Cisco Technology, Inc.

Kavitha Kamarthy

Sheela Dixit Rowles

Warren Scott Wainner

Mohamed Khalid

Scott Roy Fluhrer

David A McGrew

Brian Eliot Weis

Dinesh Ranjit

Tanya Roosta

Rajiv Asati

Pratima Pramod Sethi

Haseeb Sarwar Niazi

Scott Thomas Fanning

Shree N Murthy

Aamer Saeed Akhter

Ciprian Pompiliu Popoviciu

Andrew Persaud

Thirunavukkarasu Suresh

Haseeb Naizi

Various techniques that allow group members to detect the use of stale encryption policy by other group members are disclosed. One method involves receiving a message from a first group member via a network. The message is received by a second group member. The method then detects that the first group member is not using a most recent policy update supplied by a key server, in response to information in the message. In response, a notification message can be sent from the second group member. The notification message indicates that at least one group member is not using the most recently policy update. The notification message can be sent to the key server or towards the first group member.

Detection of stale encryption policy by group members

A network device receives packets sent over a network from another network device. Each packet contains a source identifier that identifies a device that is the source of the packet, a destination identifier that identifies a device that is the intended destination of the packet, a sender identifier that identifies a network device that encrypted and sent the packet and a sequence number associated with the packet. The network device stores data indicating source identifier, destination identifier, sender identifier and sequence number for packets received over time. The network device rejects a newly received packet when it is determined that the sequence number of the newly received packet is less than the last sequence number stored for a matching packet flow (same source identifier, destination identifier and sender identifier) and falls outside of the counter-based window with respect to the last sequence number stored for the matching packet flow.

Sender-specific counter-based anti-replay for multicast traffic

A technique for dynamically creating and deleting groups to support secure group communication sessions is provided herein. A request for creation of a dynamic group that enables group members to participate in a secure group communication session is received by a network authentication device such as a key server. Creation of the dynamic group includes generating a lifetime attribute indicating when the dynamic group is to exist based on timing information provided in the request, along with security policies required for generating the keys, and generating a unique group ID associated with the dynamic group for distribution to the group members. The keys for the secure group communication session are supplied, along with security policies, in response to a request containing the unique group ID identifying the dynamic group. The dynamic group is deleted in response to determining from the lifetime attribute that the secure group communication session has expired.

Dynamic group creation for managed key servers

Techniques are provided for securely storing data files in, or retrieving data files from, cloud storage. A data file transmitted to cloud storage from a client in an enterprise computing environment is intercepted by at least one network device. Using security information received from a management server, the data file is converted into an encrypted object configured to remain encrypted while at rest in the cloud storage.

Security management in a group based environment

Techniques are provided for determining freshness of control messages in a network. At a first device that is to enter into a secure communication session with a second device, timestamp information and time window size information are sent to the second device in a control message during a first exchange between a first device and a second device. At the first device, timestamp information and time window size information are obtained from a control message received from the second device by the first device during the first exchange. At the first device, the freshness of a control message is tested based on the timestamp information of the control message during a second exchange and the time window size information received from the second device during the first exchange.

Protection of control plane traffic against replayed and delayed packet attack

A system and method directed to carrying out dynamic secured group communication is provided. The method includes: obtaining a first packet that includes a first header; forming a frame that includes the first header in encrypted form; combining the first header and the frame to form a second packet and forming a second header; encapsulating the second packet with the second header to form a third packet, and communicating the third packet into the second network from the second source node for termination to the second-destination node. The first header includes a first source address of a first source node of a first network, and a first destination address of a first destination node of the first network. The second header includes a second source address of a second source node of a second network, and a second destination address of a second destination node of the second network.

Method and system for dynamic secured group communication

In one embodiment, group member devices may be divided into at least one cluster, wherein each cluster includes a primary key server designated to synchronize with a master key server. Each cluster further includes at least one registration server configured to communicate with member devices in the group within the cluster and to synchronize with the primary key server.

Active-active hierarchical key servers

In one embodiment, a Home Agent receives a Mobile IP registration request from a group member, where the group member is a Mobile Node. The Home Agent generates a mobility binding for the group member that associates the group member with a care-of address, wherein the group member is a member of one or more groups. The Home Agent generates a Mobile IP registration reply, where the Mobile IP registration reply identifies one or more key servers. Each of the one or more key servers serves at least one of the one or more groups and is adapted for distributing group cryptography material to members of each group that is served by the corresponding key server. The Home Agent sends the Mobile IP registration reply to the group member, thereby enabling the group member to obtain cryptography material for at least one of the one or more groups from at least one of the one or more key servers to enable the group member to use the cryptography group material to securely communicate with other group members.

Distribution of group cryptography material in a mobile IP environment

Various systems and method are disclosed for automatically disseminating key server contact information in a network. For example, one method (e.g., performed by a discovery server) involves generating a discovery message that includes at least one list of one or more key servers and then sending that discovery message to one or more members of a key management protocol group. Each list of key servers can include contact information for one or more key servers and indicate the priority of each key server relative to other key servers within the list.

Dynamic key management server discovery

A system and method directed to carrying out dynamic secured group communication is provided. The method includes obtaining a first packet that includes a first header. The first header includes a first source address of a first source node of a first network, and a first destination address of a first destination node of the first network. The method also includes forming a frame that includes the first header in encrypted form, combining the first header and the frame to form a second packet, and forming a second header. This second header includes a second source address of a second source node of a second network, and a second destination address of a second destination node of the second network. The method further includes encapsulating the second packet with the second header to form a third packet, and communicating the third packet into the second network from the second source node for termination to the second-destination node.

Growing community of inventors

Milpitas, CA, United States of America

Kavitha Kamarthy