Google Inc.

Keith Moyer

Uday R Savagaonkar

Chong Cai

Matthew Gingell

Sergey Karamov

Anna Sapek

Alexander Thomas Cope

Peter Gonda

Benjamin Seth Moore

Ariel Joseph Feldman

Marcel Catalin Rosu

Tiziano Santoro

Ivan Petrov

Kevin Yap

Ari Medvinksy

Catalin Daniel Sandu

Joseph Richey

Alex Wu

Jiankun Lu

A method includes obtaining a container associated with a first entity, the container executing a workload, the workload requiring access to private resources associated with a second entity. The method also includes obtaining encrypted resources including the private resources associated with the second entity. The method further includes generating a verifiable attestation. The method includes transmitting the verifiable attestation to an attestation service and, after transmitting the verifiable attestation, receiving, from an access policy verifier, a federated identity token. The method further includes generating a decrypt request including the federated identity token. The method includes transmitting, to a key management service, the decrypt request, and, after transmitting the decrypt request, receiving, from the key management service, a data encryption key. The method includes decrypting, using the data encryption key, the encrypted resources to access the private resources and providing the workload access to the private resources.

Untrusted multi-party compute system

A method for remote attestation includes establishing, using a cryptographic protocol, a communication session between a first computing device and a second computing device. The communication session includes communications encrypted by an ephemeral session key. The method includes receiving, at the first communication device via the communication session, from the second computing device, an attestation request requesting the first computing device to provide an attestation report. The method includes generating, by the first computing device, the attestation report based on the ephemeral session key and sending, using the communication session, the attestation report to the second computing device.

Remote attestation transport layer security and split trust encryption

A uniform enclave interface is provided for creating and operating enclaves across multiple different types of backends and system configurations. For instance, an enclave manager may be created in an untrusted environment of a host computing device. The enclave manager may include instructions for creating one or more enclaves. An enclave may be generated in memory of the host computing device using the enclave manager. One or more enclave clients of the enclave may be generated by the enclave manager such that the enclave clients configured to provide one or more entry points into the enclave. One or more trusted application instances may be created in the enclave.

Uniform enclave interface

A fork support is provided for duplicating an application running inside an enclave entity. In this regard, a request to duplicate an application running inside a first enclave may be received by one or more processors of a host computing device of the first enclave. A snapshot of the first enclave including the application may be generated. The snapshot may be encrypted with a snapshot key and copied to untrusted memory of the host. A second enclave may be generated. The snapshot key may be sent from the first enclave to the second enclave through a secure communication channel. The encrypted snapshot may be copied from the untrusted memory of the host into the second enclave. The encrypted snapshot may be decrypted inside the second enclave with the snapshot key.

Enclave fork support

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Kirkland, WA, United States of America

Keith Moyer