TPM log and platform configuration register (PCR) data to establish common history for future attestation requirements, enabling dynamic changing the server nodes and concurrently adding and removing nodes.

Implementing authentication protocol for merging multiple server nodes with trusted platform modules utilizing provisioned node certificates to support concurrent node add and remove

A method, apparatus, computer system, and computer program product for releasing secret information. A client on a computer system performing an attestation to a server on another computer system. The client receives an authorization that authorizes releasing the secret information. The client releases the secret information from a co-processor on the computer system using the authorization received from the server.

Releasing secret information in a computer system

Controlling execution of software is provided. In response to receiving an input to execute a software module on a data processing system, a set of measurements are performed on the software module performing a process to prepare the software module for execution on the data processing system. In response to determining that the set of measurements meets a predetermined criterion, an authorization to proceed with the process of preparing the software module for execution on the data processing system is requested from a trusted third party computer. In response to receiving the authorization to proceed with the process of preparing the software module for execution on the data processing system from the trusted third party computer, the software module is executed.

Controlling execution of software by combining secure boot and trusted boot features

According to one or more embodiments of the present invention, an example computer-implemented method for measuring concurrent updates in a security coprocessor includes using a first set of platform configuration registers of the security coprocessor to store and extend measurement of a code-load used during a boot sequence of a computing device. The method further includes using a second set of platform configuration registers of the security coprocessor to store and extend measurement of configuration parameters of the code-load used during the boot sequence. The method further includes using a third set of platform configuration registers of the security coprocessor to store and extend measurements of a concurrent update that changes the code-load that was used during the boot sequence.

Handling of remote attestation and sealing during concurrent update

A processor-implemented method for a secure processing environment for protecting sensitive information is provided. The processor-implemented method may include receiving encrypted data and routing the encrypted data to the secure processing environment. Then the encrypted data may be decrypted and fields containing sensitive information may be found. The method may also include obfuscating the sensitive information and returning, by the secure processing environment, the decrypted data and obfuscated data.

Secure processing environment for protecting sensitive information

Method, apparatus, and computer program product are provided for merging multiple compute nodes with trusted platform modules (TPMs) utilizing an authentication protocol with active TPM provisioning. In some embodiments, compute nodes are connected to be available for merger into a single multi-node system. Each compute node includes a TPM accessible to firmware on the node. One compute node is assigned the role of master compute node (MCN), with the other node(s) each assigned the role of slave compute node (SCN). Active TPM provisioning in each SCN produces key information that is sent to the MCN to enable use of a challenge/response exchange with each SCN. A quote request is sent from the MCN to each SCN. In response to receiving the quote request, a quote response is sent from each respective SCN to the MCN, wherein the quote response includes slave TPM content along with TPM logs and associated signatures.

Merging multiple compute nodes with trusted platform modules utilizing authentication protocol with active trusted platform module provisioning

A processor in a computer system, the processor including a mechanism supporting a Secure Object that comprises information that is protected so that other software on said computer system cannot access or undetectably tamper with said information, thereby protecting both a confidentiality and an integrity of the Secure Object information while making the Secure Object information available to the Secure Object itself during execution of the Secure Object. The mechanism includes a crypto mechanism that decrypts and integrity-checks Secure Object information as said Secure Object information moves into the computer system from an external storage system, and encrypts and updates an integrity value for Secure Object information as said Secure Object information moves out of the computer system to the external storage system, and a memory protection mechanism that protects the confidentiality and integrity of Secure Object information when that information is in the memory of the computer system.

Growing community of inventors

Norwalk, CT, United States of America

Kenneth Alan Goldman